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Abstract
Recent advances in Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and low-power short-range
radios have enabled rapid development of wireless sensor networks. Future sensor networks
are anticipated to include hundreds or thousands of these devices in many applications, such
as capturing multimedia content for surveillance, structural health monitoring, tracking of
accidental chemical leaks, machine failures, earthquakes and intrusion detection.
With the increase of sensor applications, a number of challenging problems related to the
network protocol design have emerged - the most important ones relating to energy efficiency
and lifetime maximisation. Techniques devised for sensor networks should deal with a large
number of sensors distributed in the field. Wireless sensor nodes are deployed with limited
energy reserves, so the networks should operate with minimum energy overhead. In fact,
the network should take into account not only individual node’s energy efficiency but also
consider the global picture, because surviving nodes’ energy reserves in a failed network are
wasted energy.
This thesis examines a node organisation technique to deal with the above challenges.
The focus is on improving network lifetime via organising the nodes in a distributed and
energy efficient manner. The main goal is lowering wasted energy via energy balancing and
exploiting node redundancy in case of node failure.
A self-organising clustering method, Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC), is proposed first.
In EBC, network tasks (such as data aggregation and data forwarding) are shifted to high
energy neighbours to reduce the energy consumption of low energy nodes. To identify high
energy nodes, EBC classifies nodes based on residual energy levels. A node having energy
level above a predefined threshold is called Excess Energy Node (EEN), otherwise it is a
Necessary Energy Node (NEN). In EBC, nodes are grouped into clusters, with an EEN as
cluster head and its neighbours as cluster members. An EEN leaves the cluster head task,
also called gateway state, when it becomes a NEN to avoid early exhaustion.
2After showing how to extend network lifetime by energy balanced node organisation,
the effect of redundant node deployments on network lifetime is addressed. Redundant
nodes consume energy by performing unnecessary tasks and thus reduce network lifetime.
A distributed node redundancy identification method, Self-Calculated Redundancy Check
(SCRC), is proposed, which determines overlapping node sensing regions. Redundant nodes
deactivate themselves to prolong network lifetime.
A deactivated redundant node can be used as a replacement for a failed node. The
Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD) proposed in this thesis uses the data
packets exchanged between neighbours instead of explicit node probing. To validate failure
assumptions, a consensus mechanism is proposed among dynamically selected failure detec-
tors. These ensure that the method can identity failed nodes with minimum overhead and
without the need of any global time synchronisation.
Reusing redundant nodes to replace failed ones can further extend network lifetime. To
restore coverage for network holes caused by failed nodes, policies are given for re-activating
redundant nodes. Those policies select redundant nodes for re-activation according to dif-
ferent criteria, such as Directed Furthest (inactive) Node First (DFNF), Weighted Directed
Furthest (inactive) Node First (WDFNF) and Best Fit (inactive) Node (BFN). BFN finds
the best replacement by involving all the live neighbours of a failed node and thus exponen-
tially increases the energy overhead with the increase of the number of live neighbours. Both
DFNF and WDFNF use the first live node that has detected a failed neighbour to replace it
so the overhead is minimum.
Detailed analytical analysis and simulation of the proposed methods demonstrate that
by taking into account energy balancing, eliminating redundant tasks and replacing failed
nodes sensor network lifetime can significantly be improved.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Issues in Sensor Networks
The miniaturisation and increased communication capabilities of sensors has enabled their
ubiquitous and invisible deployment anywhere at anytime. For example, sensors can be
deployed in Mars to sense the atmosphere analysing and predicting the weather of Mars [Hong
et al., 2002]. A network of 4000 sensors deployed by Intel in a semiconductor manufacturing
plant performs predictive maintenance of machinery [Krishnamurthy et al., 2005]. Invention
of bio-sensors even allow those tiny devices to co-exist with haemoglobin to monitor every
physical change inside their human host [Schwiebert et al., 2001]. These deployments of
sensors require a collaborative network to accomplish a common task such as acquiring the
complete data set of a monitored phenomenon.
The exciting prospects of what sensor networks can bring come with numerous challenges.
An architectural overview of typical resource-limited sensors and sensor networks is given in
Chapter 2. These networks are likely to be composed of potentially hundreds or thousands
of tiny sensor nodes that are required to function autonomously, usually without access to
renewable energy resources [Ganesan et al., 2004].
The set of challenges in sensor networks are diverse, the fundamental ones relating to
node organisation, also referred as topology or network formation, are the main focus of this
thesis. The key challenges in sensor node organisations are as follows.
• Limited Energy Reserves and Energy Efficiency
A sensor node can only be equipped with limited energy reserves such as 1.5 Amp-
hours at 3 Volt [Crossbow, 2007b]. For this reason, good management of energy usage
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is extremely important in a sensor network. Sensors are usually unattended in the
field. In most cases, renewing energy is not feasible or even impossible. Techniques
that utilise energy reserves efficiently can keep sensor nodes operational for a relatively
long period of time without any human intervention.
Energy efficiency affects the operational lifetime of a sensor network. For example,
in a multi-hop sensor network, sensor nodes operate in multiple modes by perform-
ing sensing and data forwarding, and the exhaustion of some nodes can seriously de-
grade network performances. To prolong the operational lifetime of a sensor network,
energy efficiency must be considered in almost every aspect of network design. An
energy-efficient network protocol or algorithm can provide significant power savings in
individual sensor nodes and thus extend the operational lifetime of an entire network.
• Sensor Node Density and Scalability
Future networks are predicted to accommodate large numbers of sensors that operate
cooperatively to perform a sensing task. Network scalability is one of the main hurdles
to achieve this objective [ElBatt, 2004]. Scalability indicates the network’s ability
to handle growing amounts of work in a graceful manner and be readily enlarged.
Gupta and Kumar [2000] show that the one-to-one transport capacity of wireless ad-
hoc networks scales as O(
√
N) where N is the node density, but this scaling law does
not hold when node density grows to infinity. ElBatt ElBatt [2004] argues that this
conclusion may not be true for sensor networks where spatially close sensors may have
correlations among their sensing tasks.
• Unattended Nodes and Self-Organisation
Sensor networks usually operate unattended, and nodes often fail. In such a case,
nodes should dynamically organise themselves to cope with the changing environment.
A self-organising system is defined as “a system where a collection of units coordinate
with each other to form a system that adapts to achieve a goal more efficiently” [Collier
and Taylor, 2004]. Sensor nodes should be self-organising as the ad-hoc deployment
of these unattended nodes requires the system to form a covered and connected net-
work. For each sensor node, there is a defined cost (for example, energy consumption)
of sensing, processing and communicating, and for each sensor network there is a de-
fined task to accomplish (for example, tracking a moving object) with a defined set
of constraints, such as minimum tracking error and energy consumption. The node
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organisation technique also should take those constraints into account while forming
the network.
• Limited Resources and Control Overhead
A typical small sensor node has low end processors, small memory and limited energy
reserves. These require algorithms that can perform with minimum control overhead.
However, there are trade-offs between control packet overhead, energy efficiency and
algorithmic performances. For example, self-organisation is extremely important for a
rapidly changing network environment, but node re-organisation increases the control
overhead with the increase of node density. On the other hand, energy overhead (con-
sumed energy to re-organise) is directly proportional to the number of control packets
generated [Cordeiro and Agrawal, 2006], so high control overhead also implies energy
inefficiency.
• Limited Network Lifetime and Lifetime Maximisation
Due to limited resources, the lifetime of a sensor network is also limited. Ideally,
a network should become ineffective only when all the nodes become exhausted. In
reality, the lifetime of a sensor network is the minimum time up to which the network
is functionally effective. A network is functionally effective, if it can monitor the entire
sensor field and collect sensed data with a predefined Quality of Service (QoS). For
example, in some military applications, data should be delivered accurately within a
certain period of time, otherwise the data is useless. For this reason, network lifetime
or network effectiveness depends on the required degree of coverage and connectivity
by applications.
Network lifetime maximisation problem has been mostly studied from the indirect
perspective of energy conservation [Dong, 2005]. However, energy conservation is not
the same problem as network lifetime maximisation. Energy efficient, low cost network
protocols or algorithms can extend node lifetime, but network lifetime depends on more
than an individual node’s energy conservation because a network can still sense and
collect data despite a node failure. The impact of individual node energy conservation
on network lifetime cannot be ignored, but a network can extend its lifetime more by
best utilising limited node resources.
In order to form sensor networks that can cope with the numerous future applications,
the challenges described above must be addressed. While some of these challenges can be
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dealt with through technological improvements, not all of them can be solved this way. For
example, while processor speed and memory technologies have achieved significant improve-
ments, battery life improves on average only 5 to 10% each year [Starner, 2003]. Therefore,
instead of relying on the improvement of battery lifetime to solve the limited energy problem
for sensor nodes, the focus should be on designing network protocols that are more energy
efficient and lifetime maximising. Similarly, sensor nodes have limited resources so it is im-
portant to design protocols that have low control overhead and make efficient use of available
resources.
1.2 Research Questions
Node organisation has been a subject of extensive study in typical distributed systems
[Stallings, 2007; Coulouris et al., 2005; Sinha, 1997]. These works were based on the assump-
tion that nodes such as PCs and servers have limitless resources and are strongly connected
in a static network topology. This assumption however does not hold where sensor nodes
have strict resource constraints and are vulnerable. A sensor network may need to change
its topology with the change of environment, such as weather, or with the change of targeted
phenomenon, such as a moving object.
This thesis proposes a novel network formation technique for sensor networks which ac-
commodates energy constraints, changing environments and limited processing and memory
capabilities. The objective is to form the network in such a way that the network will be
functional for an extended period of time, with given sensor node limitations. In particular,
the following main research questions are pursued.
1. What is a sensor node organisation technique that can extend network operational
lifetime while accommodating large number of deployed nodes? Existing node organ-
isation techniques have been studied in the context of sensor networks [Heinzelman
et al., 2002; Cerpa and Estrin, 2004; Sohrabi et al., 2004]. It has been found that
these techniques have limits in extending lifetime because of their less efficient network
energy management.
2. To be able to cover the entire sensor field, redundant node deployment is common.
What is the effect of redundant node deployment on network operational lifetime?
Can we organise nodes by temporarily deactivating redundant nodes? While some
redundant node elimination techniques have been proposed [Tian and Georganas, 2005;
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Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005; Xing et al., 2005], they cannot identify the maximum
possible redundant node set due to their imprecise redundancy calculation. In some
cases they do not even consider control overhead, and so waste precious energy.
3. Sensor nodes are vulnerable in nature because they can often fail due to various rea-
sons including exhaustion of energy or external hindrances. To extend the network
operational lifetime further, can we reuse deactivated redundant nodes to replace failed
nodes? Techniques for identifying failed nodes have been studied widely in the context
of traditional distributed networks [Zhuang et al., 2005; Ranganathan et al., 2001; Tai
et al., 2004]. These techniques cannot be used in sensor networks because they do not
consider communication overhead and cannot deal with the dynamic restructuring of
sensor nodes.
4. Which is the best replacement of a failed node that can maintain network effectiveness
the longest? Choosing a good replacement node is critical because there is a trade-off
between finding the best replacement nodes and overhead. What is the ideal policy
that can identify the best failed node replacement from already deactivated neighbours
and can extend the network operational lifetime?
1.3 Research Contributions
In answering the above research questions, our research contribution to the node organisation
in a sensor network is summarised as follows.
Formation of Energy Balanced Clusters
The first contribution is the development of an energy balanced network formation technique
that can organise nodes with a low control overhead and can maximise node and network
operational lifetimes. In this technique, called Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC), nodes
deterministically organise themselves into clusters based on their capabilities such as residual
energy levels, so that the network can dynamically restructure when the environment changes.
This enables the best utilisation of limited energy reserves and protects nodes from being
exhausted unexpectedly. Thus, a network remains effective for an extended period of time by
reducing wastage of energy reserves. The algorithm analysis shows that the computational
complexity and energy overhead are linear for EBC.
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Detailed analytical models of EBC and various existing node organisation techniques have
been developed for better understanding of their performance from a theoretical perspective.
These models provide a simple way to compare the lower bound of network lifetime of existing
techniques. The analytical result shows that this lower bound when using EBC is at least
around 15% higher than that of the existing techniques.
Extensive simulation has been performed to study the performance of EBC for three
different lifetime definitions - when first node becomes exhausted, when first network partition
occurred and when half of the deployed nodes become exhausted. Results show that compared
to existing node organisation techniques, EBC extends the network lifetime by at least 10%
more for various lifetime definitions. EBC maximises the lifetime because of its energy
balancing measures, as the results show that the standard deviation of residual energy levels
is at least 20% less than that of the existing techniques.
Elimination of Redundant Nodes
The second contribution is a redundant node identification and deactivation scheme that re-
duces the impact of excess energy consumption by redundant nodes on network operational
lifetime. The scheme, called Self-Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC), improves the ac-
curacy of node redundancy calculation by utilising the local information of sensor field and
deployed nodes. Using local information, a sensor field is divided up by a sensing grid and a
sensor node’s sensing region becomes a subset of the sensing points. Each of the nodes then
calculates redundancy by checking the coverage degree of its sensing region. This maximises
the set of deactivated redundant nodes, and thus maximises network operational lifetime.
Algorithm analysis shows that the time, message and space complexity of SCRC is linearly
proportional to the number of neighbours of a node. The simulation study shows that com-
pared to existing redundant node identification techniques, SCRC can identify 5 to 10% more
redundant nodes for various node distribution methods.
A detailed analytical study of expected number of redundant nodes under uniformly ran-
dom and Poisson node distributions have also been conducted. The results obtained demon-
strate the potentially redundant node’s behaviour under those node distribution models. The
simulation results show that SCRC is consistent with the analytical results.
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Detection of Failed Sensor Nodes Asynchronously
The third contribution is the proposal of an asynchronous failed node detection mechanism
which supports sensor nodes monitoring neighbouring nodes with low control overheads.
The mechanism, called Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD), differs from
traditional distributed failure detection techniques by addressing the vulnerability of a failure
detector in sensor networks due to limited resources. It highlights the importance of dynamic
selection of failure detectors with the change of environments. Instead of periodic probing,
AFSD uses data packets exchanged between nodes to predict a failed node and the prediction
is verified using a consensus mechanism. The use of data packets reduces control overhead
to an acceptable level for a resource limited sensor node.
A theoretical study proves that AFSD is complete by detecting all failed nodes and is
accurate by avoiding false positives. Complexity analysis shows that the control, energy, and
time overhead of AFSD are linearly proportional to the number of neighbours and gateways.
The experimental result shows that AFSD is consistent with the analytical result obtained
from the complexity analysis, and that it is at least three times more energy efficient than
any of the existing methods. The result also shows that the average time to detect an AFSD
failed node is at least as good as other existing methods when the packet generation rate is
high.
Replacing Failed Nodes with Redundant Nodes
The final contribution is the introduction of a new concept, called policy for failed node
replacement, and the proposal of three specific failed node replacement policies to improve
network operational lifetime. Failed node replacement is considered as the repairing of net-
work holes created by failed nodes. Existing hole repairing techniques are analysed, and it is
shown that none of them utilises the existing node deployment, instead, they use either mo-
bile robots or additional node redeployments. The proposed failed node replacement policies
take the advantages of redundant node deployment and replaces failed nodes with those.
In the first proposed policy, called Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF), an active node
that encountered a failed neighbour and a network hole, re-activates an inactive neighbour to
repair the hole. The inactive neighbour is selected based on its location, distance and the hole
direction. The second policy, called Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF), is an
extension of the first policy where an active node, having detected a failed node first, assigns
a weight to each of its inactive neighbours based on its direction and distance with respect
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to the hole. By considering both distance and direction, WDFNF can select a pseudo ideal
replacement for a failed node. Finally, Best Fit Node (BFN) policy is proposed to identify
the appropriate replacement node with a higher control and energy overhead. In BFN, all
the active nodes encountering a coverage hole participate in the replacement procedure. As
a result, BFN can select an ideal replacement node by considering all inactive neighbours of
a failed node.
Analytical study of failed node replacement policies showed that in the best case scenario,
the energy and control overhead of DFNF and WDFNF are constant, and it is in the quadratic
order of node density for BFN. In the worst case, the overhead increases linearly in the order
of node density for DFNF and WDFNF, and control overhead increases in the cubic order
for BFN.
Extensive simulations of DFNF, WDFNF and BFN have been conducted to evaluate their
performance. The policies tested include network lifetime, Quality of Coverage (QoC) and
redundant node usage. Test results show that DFNF and WDFNF can maintain the same
performance as BFN when the network is extremely dense.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.
• Chapter 2 provides background information related to this thesis. Sensors, sensor
networks and sensor network applications are discussed, together with a description of
the network model used in the remainder of this thesis.
• Chapter 3 addresses the problem of how to efficiently organise nodes for sensor net-
works. Existing node organisation techniques are studied analytically and evaluated
through simulation. Furthermore, a low cost and network lifetime maximising cluster-
ing mechanism is proposed where network energy consumption is balanced to reduce
the wasted energy after a network fails.
• The effects of redundant node deployment on network lifetime are studied in Chapter 4.
Related work on redundant node identification and deactivation is presented. This is
followed by the proposal of a low overhead and accurate node redundancy calculation
scheme, SCRC, that reduces the impact of redundant energy consumption on network
lifetime. The proposed method is evaluated and compared to existing redundancy
identification approaches through simulation.
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• Chapter 5 addresses the issue of node failure for sensor networks. The use of data pack-
ets exchanged between nodes to assist failure detectors in making failed node detec-
tion decisions is investigated. Existing synchronous and asynchronous failure detection
schemes are described. The AFSD method is also proposed in this chapter together
with evaluations and discussions.
• Policies to replace failed nodes are introduced in Chapter 6 to exploit redundant node
deployments. The aim of those policies is to improve network effectiveness in case of
active node failures. Three failed node replacement policies are proposed, and their
performance is evaluated against each other analytically and experimentally.
• Finally, this thesis concludes in Chapter 7 where the research aim and achievements
are summarised and possible directions for future research are discussed.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides the background for the work presented in this thesis. In the following,
sensors and sensor networks are described with network design criteria. This is followed by
a survey on sensor network applications and future trends. Finally, the network model this
thesis is based upon is described.
2.1 Sensors
A Sensor is a device that stimulates to an input (for example, temperature, pressure, light)
and produces a functionally related output usually in a user understandable form (for exam-
ple, electrical or optical signal). Sensors are classified according to the type of phenomenon
they detect, such as thermal, electromagnetic, mechanical, optical, chemical or acoustic sen-
sors.
Recent advances in wireless communications and electronics have enabled low-cost, low-
power, multi-functional sensors that are small in size and able to communicate across short
distances [Akyildiz et al., 2002]. It is assumed that sensor devices, sometimes called sensor
nodes, are equipped with small form-factor processors, limited storage capacity, wireless
communication capabilities (transceiver/radio) and sensors [Tubaishat and Madria, 2003].
Some of the well known sensor nodes are IMote [Crossbow, 2007a], Crossbow Mica [Crossbow,
2007b] and Telos [Polastre et al., 2005]. An IMote sensor node with its comparative size
is shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows an architectural overview of a sensor node and
important components of a sensor node are described below.
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Figure 2.1: An IMote Sensor Node from Intel Research [Intel Corporation, 2007].
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Figure 2.2: Architectural Overview of a Sensor Node.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Existing Sensor Nodes
Platform Year Micro-controller Memory References
(ROM,RAM)
Mica 2002 ATMEL AtMega128 128 KB, 4 KB [Crossbow, 2007b]
Telos 2004 TI MSP430 60 KB, 10 KB [Polastre et al., 2005]
IMote2 2006 Intel PXA271 256 KB, 32 KB [Crossbow, 2007a]
Processor and Memory
The miniaturisation of sensor nodes requires special processors which are small in size and
have limited processing capability. Examples of such processors with full operating system
(for example, TinyOS [University of California, Berkeley, 2007]) support include ATMEL At-
Mega128L, AT90LS8535, Intel PXA271 and Texas Instruments MSP430 [Lynch and OReilly,
2005]. These processors use advanced low power RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer)
architecture1. An important feature of these micro-controllers is power saving capability. For
example, MSP430 has six different power modes, ranging from fully active to fully powered
down. The power saving mode helps to design network protocols to extend node and network
lifetimes by keeping unnecessary nodes in an inactive state.
Size and cost constraints on sensor nodes result in corresponding constraints on memory
as well. Sensor nodes have a very simple memory architecture. All primary memory is
accessible to all services running on a sensor node via a single address space. Most of
these architectures do not have features such as memory management units (MMUs) or
privileged mode execution to isolate program data and code. For this reason, applications
and algorithms for sensor nodes need to be memory-conscious. Micro-controllers and memory
sizes of some existing sensor nodes are given in Table 2.1.
Operating Systems
A sensor node needs a small, highly portable, multitasking operating system developed for
use on a resource-constrained networked system. Some of the existing sensor node operating
1RISC architecture uses an instruction set reduced both in size and complexity of addressing modes, in
order to enable efficient implementation of compilers with greater instruction level parallelism [Patterson and
Hennessy, 1998].
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Figure 2.3: Sensing Range, Transmission Range and Sensing Region of a Sensor Node.
systems are TinyOS [University of California, Berkeley, 2007], SOS [University of California,
Los Angeles, 2007] and Contiki [Dunkels et al., 2004]. Among them TinyOS is more popular
in the sensor network research community [Hellerstein et al., 2003].
TinyOS supports complex, concurrent programs with very low memory requirements for
example, many applications fit within 16KB of memory, and the core OS is 400 bytes [Levis
et al., 2005]. This flexible operating system built from a set of reusable components that are
assembled into an application-specific system. Levis et al. [2005] show that TinyOS supports
an event-driven concurrency model, asynchronous events, and deferred computation, called
tasks. In addition, TinyOS provides a list of services for applications and also provides
facilities for creating new services for sensor networks. Such facilities help researchers to
design and build various sensor network related protocols or algorithms.
Sensing Range
The ability to sense any arbitrary region within the sensor field is a fundamental requirement
of a sensor node. Sensor devices have a limited sensing coverage area that depends on the
sensitivity of the sensing instrumentation such as light range [Miluzzo et al., 2006].
Most of the existing work considers only two dimensional sensing and assumes that the
sensing range of a sensor node is uniform in all directions, so the sensing or coverage region
is a circle (disk) of radius equivalent to the sensing range [Zhou et al., 2004; Xing et al.,
2005]. The disk model assumes that if an event happens at a distance less than or equal to
the sensing range from the sensor location, that event will be detected. On the other hand,
an event occurring at a distance greater than the sensing range cannot be detected at all.
This assumption also makes network coverage maintenance protocols less complex to design
and analyse [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2004; Kumar et al., 2004].
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In this thesis, it is assumed that a sensor node has a fixed sensing range and the sensing
coverage of a sensor node is uniform in all directions. This simplification allow to assume
that the sensing region of a sensor node is a circle where the radius of the circle is the sensing
range of the sensor node as shown in Figure 2.3.
Transmission Range
Sensor nodes are deployed in a field and forward their sensed data using a transceiver.
Transmission range of a sensor node depends on the energy required to transmit a data
packet within a certain distance. Dai and Wu [2005] show that the minimum transmission
power required to sustain a link between nodes i and j depends on the distance of i and j.
If r is the distance between nodes i and j, the required transmission power can be modelled
as follows.
Pij = r
α (2.1)
Where α is between 2 and 4. For this reason, an optimum transmission range is identified
to minimise the transmission power [Dai and Wu, 2005]. Like sensing range, it is assumed in
this thesis that the transmission is of uniform strength in all directions, and the transmission
range of a sensor node is always greater than or equal to its sensing range.
Energy Reserves and Consumption
Due to the size constraints, sensor nodes have limited energy reserves. Existing sensor
nodes such as Mica2 uses AA batteries of about 1.5 Amp-hours (Ah) at 3V [Crossbow,
2007b]. Trends in miniaturisation suggest that the drops of sensor and battery sizes are
not proportional. Battery sizes are not dropping at the same rate as sensor sizes, so node
energy reserve is an important issue. For example, Lynch and OReilly [2005] show that a
standard 3V CR2450 lithium coin cell has an energy density of 240mAh/cm3, and a sensing
application requiring 4mAh per day with a twelve month deployment would require 6.1cm3
of battery. In one test deployment of Mica2 motes, Mainwaring et al. [2002] show that an
environmental monitoring application had a daily energy requirement of 8.14mAh.
Sensor nodes consume different amounts of energy at different stages. For example, on av-
erage a Mica2 sensor draws 8mA in active mode and >15µA in sleep mode [Crossbow, 2007b].
The power consumption of receiving and transmitting data packets are also different such
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Various Node Energy Consumptions [Polastre et al., 2005]
Platform Active Mode Sleep Mode Transmit Receive
Mica2 75mW 33µW 42mW 29mW
Telos 3mW 15µW 38mW 35mW
Mote2 50mW 20µW 4317nJ/bit 2028nJ/bit
Sink/
Base
Sensor Nodes Sensor Field
Figure 2.4: Sensor Nodes Distributed in a Sensor Field.
as a UC Mote consumes 2028nJ/bit while receiving and 4317nJ/bit while transmitting [Hill
et al., 2000]. Power consumptions of various sensor nodes are given in Table 2.2.
2.2 Sensor Networks
A sensor network is usually a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed sensor nodes
to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions such as temperature, sound,
vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants at different locations [Culler et al., 2004]. A sensor
network composed of a large number of sensor nodes that are densely deployed in the sensor
field is shown in Figure 2.4. Sensors usually communicate with each other using a multi-hop
data communication approach. The routing of data ends at special nodes called sinks or
base stations that are special type of machines with enhanced capabilities over simple sensor
nodes since they do complex data aggregation.
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2.2.1 Network Design Criteria
Sensor networks have a wide variety of applications in systems with vastly differing require-
ments and characteristics. Important network design criteria that relates to our research are
discussed below.
Random Vs. Predetermined Node Deployment
The deployment of sensor nodes in the sensor field may be performed in several ways. Nodes
may be deployed at random (for example, by dropping them from high above) or at predeter-
mined positions. Deployment may be a one-time activity or may also be a continuous process,
with more nodes being deployed when the network is already active [Romer and Mattern,
2004]. In this thesis, it is assumed that nodes will be deployed in such environments (for
example, in a disaster area or even in a battle field) where node deployment location may
not be known a priori, so the node deployment is random and one-time. However, protocols
that are proposed are also applicable to a network with predetermined and continuous node
deployment.
Optimum Vs. Redundant Node Deployment
Sensor networks can be classified as fixed/traditional or ad-hoc networks. In a fixed sensor
network, node deployment locations are known and using the location information, an opti-
mum number of nodes can be deployed. In an ad-hoc sensor network, sensor location is not
known a priori so random sensor deployment methods are used [Megerian and Potkonjak,
2002]. This is required when individual node placement is infeasible, such as battlefield or
disaster areas. To compensate the lack of exact positioning, nodes are redundantly deployed
in such networks. In this research, it is assumed that the node placement is not known a
priori, so random and redundant node deployment is used.
Static Vs. Mobile Network
Sensor networks can be static or mobile according to the movability of deployed nodes.
Sensor nodes may be attached to or carried by mobile entities, and sensor nodes may possess
automotive capabilities. Romer and Mattern [2004] also show that node mobility can result
from environmental influences such as wind or water. However, in this thesis, nodes are
assumed to be static and network protocols for mobile sensor networks are left for future
work.
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Homogeneous Vs. Heterogeneous Network
Sensor networks can be homogeneous (that is, all the sensor nodes are architecturally iden-
tical) or heterogeneous (that is, nodes can be architecturally different) [Duarte-Melo and
Mingyan, 2002]. For simplicity, a homogeneous sensor network is considered to consist of
nodes that are mostly identical from hardware and software points of view. However, each
node has a separate and unique ID to distinguish from others. In chapter 4, to identify the ef-
fect of sensing range on node redundancy, sensing range is varied with respect to transmission
range.
Partial Vs. Complete Network Coverage
Network coverage measures the degree of coverage over the area of interest by sensor nodes
[Dhillon and Chakrabarty, 2003]. Sometimes only parts of the area of interest are covered by
the sensor nodes (for example, in a wild-life monitoring network). In other cases, the area
of interest is completely covered by sensors (for example, in a security surveillance system).
Redundant coverage may also be needed, that is multiple sensors cover the same physical
location depending on the application. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this thesis a
network is called effective if it can provide complete network coverage.
Intermittent Vs. Complete Network Connectivity
If any two sensor nodes in the network can communicate with each other (possibly via multi-
hop communications), the network is connected [Ghosh and Das, 2006]. In a sensor network,
nodes can be scheduled to be inactive most of the time and participate in data routing
occasionally - this is intermittent connectivity. Nodes in a network may also be connected all
the time, which is complete network connectivity. Some of the applications may need more
than complete connectivity and require redundant connectivity between nodes. In this thesis,
a network is considered effective if it can provide (redundant or non-redundant) complete
network connectivity.
2.2.2 Applications
Wireless sensor networks enable a paradigm shift in the science of monitoring, and constitute
the foundation of a broad range of applications related to security, surveillance, military,
medical, and environmental monitoring. They can significantly improve the accuracy and
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density of scientific measurements of physical phenomena because large numbers of sensors
can directly be deployed where experiments are taking place [Estrin et al., 1999]. Some
existing real life applications of sensor networks are given below.
Military Applications
Sensor network research was initially driven by military applications, such as battle-field
surveillance and enemy tracking. One of the earliest applications of such networks was for
anti-submarine warfare, like the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) used during the cold
war. SOSUS is now used by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of USA for monitoring events in the ocean such as seismic and animal activity, and
named as Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) [Nishimura and Dennis, 1994].
During the cold war, networks of air defence radars were also developed and deployed
to defend the continental United States and Canada. This air defence system has evolved
over the years to include aerostats as sensors and Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) planes, and is also used for drug interdiction [Chong and Kumar, 2003].
Habitat Monitoring
Cerpa et al. [2001] describe habitat monitoring as a driver application for wireless sensor
networks, and they propose a tiered architecture for such applications for monitoring moving
phenomenon. One of the example of habitat monitoring is Great Duck Island (GDI) system.
In August 2002, researchers from UCB/Intel Research Laboratory deployed a Mote-based
tiered sensor network on Great Duck Island, Maine, to monitor the behaviour of storm
petrel [Mainwaring et al., 2002]. Other than that, Remote Ecological Micro-Sensor Network
(REMSN) [Biagioni and Bridges, 2002] is a research project at the University of Hawaii that
built a wireless network of environmental sensors to investigate why endangered species of
plants will grow in one area but not in neighbouring areas.
Wireless sensor networks help farmers in assessing the requirements for crop and stock
management by regularly monitoring animal behaviour and environmental conditions [Corke
et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2006]. Scientists are using mobile sensors on cows to study their
behaviour where sensors are linked by radio to another network monitoring the local field
environment [Butler et al., 2004].
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Environment Monitoring
Environment monitoring networks span large geographic areas to monitor and forecast phys-
ical processes such as environmental pollution, flooding etc. CORIE (COlumbia RIEver)
[Steere et al., 2000] is an example of such applications, where a number of stationary sensor
nodes are deployed across the Columbia river estuary and a mobile sensor station collects
information from them. Another example of environment monitoring is the Automated Lo-
cal Evaluation in Real-Time (ALERT). The network was developed by the national weather
service of USA in the 1970’s, and provide important real-time rainfall and water level infor-
mation to evaluate the possibility of potential flooding [ALERT, 2007]. Currently ALERT is
deployed across most of the western United States, and it is heavily used for flood alarming
in California and Arizona.
For the Queensland Centre for Native Floriculture, CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation) developed a wireless sensor network that provides
horticulturalists with a better understanding of the environment inside a greenhouse [CSIRO,
2007], and knowledge about what can grow in specific climates.
Medical Applications
Applications in health monitoring include tele-monitoring of human physiological data, track-
ing and monitoring of doctors and patients inside a hospital etc. An interesting project
of medical sensor networks is the Smart Sensors and Integrated Micro-systems (SSIM)
[Schwiebert et al., 2001] where retina prosthesis chips that consisting of 100 micro-sensors
are built and implanted within a human eye. Those sensors collaborate with each other
allowing patients with no vision or limited vision to see at an acceptable level. The idea of
embedding wireless biomedical sensors inside human body is promising and applications for
such a technique include general health monitoring and cancer detectors.
In-home Applications
The Smart Kindergarten [Srivastava et al., 2001], a sensor-based wireless network for early
childhood education envisioned that interaction-based instruction method will soon replace
the traditional stimulus-responses based methods.
The smart home concept is another example of a real-life in-home sensor network. In
Smart Home Vacuum (SHV), a goal driven task planning (GDTP) engine is developed [Chen
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et al., 2006]. The engine is implemented in wireless vacuum systems to maximise cleaning
efficiency.
2.2.3 Future Applications
Recent advances in Micro-Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and wireless communication
technology produced inexpensive miniaturised sensor nodes. This promises future applica-
tions of large scale, widely distributed sensor networks. The ad-hoc and unattended nature of
sensor networks makes it even more attractive for military and other risk-associated applica-
tions. Some of the potential future applications include - Space exploration [Hong et al., 2001],
Unmanned aerial vehicles [Sinopoli et al., 2003], Robotic landmine detection [Santana et al.,
2005], Border surveillance [Chong and Kumar, 2003], Traffic control [Chong and Kumar,
2003], Bushfire monitoring and response [Mendis et al., 2006], Wearable network [Lorincz
et al., 2007], Home automation [Oh et al., 2005] etc.
2.3 The Network Assumptions
In this section, the network assumptions used in this thesis are described. All subsequent
discussions are based upon the following.
A sensor network comprises a specific region of interest and a set of sensor nodes to
monitor that region. To collect data from sensors, another set of special nodes, called sinks
or base stations, are deployed. Based on sensing and transmission ranges, nodes form an
ad-hoc network. Each of these important entities are described below.
• Sensor field: Sensor nodes are deployed in a region of interest, called sensor field.
A sensor field is represented by a 2D grid, whose dimension is X × Y as shown in
Figure 2.5. Let m = X × Y , so there are m grid points in the sensor field. Let M =
{m1,m2 . . . ,mm} be the set containing all the grid points and each of the points are
represented by a location vector, mk = (xk, yk), where xk and yk are the coordinates
for grid point mk.
• Sensor node: Sensors, termed sensor nodes or nodes, are randomly distributed in
the sensor field. Each sensor node has sensing capability as well as computing and
communication capabilities to execute protocols and exchange messages. S is used to
denote the set of sensor nodes deployed in the sensor field, where all the sensor nodes
are homogeneous and have unique IDs. A node with id k is referred to as sk (sk ∈ S).
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Figure 2.5: A Sensing Grid with Two Sinks.
Each sensor node is aware of its physical location information either through GPS or
through location discovery algorithms (for example, [Hu and Evans, 2004]). Notation
sk = (xk, yk) is used, where xk and yk are the coordinates for sensor node sk.
• Sensing and Transmission Range: Since sensor nodes are homogeneous, all nodes
are equipped with the same type of sensing and communication hardware. They have
the same sensing range (ts) and transmission or communication range (tr).
• Sensing region: A node can sense a particular region of the sensor field within its
sensing range. As is mentioned earlier, the sensing range of a sensor node is assumed
to be uniform in all directions, so the sensing region of a node is circular.
• Neighbour nodes: Nodes within the transmission range of each other are called
neighbours. As transmission ranges are fixed, each sensor node has a fixed set of
neighbours. Communication between neighbouring nodes is bidirectional.
• Sink/Base stations: Sink or base stations are special nodes in the field to collect data
from sensor nodes. Unlike sensor nodes, these have ample resources, such as sufficient
memory capacity, processing power and unlimited energy supply. A sensor network can
be a single-sink or multi-sink network.
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• Network topology: Sensor network topology can be represented as a graph where
nodes are sensors or sinks and edges are communication links. In such a network, each
link represents a one-hop connection, and the neighbours are those within the one-hop
communication distance of each other.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the typical sensor node architecture used in this thesis was described, and
specific limitations of sensor networks were explained. The rest of the thesis addresses these
limitations, and proposes solutions to overcome or mitigate those. Existing and future pos-
sible sensor network applications that put the work in this thesis into context have also been
described.
Chapter 3
Energy Balanced Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
Sensor networks need to be able to dynamically restructure their network backbone and
data paths in response to changing network conditions [Santi, 2005]. This is particularly
important for energy efficiency because nodes have limited energy supply. Nodes are generally
unattended, so that the energy supply is irreplaceable [Ganesan et al., 2004]. For these
reasons, node organisation techniques should aim to prolong node lifetime. Mechanisms to
best improve network lifetime must take into account more than individual nodes’ energy
consumption, since energy remaining after the network fails is wasted energy. Networks with
no remaining energy are better than networks with some wasted energy.
If a node’s battery is depleted, this will affect neighbours who rely on it for connection to
the rest of the network. Node organisation techniques should consider overall network energy
consumption and should delay node exhaustion. Ideally all nodes should become exhausted
at the same time however, in reality, this is impossible due to the different node position and
uneven traffic in the network. A node that is close to a base station has to perform more
tasks than the nodes at the boundary region as it has to relay data from other nodes to the
base stations.
Existing node organisation approaches emphasise network quality of services by providing
complete coverage and connectivity. For example, by sharing all possible network information
such as node coordinates, states and energy levels a network is formed providing complete
coverage and connectivity [Heinzelman et al., 1999]. This requires exchanging a considerable
amount of control information which is impracticable in a resource limited network. To reduce
the information exchanged, a small group of nodes, called clusters, can be formed [Heinzelman
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et al., 2002; Taek et al., 2003], however periodic exchange of network related information even
within a small group may be energy inefficient. Instead of continuous network monitoring,
sensor networks can be formed adaptively where nodes are only activated when network
quality degrades [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]. These approaches cannot extend the network
lifetime due to lack of energy conserve measures. For example, in such approaches, once a
node is made active it remains active until it depletes its energy reserves [Cerpa and Estrin,
2004].
If a sensor network becomes less effective because of the exhaustion of important nodes,
the quality of the network is degraded. To protect nodes from early exhaustion, energy
consumption across the network should be even. Even energy consumption will protect
nodes from exhaustion due to running out of energy, while their neighbours still have enough
energy. The energy consumption of a node is directly proportional to the tasks performed by
that node. It is preferred to share tasks among nodes such that energy usage is balanced. The
task sharing mechanism itself needs to be efficient and should consider the sensing area and
network conditions. That is, a dynamic network control protocol enabling the distribution
of tasks according to current node capabilities is required.
This chapter proposes a method of managing self-configuring nodes such that the network
operational lifetime is maximised, called Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC). Small groups
of nodes are organised into clusters to share their energy levels. Within a cluster, nodes are
organised as gateway and non-gateway nodes, where a gateway node can communicate with
any other nodes (gateways or non-gateways) but a non-gateway can only communicate with
gateways. Clusters are formed around gateway nodes, and neighbours of such a node become
members of that cluster. Gateway nodes collect data from cluster members and forward to
base stations. To maintain the network connectivity, clusters are overlapped so a cluster may
contain multiple gateway nodes. To identify a node capability for becoming a gateway, EBC
classifies nodes according to their residual energy levels. A node is considered eligible to be
a gateway if it has sufficient energy to relay the others’ data. When the residual energy of
a gateway drops below a predefined level it voluntarily gives up the gateway job and thus
extending its lifetime. This helps preserve network coverage and connectivity by preventing
nodes from early exhaustion.
An analytical and experimental evaluation was performed to compare EBC with existing
techniques such as All-Active [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002], LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002]
and ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]. The analytical result shows that the lower bound of
a node lifetime using EBC is at least around 15% higher than that of the existing techniques.
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Since the energy balancing mechanism of EBC protects nodes from early exhaustion, this
extends node lifetime. Extensive simulation confirmed that EBC has at least 20% more
evenly distributed energy than networks using existing schemes. Better energy balancing
was achieved because unlike existing techniques, EBC balances tasks among nodes. Energy
balancing has a significant effect on network lifetime, which is demonstrated using three
metrics, 1) the time taken for the first node to deplete its battery, 2) the time taken for the
first network partition to occur, and 3) the time taken for 50% of deployed nodes to exhaust
their energy supply. In all three cases, EBC outperformed existing techniques, and our result
shows that EBC network lifetime is extended by at least 40% when measuring time for “first
node to die” and by at least 10% when other two lifetime metrics were considered.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Existing node organisation and node
characterisation schemes are described in section 3.2. Section 3.3 provides details of the
proposed energy based node classification technique. The proposed clustering technique is
described in section 3.4. An analytical framework for identifying the lower bound of a node
lifetime under various techniques is given in section 3.5. A detailed analytical comparison
of the existing and proposed schemes is also presented in section 3.5. This is followed by
simulation results and performance evaluation in section 3.6. Finally, comparative results
are discussed and the conclusion is drawn in sections 3.7 and 3.8 respectively.
3.2 Related Work
Relevant solutions for topology control and network related issues in sensor networks are
discussed in this section. A topology refers to either the shape of a network or a network
layout, how different nodes are connected and how they communicate with each other [Sub-
ramanian and Katz, 2000]. The discussion starts with the most basic approach for sensor
node organisation, and then improvements are demonstrated.
Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation (SPIN)
One basic approach to node organisation is collecting and sharing all network related infor-
mation (such as node status and energy levels) to construct an overall view of the network.
Such an approach is Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation (SPIN) [Heinzelman
et al., 1999]. The method uses high-level data descriptors, called meta-data, to eliminate
redundant network information. Based on meta-data contents, SPIN nodes organise them-
selves to provide the best coverage and connectivity. The experimental result shows that
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a SPIN network can deliver 60% more data than networks using conventional approaches
such as flooding [Heinzelman et al., 1999]. However, exchanging a substantial amount of
meta-data across the network is an energy consuming activity which can reduce the network
operational lifetime.
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH)
Clustering is often used to reduce control overhead by restricting network information ex-
change to within small groups of nodes. Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH)
[Heinzelman et al., 2002] is a well known clustering approach, where nodes are organised
around a cluster head selected from a subset of nodes. The base station selects cluster heads
for a certain time period using a stochastic and rotation based selection policy. Intra-cluster
network information (for example, node position, status and energy levels) is sent periodically
to the base station to compute the cluster-head probability of each node. After each time
round, LEACH adaptively elects “capable nodes” as cluster heads, and each node determines
the cluster to which it belongs based on communication distances. The drawback of LEACH
is related to the amount of information periodically exchanged even within a cluster which
can affect node lifetime.
Radio Channel Based Clustering
Radio channel based clustering is another popular method, where a group of nodes tune
their radio transmitter to a common frequency to form a cluster. One example of this
type of clustering mechanisms is Dual Network Clustering (DNC) [Sohrabi et al., 2004].
The method proposes that each node should have two radios on board, and those radios
create two distinct networks or channels in the sensor field. Radios on a node are tuned
to a specific and known set of fixed channels. The first radio to wake up and detect a free
channel becomes the cluster head for that channel, and nodes that wake up later on that
channel become members of that cluster. Although the mechanism is simple, it lacks control
over topology such as uncontrolled cluster membership determination. A similar approach
is proposed by Sohrabi et al. [2004], called Rendezvous Clustering Algorithm (RCA), which
tunes one of the two radios on a node to a fixed network signalling channel. A node uses this
channel to advertise its presence to its neighbours and to gather advertisements from other
nodes. Based on collected advertisements, a node becomes a member of a cluster. Although
using separate control channels provides better control over the network, distributed time
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synchronisations and continuous link monitoring mechanisms are required to maintain those
channels.
Passive Clustering
Instead of conventional clustering, Taek et al. [2003] propose a multi-level clustering technique
to achieve scalability. This could be described as “passive clustering” [Taek et al., 2003],
where clusters share some common nodes that are used as intermediaries for inter-cluster
data communication. Common nodes eliminate the need for special type cluster head nodes.
This flexibility also leads to substantially higher overheads. Every time the topology changes
there will be two types of selection procedures triggered - one for cluster head and another
for identifying common nodes agreed by neighbouring cluster heads.
Adaptive Self-Configuring sEnsor Networks Topologies (ASCENT)
Topology can be formed adaptively, where nodes join the network whenever necessary. For
example, Adaptive Self-Configuring sEnsor Networks Topologies (ASCENT) [Cerpa and Es-
trin, 2004] activates nodes one by one to maintain network coverage and connectivity. In
ASCENT, once a node is activated it stays awake throughout its lifetime and performs both
sensing and multi-hop routing. The drawback of ASCENT is not being able to conserve
node energy. Since the area of interests for sensing may not be fixed, an active node may no
longer be needed for a while. In such an environment, an active ASCENT node will waste
its limited energy reserves. ASCENT also does not guarantee maximum network operational
lifetime because some nodes become exhausted by performing additional tasks, while some
of their neighbours are idle.
Hierarchical Node Organisation
Other than clustering, hierarchical node organisation schemes can also be used. These
schemes include the hub-spoke technique [Ma and Aylor, 2004], where a Resource Oriented
Protocol (ROP) is used to build network topology. This protocol divides network opera-
tions into two phases. In the topology formation phase, nodes report their available resource
characteristics and, based on this, optimal network architecture is built. ROP assumes there
exist some nodes with limitless resources, and a top-down appointment process then builds
the architecture with the minimum resource consumption of ordinary nodes. In the topology
update phase, additional sensors are accepted into the network with an optimal balance of
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resources. The technique is manageable in such environments, where nodes at the top of the
hierarchy can be attached to the mains power supply to be considered limitless resources.
But this scheme may not be applicable in certain conditions where sensors are thrown in a
hostile environment with fixed energy reserves.
A special type of flat hierarchical scheme uses a graph based method for node organ-
isation [Cheng et al., 2003], where nodes and communication links are considered graph
vertices and edges respectively. For a given set of sensors, transmission power is assigned
to each sensor in such a way that the network formed contains only bidirectional links and
is strongly connected. Like traditional hierarchical node organisation techniques, the graph
based method has constraints on space and node membership. Hierarchy restructuring is
also an energy costly task, so that it may not be feasible for a sensor network.
Summary
In summary, a basic network information sharing approach was initially suggested for organ-
ising sensor network topologies. Due to high energy overhead of network information sharing,
different self-organising techniques have been proposed such as clustering [Heinzelman et al.,
2002; Taek et al., 2003; Sohrabi et al., 2004], hierarchy [Cheng et al., 2003; Ma and Aylor,
2004] or adaptive topology [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002; 2004]. Although these approaches can
reduce network control overhead, they produce uneven energy consumption of nodes by only
considering individual node energy usage. Uneven node energy usage resulted in unevenly
distributed node lifetime. As a result, the early exhaustion of an important node degrades
the network quality of service such as coverage and connectivity.
3.3 Residual Energy Based Node Classification
Existing node organisation protocols only concentrated on local energy efficiency [Heinzel-
man et al., 2002; Taek et al., 2003; Cheng et al., 2003; Baek et al., 2004], where global energy
consumption is important to minimise energy wastages. The method proposed in this chapter
is organising nodes such that the global energy consumption is balanced over the network.
This will extend the network operational lifetime by protecting nodes from early exhaustion.
A residual energy based node classification technique is provided. The node classification
helps to identify high energy nodes that may perform additional tasks other than sensing.
Then nodes are organised based on their capabilities to share tasks of a low energy node by
high energy neighbours.
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Figure 3.1: Sensor Node Life-Cycle.
In the proposed residual energy based node classification, nodes are classified as high and
low energy nodes to share energy usage among them. The energy consumption of a node is
directly proportional to the tasks performed, so that energy usage will be balanced if tasks
are shared. It is assumed that tasks involved in a sensor lifetime need to be identified to
enable task sharing among neighbouring nodes.
3.3.1 Tasks of a Sensor Node
Node lifecycle is defined as a set of different phases (such as Initialisation, Execution) and
tasks (such as start, sense) involved in each phase are identified. This will help identify tasks
that can be shared among neighbouring nodes during different phases of a node lifecycle.
In the literature, node phases are demonstrated as either active or passive over the node
life span [Chang and Tassiulas, 2004; Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]. Those phases are elaborated
and differentiated into basic states. The transition criteria between those states are also
identified.
Every node follows a specific pattern in its lifecycle. For example, nodes start by initial-
ising and then, based on some parameters (such as energy level and query requests), they
may sense and/or transmit data or hibernate. Finally, every node may become exhausted by
finishing the energy reserve. Amongst these activities, sensor lives can be divided into four
phases (see Figure 3.1) and explained below.
1. Initialisation phase: A sensor starts its lifecycle in an Initialisation phase, where it
identifies neighbours and sets up network parameters (such as node position, sensing
and transmission ranges). The Initialisation phase is represented by the Start state in
Figure 3.1.
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2. Configuration phase: Sensor nodes take various decisions during their lifetime such
as, should the node be active or inactive. Such decisions are taken in the Configura-
tion phase using available node and network information. The Configuration phase is
represented by the Transition state in the diagram.
3. Execution phase: Each node enters the Execution phase by being inactive or active, as
decided during the Configuration phase. In the inactive state, nodes do nothing other
than listening for wake-up requests. This is represented by the Hibernating state in
the figure. Nodes in the active state may be performing sensing and data transmission.
Most generally nodes perform only sensing, and some will also be collecting data for
forwarding to base stations. These are represented by the Sense state and Gateway
state respectively in Figure 3.1.
4. Dead phase: After consuming their limited energy, nodes eventually become exhausted.
Nodes may also be failed by external events such as natural disasters or human inter-
ventions. The End/Dead state is representing the Dead phase in Figure 3.1.
3.3.2 Node Classification
Nodes are classified based on their current energy levels to define capable nodes of performing
tasks on behalf of their low energy neighbours. Initially it is assumed that all nodes possess
the same energy reserves. As soon as a node starts performing activities, the node’s energy
level gradually decreases. Since tasks at different phases consume different amounts of energy,
the residual energy of all nodes will differ at any given time. For example, compared to
sensing a gateway node may consume more energy relaying other’s data. Such additional
tasks should be redistributed among nodes to balance the energy consumption. Distribution
of tasks must be fair, ensuring that a node is not considered for additional tasks if it has
only the minimum required energy to sense and transmit its data.
The node energy reserve is the only parameter that is variable and decreasing over time
considering that nodes are having the same memory and processing powers. This leads to
us characterising sensor nodes based on their residual energy levels. A similar approach is
noticed in traditional distributed systems where processors are characterised by their process
loads [Sinha, 1997]. For example, processors having loads below a certain threshold are called
“under-loaded processors”, and processors having loads above that threshold are considered
“over-loaded processors”. A similar approach is adopted by dividing sensors into two types
shown in Figure 3.2 which are -
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• Excess Energy Node (EEN), and
• Necessary Energy Node (NEN).
Nodes having enough energy to perform additional tasks are called EEN, as opposed to nodes
having sufficient energy only to perform its own sensing tasks, which are called NEN.
3.3.3 Determining Node Types (EEN/NEN)
The aim of this section is to analytically determine node types, EEN or NEN, based on some
network assumptions. This will also help in determining node lifetimes analytically (see
Section 3.5). Node types are calculated using the consumed energy or the residual energy
level of a node. If the energy requirement for sending and receiving a packet is already
known, the residual energy of a node can be computed by considering packet generation and
packet arrival rates (alternatively, a node could just measure its battery). This will enable a
node determining its type, EEN or NEN, by comparing its residual energy with a predefined
threshold (Eth).
The residual energy level of a node is normalised to the maximum battery capacity and
scaled to 100 [Hong et al., 2002]. The normalised energy level makes it easier to handle
even heterogeneous nodes with different battery capacity. Based on the battery capacity,
a minimum level of energy, denoted as Eth, is identified. The value of Eth is application
depended and is considered the minimum required energy to perform a node’s own tasks for
a certain amount of time. Nodes having residual energy above Eth are called EEN (Excess
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Energy Node), otherwise they are called NEN (Necessary Energy Node). A node will be
considered exhausted when it finishes its energy reserves.
For simplicity it is assumed that -
• A node is either in the gateway state, called a gateway node, or in the sensing state,
called a non-gateway node.
• Compared to the data transmission or reception, energy consumption while sensing is
negligible [Min et al., 2002].
• Packet generation at a node is directly proportional to sensing tasks that it per-
forms [Heinzelman et al., 2002].
• The query for sensing objects may be random so that each sensing node has packet
streams with Poisson distribution [Hong et al., 2002].
A non-gateway node senses its sensing region and forwards sensed data to connected
gateway nodes. If Etx is the required energy for transmitting a single packet from one node
to another, and λi is the packet generation rate at node i, the energy requirement of a
non-gateway node for transmitting packets over time t is defined as follows.
Ei(NG)(t) = Etx × λi × t (3.1)
A Gateway node generates sensing data and is also responsible for receiving packets from
neighbours to be forwarded to the next gateway. Since neighbours have independent packet
streams with Poisson distribution, a gateway node also has a packet stream with a Poisson
process. Let us assume that gateway j has nj neighbours. Then the packet arrival rate at
gateway j is
∑nj
k=1 λk.
If the packet generation rate at Gateway j is λj , and the expected value of total packets
at gateway j for duration t is Xj(t), the expected value of packets at gateway j over time t
can be computed as follows.
Xj(t) = λj × t+
nj∑
k=1
λk × t (3.2)
= t
(
λj +
nj∑
k=1
λk
)
(3.3)
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Transmitting a data packet usually consumes more energy than receiving a data packet12.
For simplicity, let us assume that the energy consumption to transmit (Etx) a single data
packet is twice the energy consumption of receiving (Erx) a single data packet. If a node
consumes C amount of energy for receiving a data packet, total consumed energy at gateway
j over time t can be obtained as follows.
Ej(G)(t) = Erx ×
nj∑
k=1
λk × t+ EtxXj(t) (3.4)
= C ×
nj∑
k=1
λk × t+ 2C × t
(
λj +
nj∑
k=1
λk
)
(3.5)
= C × t
(
2λj + 3
nj∑
k=1
λk
)
(3.6)
The consumed energy of a node depends on the time it acts as a gateway or a non-gateway
node. During the lifetime, if node i acts as a non-gateway for t1 time and a gateway for t2
time, the consumed energy can be computed using equation 3.1 and equation 3.6. If the total
energy consumption of node i over time t (where, t = t1 + t2) is Ei(t), it can be determined
as follows.
Ei(t) = Ei(NG)(t1) + Ei(G)(t2) (3.7)
A node can now calculate the residual energy using equation 3.7 to determine its node
type. If the amount of initial energy is E, and the energy decision level is Eth [Energy
Threshold], a node can decide its type, EEN or NEN, by comparing its residual energy level
with Eth. Node type determination is shown in the following equation.
δ =
E − Ei(t)
E
=
{
δ > Eth Type = EEN
δ ≤ Eth Type = NEN
(3.8)
3.4 The Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC) Method
In this section, a clustering method, called Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC), is proposed to
organise sensors according to their node types. This is an extension of conventional clustering
1Power usage of UC Mote: Erx = 2028 nJ/bit and Etx = 4317 nJ/bit [Hill et al., 2000]
2Power usage of MICA2 Mote: Erx = 10 mA and Etx = 27 mA (transmit with maximum power) [Crossbow,
2007b]
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approaches [Deng et al., 2005; Younis and Fahmy, 2004; Taek et al., 2003; Bandyopadhyay
and Coyle, 2003] to deal with network energy balancing. Energy is balanced by choosing
gateways or cluster heads only from EEN, and if a gateway becomes NEN, it reverts to being
a non-gateway to preserve its energy. Should all the nodes in a cluster become NEN, they
organise themselves as an All-Active network [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002] where all nodes act
as gateways.
Whenever a node becomes a gateway and forms a cluster, neighbours of that gateway
become automatically members of that cluster. In order to provide the required connectivity,
gateways are chosen in such a way that there is always at least one gateway within the
communication range of every gateway. As a result, clusters are overlapped and members of
overlapping clusters may have multiple gateways to forward their data. The interconnection
between gateways and overlapping cluster regions is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
3.4.1 Gateway Selection Algorithm
Since clusters are formed around gateways, the selection of gateways from EEN nodes forms
the entire network. Whenever an EEN node enters the gateway state, it informs its neigh-
bours using a gateway confirmation message. After receiving the confirmation message, nodes
update their respective gateway tables for forwarding their data. To be able to forward the
sensed data, every node needs to be connected to at least one gateway.
Gateways need to be connected because gateways only collect and forward data toward
the base station using muti-hop communications. The intermediate nodes of a multi-hop
path are also gateways. If an EEN node is connected with at least one other gateway, it is
eligible to be a gateway. A predefined number Gth controls the number of gateways within
the cluster. At most Gth gateways are allowed per cluster permitting redundant connectivity.
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Gth is application dependent. If the application requires high Quality of Service (QoS), the
value of Gth will be more than one. Gth tuning process is shown in Subsection 3.4.3.
Nodes initialise themselves as sense nodes, so that there are no gateways in the network
initially. It is assumed that there are some fixed “initial gateways” such as sink or base
stations to start the gateway selection procedure given in Algorithm 1.
A node can initiate the gateway selection procedure by simply broadcasting a gateway
request message to its neighbours when it fails to communicate with existing gateways.
Initially, nodes far from the initial gateways may start the selection procedure because they
do not have any connectivity with a gateway. To minimise the overhead, a node that receives
a gateway request message does not need to resend that message.
After receiving a gateway request message, a node determines its node type and the
number of gateway neighbours to check its eligibility to be a gateway. The eligibility check
is shown in Algorithm 1 at Line 1.2. Eligible nodes further verify whether the addition of
another gateway will exceed the Gth. If it does, the eligible node refrains from becoming a
gateway. Otherwise, it enters the transition state and participates in the gateway selection
procedure. Nodes always save their previous state (such as sense or hibernating), to be able
to revert should they not become a gateway (Lines 1.3 - 1.4 in the algorithm).
In the transition state, an eligible node announces its participation to become a gateway
by broadcasting a message, called willingness message, to its neighbours. After sending the
message, it waits for a predefined amount of time (tp) to receive such messages from others.
tp is chosen as the round trip time to send a message and receive the reply from a neighbour.
Within the waiting time, if the node does not receive any other gateway willingness messages,
it assumes that there are no other gateway aspirants among its neighbours, and then it enters
the gateway state by broadcasting a gateway confirmation message (Lines 1.18 - 1.21). After
receiving a gateway confirmation message, neighbour nodes update their gateway tables.
Should a waiting eligible node receive willingness messages from other nodes (within
its wait time tp), this indicates that there are more than one eligible node. All eligible
nodes go through a random back-off process to discourage multiple nodes from entering the
gateway state. The random back-off is a technique used to avoid collision in medium access
control [Stallings, 2007] and also used in sensor networks to avoid redundant coverage [Tian
and Georganas, 2005]. This process is shown in Lines 1.7 - 1.16 of Algorithm 1, where each
eligible node waits a random amount of time (ts). The wait time ts is chosen as round
trip times between one and the number of eligible nodes. The eligible node that receives
the lowest waiting time will get the chance to become a gateway by sending the gateway
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Algorithm 1: Gateway Selcetion Algorithm
Assume:
Each node has a gateway information table to store at most Gth number of
gateway info.
Let :
NType: type of node GNo: no of gateways
Gth: gateway threshold State: state of the node
Msg: Control message Table: gateway info
tp: predefined wait time ts: random wait time
When gateway request message received ;1.1
if NType 6= NEN AND Gno 6= 0 AND Gno ≤ Gth then1.2
Stateprev ← Statecurrent ;1.3
Statecurrent ← Statetransition ;1.4
Broadcast( Msgwillingness);1.5
Wait(tp);1.6
if Msgreceived == Msgwillingness then1.7
Wait(ts);1.8
if Msgreceived == Msgconfirmation then1.9
Update(Table);1.10
Statecurrent ← Stateprev ;1.11
end1.12
else1.13
Broadcast(Msgconfirmation);1.14
Statecurrent ← Stategateway ;1.15
end1.16
end1.17
else1.18
Broadcast(Msgconfirmation);1.19
Statecurrent ← Stategateway ;1.20
end1.21
end1.22
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confirmation message. If an eligible node receives a gateway confirmation message within
time ts, it exits from the gateway selection procedure and reverts to its previous state.
3.4.2 Algorithm Complexity
To show the computational performance, the algorithmic complexity of EBC is identified.
The performance is measured as the message and time complexity of the gateway selection
algorithm shown in the following.
The message complexity is important for a sensor network protocol because energy con-
sumption is directly proportional to messages sent and received by a sensor node. A node ni
sends gateway request messages to its neighbours whenever that node fails to communicate
with its gateways. If there are average N neighbours, ni has to send N request messages. In
response, all the eligible neighbours participate in the gateway selection procedure by sending
gateway willingness messages to their respective neighbours. In the best case scenario, there
may have only one eligible node in the neighbour set of ni to become a gateway. That node
broadcasts a willingness message and a gateway confirmation message to its N neighbours.
If each broadcast takes O(N) messages, the message complexity of the proposed algorithm
is also O(N). In the worst case scenario, all N neighbours of node ni may be eligible to
become a gateway. In that case, each of those EEN nodes sends N willingness messages and
only one of them sends another N gateway confirmation messages. With that, the message
complexity becomes in the order of O(N2) for the worst case scenario.
The time complexity shows how fast the algorithm can organise nodes. The time com-
plexity of EBC is constant in either case. For the best case, an eligible node only has to wait
for a predefined time tp which is the round trip time of a data packet. For the worst case,
the wait time is tp + ts, where the maximum value of ts can be N unit time.
3.4.3 Algorithm Parameters
The proposed clustering method has two important parameters, namely the energy threshold
(Eth) and the gateway threshold (Gth). Eth controls each node’s capability to become a
gateway, and Gth controls the level of redundant connectivity between nodes and gateways.
The values of both of the parameters depend on network topology and applications. For
instance, Eth in a sparse network should be low enough to reduce node reorganisation. On
the other hand, if fault tolerance and higher QoS is required, Gth should be higher to provide
redundant connectivity.
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Table 3.1: Network Parameters for Determining EBC Energy and Gateway Thresholds
Parameter Value
Initial node energy 100 unit
Energy usage per data packet
Transmit 0.04
Receive 0.02
Average number of neighbours per node 2 to 10
Packet generation rate Uniformly Random
The energy threshold Eth balances energy usage over the network by preventing nodes
below Eth performing additional tasks. If Eth is set too high, an EEN node will become a
NEN after a short period of time because its energy level will decrease below the threshold
quickly. When all nodes become NEN, the network acts like an All-Active network [Cerpa
and Estrin, 2004], so that energy consumption will be uneven. If Eth is set too low, a gateway
node will consume most of its energy reserves before becoming a NEN from an EEN. As a
result, a NEN node will get less energy reserve to perform its own tasks and exhaust early.
To find the best value for Eth, experiments were performed to compute the standard
deviation of energy using equation 3.8. Eth was varied from 0% to 50% with other parameters
as shown in Table 3.1. The standard deviation of residual energy levels was measured when
the first node became exhausted and results are shown in Figure 3.4. The figure shows that
the standard deviation of residual energy was about 90% when Eth was 0%. At Eth=0%,
an EEN node cannot share its tasks with others because it performs gateway task until it
finishes its energy reserves. When Eth was increased to 10% from 0%, a significant change in
standard energy deviation was noticed. The deviation decreased from 90% to 60% because
an EEN node shared tasks with its neighbours. With the increase of the energy threshold
value, the standard energy deviation reduced more up to Eth = 30% where the deviation
was below 40%. After that, with the increase of the threshold value, the standard deviation
of residual energy levels started increasing. Since the least standard deviation of energy was
observed at Eth = 30%, it was set to 30% for subsequent simulations (see Section 3.6).
The gateway threshold Gth represents the number of communication paths within a given
cluster. If Gth is high, there will be redundant connectivity for a node to gateways. This will
allow multiple nodes within a cluster consuming excess energy. For a sparse network, it may
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Figure 3.4: Standard Deviation of Remaining Energy for Various Energy Threshold Values.
not be possible to replace all those gateways when they become NEN. Other than that, a
network with excessive gateways will work more like an All-Active network where all nodes
are gateways [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]. If Gth is low, there will be fewer options for a node
to send data and that may cause network congestion and degraded QoS.
Another experiment was performed to find the best value of Gth. The same testbed
described in section 3.6 was used and set Eth to 30%. By varying Gth from 2 to 5, the
standard deviation of residual energy levels and the network lifetime to when the first node
became exhausted were measured. Figure 3.5 shows that in a sparse network, the residual
energy deviation among nodes is low. Since there were fewer neighbours to share the task
of a low energy node, the network became All-Active and most of the nodes were acting as
gateways. With the increase of the node density, the energy deviation was increasing but
almost stabilised to a certain value for all Gth levels. Figure 3.5 also shows that the energy
deviation is not affected by Gth when the nodes per transmission range is ≥ 5. A similar
effect is noticed in Figure 3.6, where lifetime is proportional to the gateway threshold up
to a certain node density, after which network lifetime becomes saturated. Interestingly,
saturation points for standard energy deviation and network lifetime were almost the same
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in the experiment because better energy balancing increases network lifetime. In Figure 3.5,
the best energy balancing is found at Gth = ≤ 3, and in Figure 3.6, the best network lifetime
is found at the same threshold for all node densities. Experiments described in Sections 3.5
and 3.6 used Gth ≤ 3 for measuring performances of EBC.
3.4.4 The Network Connectivity of EBC
This section shows that EBC can always provide connectivity to all deployed nodes because
it forms a network based on connected gateways. An EEN node only becomes a gateway, if
it is connected to another gateway. Since clusters are formed based on gateways, clusters are
not mutually exclusive. That is, a cluster has intersecting member sets with neighbouring
clusters. Most importantly, at least one gateway node belongs to one of those intersecting
sets. If there is a gateway in one of the intersecting sets of a cluster, members of that
cluster are connected to another cluster through that gateway. Since gateways are selected
outwardly from the “initial gateways”, all the clusters are connected to each other. Every
deployed node is attached to a cluster, and connected clusters ensure that all nodes are
reachable. To formally show such a claim, let us introduce the following parameters.
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• S is the set of all sensor nodes in the network.
• Ni is the set of neighbouring nodes of node i.
• Ci is the set of cluster members of gateway i, and Ci = Ni.
• f(N) is the gateway selection algorithm selecting gateways from set N as described in
Subsection 3.4.1.
The gateway selection algorithm f(N) forms a sequence of gateways because an EEN
only becomes a gateway if it is connected to another gateway. If the communication range
of a node is tr, the average distance between two neighbouring gateways is
tr
2 . That is, the
gateway selection algorithm f(N) ensures that there will be a gateway within half of the
transmission range of another. Since f(N) starts from the initial gateways, there will be a
gateway sequence from initial gateways conforming to the following recursion rule.
Lemma 3.4.1 If the distance between the initial gateway and two neighbouring gateways,
say node i and node i+1, are di and di+1 respectively, following properties are found:
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|di+1 − di| ≤ tr (3.9)
⇒ di+1 ≤ di + tr (3.10)
Since clusters are formed around gateway nodes, according to Equation 3.10, two neigh-
bouring clusters are connected to each other by their respective gateways. That is, f(N)
chooses an EEN node as a gateway from an existing cluster. If xi+1 is an EEN node belonging
to a cluster Ci of neighbour set Ni, the gateway selection algorithm will select xi+1 to form
a new cluster Ci+1. Then Ci and Ci+1 are overlapped at least through gateways. This can
be stated as follows.
f(Ni) = {xi|xi ∈ Ci ∧ xi ∈ Ci−1} (3.11)
f(Ni+1) = {xi+1|xi+1 ∈ Ci+1 ∧ xi+1 ∈ Ci} (3.12)
This implies that two neighbouring clusters are not mutually exclusive, that is -
Ci ∩ Ci+1 6= φ (3.13)
Equation 3.13 shows that two neighbouring clusters are overlapped, and Equation 3.12
shows that xi and xi+1 are in the intersection set of Ci and Ci+1. That is -
{xi , xi+1} ∈ Ci ∩ Ci+1 (3.14)
According to EBC, if any node fails to communicate with a gateway, it initiates a new
cluster formation procedure to be associated with at least one cluster. Hence, the union of
clusters is the super set of all deployed sensors, which is shown in the following equation.
C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ ......... ∪ Ci = S (3.15)
Equation 3.14 states that a cluster is connected at least to another cluster. This ensures
connectivity in the network. Equation 3.15 states that the algorithm covers all the deployed
node set.
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Table 3.2: Symbol Table for Identifying Node Lifetime.
Symbol Denote
E Initial energy in a sensor node
Ei(T ) Energy spent by the ith sensor over time T
Ei(NG) Energy spent by the ith sensor as a Non Gateway node
Ei(G) Energy spent by the ith sensor as a Gateway node
C Energy needed to transmit or receive a single data packet
N Average number of neighbours of the ith sensor
λ Data packet generation rate
δ Ratio of the residual energy and total energy
3.5 The Lower Bound of a Node Lifetime
This section provides an analytical evaluation of EBC and some well known schemes such
as the All-Active approach [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002], LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002] and
ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]. The evaluation is based on the lower boundary of node
lifetime because this is also the lower boundary of the network lifetime. A relationship be-
tween node lifetimes versus average nodes per transmission range is identified. This will help
us determine the lower boundary of node lifetime for different node organisation techniques.
3.5.1 Node Lifetime
In the following, the consumed energy of a node over a certain period of time is identified
mathematically with some assumptions. Based on time to consume a certain amount of
energy, node lifetime is identified. It is defined as the time it takes from entering the Start
state to the End/Dead state (see Figure 3.1). In this chapter, a node is considered dead only
when it finishes its energy reserves.
Let us consider that there are n nodes in a sensor field, and the average number of nodes
per transmission range of a sensor node is N . Let E be the initial energy, λ be the packet
generation rate at each node, and T be the time when first node becomes exhausted from the
network. The boundary value of T is determined using equations described in Section 3.3.3.
The symbols used for computations are given in Table 3.2.
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Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC)
EBC protects a node from early exhaustion using an energy threshold Eth. EBC nodes are
classified as EEN and NEN based on Eth. Each node starts as an EEN, and after consuming
a certain amount of energy reserves it becomes a NEN. A node can be a gateway only if it
is an EEN, otherwise it will be in a non-gateway state such as sensing. If a node spends all
of its energy reserves above Eth as a gateway node and the rest as a non-gateway node, this
is considered the earliest time that a node can be exhausted in EBC.
If a node is continuously sensing and/or forwarding data, the consumed energy of a node
over time T is the sum of the energy consumed by that node as a non-gateway and a gateway
as shown in equation 3.7. Let us now consider that a node acting as a gateway for t1 time
and as a non-gateway for t2 time where T = t1 + t2. If T is the lower boundary of a node
lifetime, a node ni consumes (100−Eth)% of its initial energy reserves in t1 time as a gateway
and Eth% of initial energy reserves in t2 time as a non-gateway.
If E is the initial energy reserves, and Ei(G)(t1) is the consumed energy by ni as a gateway,
using equation 3.6, t1 is determined as follows.
(100− Eth)
100
E = Ei(G)(t1) (3.16)
⇒ (100− Eth)
100
E = Ct1
(
2λ+ 3
N∑
k=1
λ
)
(3.17)
⇒ t1 = (100− Eth)E
100Cλ(3N + 2)
(3.18)
If Ei(NG)(t2) is the consumed energy over time t2 for ni, using equation 3.1, t2 is deter-
mined as follows.
Eth
100
E = Ei(NG)(t2) (3.19)
⇒ Eth
100
E = 2Cλt2 (3.20)
⇒ t2 = EthE
200Cλ
(3.21)
The lower boundary of an EBC node lifetime T is the sum of equations 3.18 and 3.21
and is given below.
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T = t1 + t2 (3.22)
=
(100− Eth)E
100Cλ(3N + 2)
+
EthE
200Cλ
(3.23)
=
E
100Cλ
(
100 + 3NEth + Eth
3N + 2
)
(3.24)
The All-Active Method
In the All-Active technique, a basic node organisation method is applied without any energy
conserving measure - all nodes act as gateways. If an All-Active node i consumes Ei(T )
energy over time T, the consumed energy can be computed using equation 3.6 as follows.
Ei(T ) = Ei(G)(T ) (3.25)
= CλT (3N + 2) (3.26)
If Tall is the time to exhaust an All-active node, according to equation 3.8 Tall can be
computed as -
E = Ei(Tall) (3.27)
Tall =
E
Cλ(3N + 2)
(3.28)
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH)
LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002] periodically initiates a cluster head selection process, in
which each node broadcasts their current status to base stations where it calculates the
probability of each node to be a gateway. That is, after each round each node sends N packets
to their neighbours. If the time for the ith node to exhaust under LEACH is TLEACH , and
the cluster head (or gateway) selection process rate is ∆, the energy consumed by a node
participating in the gateway selection procedure during its lifetime will be TLEACH∆ NC.
If a LEACH node spends its entire lifetime as a cluster head or gateway, using equation 3.6
the consumed energy over time TLEACH can be determined as follows.
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E = Ei(G)(TLEACH) +
TLEACH
∆
NC (3.29)
⇒ E = CλTLEACH(3N + 2) + TLEACH
∆
NC (3.30)
⇒ TLEACH = ∆E
C(3N∆λ+ 2∆λ+N)
(3.31)
If a LEACH node spends its entire lifetime as a cluster member or non-gateway node,
using equation 3.1 the consumed energy over time TLEACH can be determined as follows.
E = Ei(NG)(TLEACH) +
TLEACH
∆
NC (3.32)
⇒ E = 2CλTLEACH + TLEACH
∆
NC (3.33)
⇒ TLEACH = ∆E
C(2∆λ+N)
(3.34)
In LEACH, base stations select nodes as gateways or cluster heads based on parameters
such as residual energy levels and distances between neighbours. Let us assume that the
cluster head rotation is evenly distributed over the node lifetime. The lifetime TLEACH is
then approximated by adding equations 3.31 and 3.34 (actual lower bound of a LEACH
lifetime may be less than the average because LEACH does not have any low energy node
protection measure like energy threshold in EBC). TLEACH is computed as follows.
TLEACH =
∆E(3N∆λ+ 4∆λ+ 2N)
2C(3N∆λ+ 2∆λ+N)(2∆λ+N)
(3.35)
Adaptive Self-Configuring sEnsor Networks Topologies (ASCENT)
In ASCENT, once a node becomes active from inactive state, it remains active throughout
its lifetime. ASCENT’s active state is equivalent to the gateway state in EBC. If the ratio of
active to total lifetime is x, the energy spent by an ASCENT node over time T is as follows.
Ei(T ) = Ei(G)(xT ) (3.36)
= CλxT (3N + 2) (3.37)
If an ASCENT node becomes exhausted at TASCENT time, the node lifetime can be
computed as follows.
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Table 3.3: Summary of the Lower Bound of a Node Lifetime.
Method Node Lifetime
EBC E100Cλ
(
100+3NEth+Eth
3N+2
)
The All-Active method E
Cλ(3N+2)
LEACH ∆E(3N∆λ+4∆λ+2N)2C(3N∆λ+2∆λ+N)(2∆λ+N)
ASCENT E
xCλ(3N+2)
E = Ei(TASCENT ) (3.38)
TASCENT =
E
xCλ(3N + 2)
(3.39)
3.5.2 Comparative Study
In what follows, EBC is compared against three well known techniques, namely All-Active
[Cerpa and Estrin, 2002], LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002] and ASCENT [Cerpa and Es-
trin, 2004]. The analysis will provide a way of comparing node lifetime between all these
approaches, and it will show the impact of energy balancing on node lifetime.
The lower boundary of node lifetime for various node organisation techniques is compared
using the lifetime equations given in Table 3.3. To compute node lifetime, an arbitrary sensor
field was considered where nodes were stochastically distributed. Nodes were assumed to be
architecturally identical, having equal sensing and transmission ranges. Each node stacked
with 100 unit of energy, and a single packet receiving consumed 0.02 units of power which
is half of the required energy to transmit a data packet. In the algorithm parameter tuning
(Subsection 3.4.3), the best value of Eth was found at 30% for our simulation testbed. The
energy threshold Eth was set to 30%. The ratio of active to total time, x, and the cluster
head selection period, ∆, are taken from [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004] and [Heinzelman et al.,
2002] respectively. The ratio of active to total time (x) for ASCENT was set 0.4 [Cerpa
and Estrin, 2004], and the cluster head selection period (∆) for LEACH was set 20 unit
times [Heinzelman et al., 2002]. With these fixed parameters, the density of sensor nodes
was increased gradually to vary the number of nodes per transmission range from 2 to 10.
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Table 3.4: Network Parameters for Analysing Node Organisation Schemes
Parameter Value
Number of nodes (S) Varied from 100 to 500
Average number of neighbours per node 2 to 10
Initial node energy (E) 100 unit power
Data transmission cost (Et) 0.04 unit power
Data receiving cost (Er) 0.02 unit power
Data generation rate (λ)
low 5
moderate 10
high 20
Energy threshold (Eth) for EBC 30%
Gateway selection period (∆) for LEACH 20 unit time
Ratio of active time to total time (x) For ASCENT 0.4
The lower boundary of node lifetime was calculated using equations described for three
different network properties, where lifetime was considered the time to exhaust the first
node. Network conditions were varied by changing packet generation rates, where the packet
generation rate was considered low when 5 packets were generated per unit time (λ = 5),
moderate when 10 packets were generated per unit time (λ = 10), and high when 20 packets
were generated per unit time (λ = 20).
Figure 3.7 shows the lower bound of node lifetime when packet generation rate is low.
The lifetime equation of EBC (equation 3.24) shows that node density has a minimum impact
on EBC lifetime because more neighbours per node implies better energy sharing. LEACH
lifetime equation shows a similar effect (equation 3.35), and it is affected by the gateway
selection rate (∆) as well. Figure 3.7 shows that EBC and LEACH lifetime are almost stable
with the increase of the number of nodes per transmission range. The lifetime equations of
ASCENT (equation 3.39) and the All-Active method (equation 3.28) show that their lifetime
are inversely proportionate to the node density. This is because, higher number of neighbours
implies that a gateway may have to relay higher numbers of data packets. Figure 3.7 shows
that with the increase of the number of nodes per transmission range, ASCENT and All-
Active lifetimes are decreasing. For example, the lifetime of an EBC node varies from 387 to
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Figure 3.7: Lower Bound of a Node Lifetime when Packet Generation Rate (λ) is Low.
321 simulation times (simtimes) for various node density, while an ASCENT node lifetime
varies from 312 to 80 simtimes for the same node density range.
Figure 3.7 reveals that EBC outperforms LEACH by 15%, ASCENT by 55% and the
All-Active by 70%. Because of the energy threshold (Eth) based node exhaustion protection,
EBC nodes avoided early exhaustion. Although LEACH periodically rotates the cluster head
among neighbours, it cannot prevent a node being a cluster head while it has low energy
reserves. The All-Active method does not have any energy preserving measures, so the lower
boundary of a node lifetime is the least for this method. ASCENT controls network topology
by keeping a subset of nodes inactive. It gradually activates those nodes whenever a node
fails to communicate with its active neighbours. By keeping a subset of deployed nodes
inactive ASCENT performed 50% better than the All-Active method.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show node lifetime when the packet generation rate are increased to
10 and 20 respectively from 5 per unit time. Results follow a similar trend to the one in
Figure 3.7. However, with the increase of the packet generation rate, lifetimes for all methods
are also reduced. EBC still outperformed other techniques with the same percentage that it
maintained when the packet generation rate was low (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.8: Lower Bound of a Node Lifetime when Packet Generation Rate (λ) is Moderate.
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Figure 3.9: Lower Bound of a Node Lifetime when Packet Generation Rate (λ) is High.
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3.6 Performance Analysis
In addition to exploration of the lower boundary of node lifetime discussed in Section 3.5,
experimental evaluation of various schemes has been performed to validate analytical results
of EBC. Two other prominent node organisation schemes, namely LEACH [Heinzelman et al.,
2002] and ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004] (see Section 3.2), have also been implemented
for comparing against EBC. Since the All-Active method [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002] is the
basic approach to node organisation, this is considered as the base line for comparisons.
The simulation environment consisted of sensor nodes randomly distributed and nodes
were assumed to be architecturally identical. Each node had the same memory, energy and
processing powers. Nodes were also having the same communication and sensing ranges, and
the node communication was bidirectional. The number of deployed nodes varied from 100 to
500 to vary the network node density. For the sake of experiment result discussion, a network
is referred as sparse when the average nodes per transmission range was ≤ 5, otherwise the
network is called dense.
The number of generated data packets was uniformly distributed to the nodes. To collect
data from deployed sensors, there were five sink or base stations. It is assumed that sink
or base stations were machines connected to the main power supply. Data packets were to
be routed to the sink node through multi-hop data communication using the shortest path
routing algorithm.
The specification of the network environment was the same as mentioned in section 3.5
and is also given in Table 3.5.
To measure the performance of various node organisation techniques the standard de-
viation of residual energy levels and network lifetime are used as metrics. The standard
node energy deviation shows how balanced the network is, while the network lifetime shows
how long each method can keep the network operational. Three different network lifetimes
are measured to compare techniques from various points of view. Definitions of those three
network lifetimes are given below.
1. Time for exhausting the first node in the network.
2. Time until the first network cut or partition occurs.
3. Time for exhausting half of the deployed nodes.
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Table 3.5: Simulation Environment for Implementing Node Organisation Schemes
Parameter Value
Number of nodes (S) Varied from 100 to 500
Number of nodes per transmission range (tr) 2 to 10
Initial node energy (E) 100 unit power
Data transmission cost (Et) 0.04 unit power
Data receiving cost (Er) 0.02 unit power
Data transmission range (tr) 4 unit distance
Energy threshold (Eth) 30%
Gateway threshold (Gth) ≤ 3
Gateway selection rate for LEACH (∆) 20 unit time
Node active to inactive time ratio for ASCENT (x) 0.4
Sensing rate Uniformly random
Data generation rate Uniformly random
For each of those cases, the residual energy levels of sensor nodes were recorded to cal-
culate the standard deviation of remaining energy and network lifetime.
3.6.1 Lifetime 1: When the First Node becomes Exhausted
To compare various node organisation techniques, the standard deviation of residual energy
levels and network lifetime were measured when first node became exhausted. Since nodes
forward data to the base stations through multi-hop data communication, nodes close to a
base station relay more data than nodes far from base stations. These are the most important
nodes for maintaining connectivity between base stations and the rest of the network. Such
nodes will exhaust earlier due to performing more tasks than others. A network starts
becoming operationally ineffective when nodes are exhausting so that the time for exhausting
the first node is considered as a network lifetime.
The standard deviation of remaining energy when the first node dies is shown in Fig-
ure 3.10. The first node exhausted by relaying more data packets than others is one of the
most important nodes, being close to the base station. For an ideal condition, the standard
deviation of remaining energy levels should be zero at any moment where tasks are evenly
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Figure 3.10: Standard Deviation of Remaining Energies when First Node becomes Exhausted.
distributed. In reality, nodes are randomly distributed and nodes in different positions have
different numbers of tasks to perform. Neither the All-Active nor ASCENT have any energy
or task balancing measure in their node organisation schemes but EBC redistributes tasks
whenever the energy level drops below a certain threshold. LEACH also periodically rotates
the responsibilities of nodes which balances the energy usage. Due to energy balancing mea-
sures, EBC and LEACH have less energy wastages compared to the All-Active and ASCENT.
LEACH does not have any explicit node protection measure like Eth in EBC, so it cannot
prevent a low energy node being a cluster head while its neighbours still have enough energy
reserves. For this reason, the standard deviation of residual energy levels for LEACH was
75% more than EBC when first node became exhausted. Figure 3.10 shows that EBC has
an energy deviation of about 40% that is, on average, all other nodes still have 40% of their
energy reserves remaining when the first node exhausted. The result also shows that energy
deviations of the All-Active and ASCENT are about 90%, and LEACH displays about 70%
residual energy deviation.
Figure 3.11 shows the time to exhaust the first node as a function of nodes per trans-
mission range. The figure clearly shows that EBC outperforms existing techniques. EBC
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Figure 3.11: Network Lifetime when First Node becomes Exhausted.
classifies nodes as EEN and NEN based on their residual energy levels. EEN nodes are con-
sidered high energy nodes, and only an EEN can become a gateway. Once the energy level
of a gateway node drops below Eth, it voluntarily leaves the gateway state thus extending
its lifetime. Such a technique is absent in existing node organisation methods. The result
also shows that in a sparse network, an EBC node lifetime is about 600 simtimes which is
about 100 simtimes more than a LEACH node lifetime. LEACH periodically rotates cluster
heads among neighbours where the cluster head selection procedure depends on broadcasting
node current status to base stations. Periodic broadcasting has an impact on node lifetime
and LEACH also does not protect a low energy node being a cluster head. However, at low
network density, a LEACH node still can survive about 250 simtimes more than an ASCENT
node. ASCENT forms the network adaptively, that is, it keeps nodes in an inactive state and
activates one by one when the network QoS degrades. Since an ASCENT node has less num-
ber of active neighbours than others, it survives 50 simtimes longer than an All-Active node
when the network is sparse. The All-Active method is a basic node organisation technique
where all nodes act as gateways. The result shows that at low network density its lifetime is
only 80 simtimes, and this is the least among all the compared techniques.
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At high network density, network lifetimes for all methods reduced from their respective
lifetimes at low node density. The lifetime reduces because of the increasing number of
neighbours. A higher number of neighbours imply that a gateway node has to relay more
data packets. Interestingly, network lifetime for EBC became stabilised when the number
of nodes per transmission range increased to ≥ 5. EBC controls the network connectivity
using a gateway threshold Gth, that is, EBC permits maximum Gth number of gateways
per cluster. In this simulation, Gth was set to 3, and the network became saturated when
the number of nodes per transmission range became ≥ 5. The same threshold was used for
LEACH as well to control redundant connectivity, so that it also showed a similar behaviour
to EBC. At high node density, Figure 3.11 also shows that an EBC node has a network
lifetime about 250 simtimes which is at least 150 simtimes longer than other techniques.
3.6.2 Lifetime 2: When the First Cut occurs
When a node becomes isolated due to the exhaustion of all of its neighbours, it is called cut
or network cut. The time to occur the first cut (that is when first isolated node is found)
is measured. This is an important performance metric because partitioning can make a
network ineffective. The standard deviation of residual energy levels and network lifetime
were observed when the first cut occurred and results are described below.
The standard deviation of residual energy when the first cut occurs is shown in Fig-
ure 3.12. The result shows that the standard energy deviation of LEACH matches with EBC
when the number of nodes per transmission range was 2. At an extremely low node density,
LEACH rotates the cluster head job among all the neighbours, whereas EBC waits for a
gateway to become NEN from EEN to rotate the gateway task. With the increase of the
number of neighbours per node, LEACH fails to rotate the cluster head job among all nodes
due to random placement of nodes. Although the gateway task is rotated among a subset of
neighbours, LEACH periodically finds new gateway eligible nodes using broadcasting. The
periodic broadcasting is an energy costly event. EBC is advantageous over LEACH because
it invokes the gateway selection procedure only when an existing gateway becomes NEN.
The figure shows that at high node density EBC is able to decrease the energy deviation to
25% while LEACH standard energy deviation increases to 60% from 40%. ASCENT and the
All-Active methods do not rotate the cluster head or gateway jobs, so nodes have about 80%
energy left while their neighbours are failing.
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Figure 3.12: Standard Deviation of Remaining Energies when First Cut occurs.
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Figure 3.13: Network Lifetime when First Cut occurs.
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Figure 3.13 shows the time taken before at least one node is isolated from the network
for various node densities. The differences between lifetimes of EBC and LEACH become
narrow when lifetime is considered the first cut to occur. LEACH lifetime improves about 200
simtimes than the first node to exhaust lifetime (Figure 3.11) because LEACH gets sufficient
time to rotate cluster head job among neighbours. However, the figure shows that EBC
lifetime is still at least 25% higher than LEACH lifetime because of the energy based node
protection measure. ASCENT also shows a noticeable improvement from the lifetime when
first node to exhaust was considered, however, ASCENT lifetime is about 400 simtimes less
than LEACH and EBC at low network density. At high node density, the differences between
lifetimes reduce but still ASCENT lifetime is 100 and 150 simtimes less than LEACH and
EBC respectively. The All-Active method performed badly and has a lifetime less than 100
simtimes due to lack of any energy conserving measures.
3.6.3 Lifetime 3: When 50% of Total Nodes become Exhausted
The time for exhaustion of 50% of total nodes is considered because some of the existing
work such as [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002; 2004] use similar metrics as network lifetime. The
network may not be effective up to that point, however the experiment is included for the
sake of completeness.
Standard deviation of remaining energy between nodes when half of the nodes have died
is shown in Figure 3.14. Due to the energy balancing measure of EBC and the cluster
head rotation policy of LEACH, the standard energy deviation curves are steady for these
two approaches. The figure shows that EBC has the least energy wastage compared to other
approaches when half of the deployed nodes are exhausted. At low node density, the standard
deviation of residual energy levels for EBC is about 40%, while LEACH has 60%, the All-
active method has about 75% and ASCENT has 80%. When the node density was increased,
unlike other approaches the standard deviation for EBC was gradually decreasing. The result
shows that the standard deviation decreases to about 25%, while LEACH standard deviation
increases to 70%. The All-active and ASCENT both have about 85% energy deviation at
high node density.
Figure 3.15 illustrates the time taken for 50% of nodes to die, while node density is varied.
The time differences between the first node to exhaust and 50% of nodes to exhaust shows an
important characteristic for various techniques. Ideally, all nodes should become exhausted
at the same time however, in reality, it is not possible due to different responsibilities and
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Figure 3.14: Standard Deviation of Residual Energies when 50% of Total Nodes Exhausted.
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Figure 3.15: Network Lifetime when 50% of Total Nodes Exhausted.
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tasks that nodes perform such as a node closer to the base station has to relay more data
packets than others. On average the lifetime increased 10% with EBC from first node to
exhaust to 50% nodes to exhaust. It is 35% for LEACH, 40% for ASCENT and 44% for
the All-Active method. That is, EBC has the least time difference between exhausting the
first node to 50% of nodes. This implies that EBC is able to operate closer to the ideal
condition compared to existing techniques. Figure 3.15 also shows that EBC able to extend
the network lifetime by 10% more than LEACH in all network densities. It also outperforms
ASCENT and the All-Active method by about 400 and 500 simtimes respectively when the
network is sparse. At high node density, lifetime differences among compared schemes reduce
but EBC still outperforms those approaches by about 100 and 200 simtimes respectively.
3.7 Discussion
In this section, the implication of analytical and simulation results is discussed. In section 3.5,
the lower bound of a node lifetime of an EBC network was analytically determined and
compared against existing node organisation approaches, namely the All-Active [Cerpa and
Estrin, 2002], LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002] and ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004].
Section 3.6 shows the experimental results of those methods for three different network
lifetime definitions. The lifetimes are defined as - time to exhaust the first node, time to occur
the first network cut and time to exhaust 50% of deployed nodes. The standard deviation
of residual energy levels and network lifetime are considered as performance criteria, and
results are observed for above mentioned node organisation approaches. The summary of the
experimental results are also shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
Table 3.6: Average Network Standard Deviation of Residual Energies (in %)
First node to die First cut to occur 50% node to exhaust
Approach Sparse Dense Sparse Dense Sparse Dense
ASCENT 80% 83% 72% 80% 82% 83%
All-Active 85% 90% 79% 83% 79% 82%
LEACH 55% 65% 55% 62% 62% 65%
EBC 41% 37% 40% 30% 42% 29%
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Section 3.5 identifies the lower boundary of a node lifetime where it is considered the time
when the network effectiveness starts deteriorating. A mathematical analysis for different
network traffic and node density was performed. The lifetime equations (see Table 3.3)
show that EBC and LEACH lifetimes have less impact with the increasing number of nodes
per transmission range because both techniques change the cluster heads with the changing
network environments. ASCENT and the All-Active node lifetimes are inversely proportional
to increasing node density because increase of neighbours implies that their fixed gateways
have to relay more data packets. The analytical results also show that EBC can extend node
lifetime at least 15% more than any of those existing techniques. EBC is advantageous over
other techniques because of its energy threshold based node exhaustion protection technique.
Table 3.7: Average Network Lifetime (in simtime)
First node to die First cut to occur 50% node to exhaust
Approach Sparse Dense Sparse Dense Sparse Dense
ASCENT 125 70 190 140 190 170
All-Active 50 10 60 30 90 90
LEACH 300 75 450 250 450 260
EBC 450 250 500 320 500 300
Section 3.6 shows the performance analysis of various techniques using simulation exper-
iments. Table 3.6 summarises that EBC can balance energy better than other techniques in
all cases by enabling task sharing. This implies that an EBC network has less wasted en-
ergy when the network becomes ineffective. LEACH periodically rotates the gateway based
on some parameters including residual energy levels. This also balances energy among the
neighbours as shown in Table 3.6. On average LEACH has about 20% more wasted energies
than EBC because LEACH fails to protect nodes from early exhaustion. ASCENT adap-
tively forms the network by activating nodes in case of network congestion or node failures.
Since ASCENT allows a node to become exhausted while their neighbours have sufficient
energy, it has on average 80% standard energy deviations for all three compared lifetimes.
The All-Active method does not have any energy conserving measures, hence the amount of
wasted energy is the highest, about 90%, for each compared lifetimes.
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Energy balancing can extend network lifetime. For example, EBC has the least wasted
energy and it also has a network lifetime longer than any other techniques as shown in
Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The result shows that the average lifetime is higher for a sparse network
than a dense network. Since the packet generation rate at each node is uniformly random,
an increase of number of neighbours uniformly increases the number of forwarding packets
by a gateway. However, due to connectivity restrictions (Gth), network lifetime gradually
stabilises at a minimum value with the increasing node density. LEACH, similar to EBC,
rotates the energy consuming tasks among the neighbours, so that its network lifetime is
noticed close to EBC’s. Table 3.7 also shows that the other methods cannot perform well
because of their inefficient energy management schemes (see Table 3.6).
The simulation result validates the analytical outcome. In Section 3.5, Figure 3.7 shows
that when network lifetime was defined as first node to die, EBC has average network life-
times of 375 and 300 simtimes for sparse and dense networks respectively,. The simulation
result (Figure 3.11) also shows that EBC lifetimes are 450 and 250 simtimes for sparse and
dense networks for sparse and dense networks respectively, which are close to the analytical
results. A little deviation is noticed because a fixed packet generation rate was considered
for mathematical analysis, whereas the packet generation rate was uniformly random when
simulation was performed.
3.8 Conclusion
A high variance in node energy consumption can cause an early network partition. To
counter this, an energy balanced sensor node organisation technique, called Energy Balanced
Clustering (EBC), is proposed in this chapter. Balancing loads with fairness is very common
in typical distributed systems preventing nodes from overloading. A similar approach is taken
by exploiting node self-organising capability to share tasks among neighbours. To balance
tasks among high and low energy neighbours, sensor nodes are classified based on residual
energy levels, and nodes are organised into clusters based on node types. EBC can prevent
nodes from early exhaustion by reducing energy consuming tasks performed by a node having
residual energy below a threshold. The lower bound of network lifetime was analytically
computed for EBC and existing techniques (namely All-Active [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002],
LEACH [Heinzelman et al., 2002] and ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004]), and our result
shows that EBC has a network lifetime at least 15% longer than those compared techniques.
It was found from the experimental performance evaluation that when measuring the time
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to exhaust the first node, EBC can prolong network lifetime by at least 40% compared
to existing techniques. The experimental results also show that EBC can extend network
effectiveness at least 10% more than existing techniques when effectiveness was defined as
the time till the network partition or as the exhaustion of half of the deployed nodes.
In this chapter, entire deployed node set was considered necessary to form a network.
Some of those nodes may share coverage region with their neighbours. These nodes can cause
redundant energy consuming activities which can shorten network lifetime. Redundant nodes
can be identified and deactivated from the network to improve overall energy efficiency. Such
nodes may be used to replace failed nodes to stretch the network operational lifetime more.
The next few chapters investigate how redundant nodes can be used to deal with the node
failures.
Chapter 4
Identification and Deactivation of
Redundant Nodes
4.1 Introduction
The operational lifetime of a sensor network can be extended by eliminating redundant energy
consumption. Sensor nodes are becoming small in size and low in cost, and such low cost
miniature sensors can be redundantly deployed to make sensor network fault-tolerant [Zou
and Chakrabarty, 2005]. Redundant nodes may consume additional energy by performing
unnecessary repetitious sensing and thus affect network operational lifetime. This chapter
examines maximising network lifetime by identifying and deactivating redundant nodes.
Network coverage and connectivity are the two most important requirements for a sensor
network. Network coverage relates to the ability to sense throughout the sensor field, and
connectivity is the ability to route data across a network [Megerian et al., 2005]. Since sensors
are randomly distributed, a redundant deployment of sensors is a common approach to meet
these requirements. As a result, network operational lifetime is less than optimal because of
the energy consumption by redundant nodes. For this reason, those redundant nodes should
be deactivated in such a way that the network requirements are preserved by the remaining
active node set. A process to solve the coverage and connectivity preserving redundancy
elimination problem has several constraints. First, it should be distributed because sensors
are distributed in the network. Second, the solution should be scalable to cope with a large
number of sensors. Finally, the method should be able to identify the maximum set of
redundant nodes with the minimum computational overhead.
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Most of the existing active node set optimisation techniques have a focus on providing
either network connectivity or coverage. For example, a connected dominating node set
is identified by disabling unnecessary nodes to build a communication backbone [Schurg-
ers et al., 2002]. On the other hand, the problem of sensing coverage is investigated more
extensively. Such as using global network information, a minimum set of active nodes is
found to provide complete coverage [Chakrabarty et al., 2002]. However, network coverage
and connectivity are both required for a sensor network to be functionally effective. A rel-
atively new area of research attempts to provide both requirements, while redundant nodes
are identified. Initially two separate methods are proposed for checking the coverage and
connectivity [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005], where the computational complexity increases ex-
ponentially due to separate complex methods. Zhang and Hou [2004] showed that complete
coverage can ensure complete connectivity under some constraints, which integrates cover-
age and connectivity checking in a common framework [Xing et al., 2005]. Those integrated
frameworks are also computationally intensive due to their used complex geometrical com-
putations such as Voronoi polygon [Carbunar et al., 2006]. Limitation of these approaches
relates to their inability to identify all the existing redundant nodes due to their imprecise
redundancy computation process [Xing et al., 2005].
To identify all possible redundant nodes, a method is proposed that exploits the local
information such as coordinates of both the sensor and sensor field. Using the field local
information, it is assumed that a sensor field is a sensor grid, and the field is divided into
finite grid points. Using the node local information, the node sensing region of a sensor is
approximated by a subset of grid points. By examining the coverage degree of those points,
redundant nodes are detected while network requirements are preserved.
In this chapter, a redundancy calculation method is proposed, called the Self Calculated
Redundancy Check (SCRC) method, detecting maximum possible redundant nodes with
minimum computational overhead. SCRC computes node redundancy by calculating the
coverage information of a set of grid points, called sensing points. It uses the distance
between a sensing point and a node to identify the coverage information of each point. If
the distance between a sensing point and a node is within the sensing range of a node, that
point is considered covered. To calculate the point coverage information, a node only needs
to compare the distances between a point belonging to its sensing region and its neighbours.
Probable node redundancy is identified by aggregating the coverage information of all the
points inside a node’s sensing region. Possibly redundant nodes may have overlapping regions
with each other, so that SCRC also performs a random-backoff check to consider the coverage
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and connectivity effects of a redundant node. This helps to avoid any coverage or connectivity
holes due to deactivation of a node. In SCRC, each node checks its own redundancy, hence
the method is distributed. It is scalable because only neighbour information of a node is
involved in the computation process. Algorithm analysis shows that the time, message and
space complexity of SCRC is linear and in the order of the number of neighbours of a node.
Using expected value optimisation technique, the redundant node behaviour for random
distribution of deployed nodes was analysed. The experimental result of SCRC and other
existing techniques, namely Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS) [Tian and Georganas, 2003],
Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS) [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005] and Cov-
erage Configuration Protocol (CCP) [Xing et al., 2005] shows that SCRC is more consistent
with the analytical result compared to others. The result also shows that SCRC identifies at
least 5-10% more redundant nodes than CCANS, CCP or SAS because of its distance based
accurate node redundancy calculation. The computational overhead analysis showed that
SCRC needs linear node organisation time like SAS, however SAS identifies at least 10% less
redundant nodes than SCRC. The other two techniques require polynomial time to detect a
redundant node.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Related redundant node identification
techniques are discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 formulates the problem as a function of
coverage and connectivity over a sensor field. Section 4.4 introduces the conceptual model for
the proposed Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC) method. An analytical framework
characterising the “best” possible solutions under various node distributions is shown in
Section 4.5. This is followed by simulation results and performance evaluation in Section 4.6.
Finally, after discussing the results in Section 4.7, Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Related Work
The problem of identifying redundant sensor nodes has been studied examining a number
of aspects for example, identifying redundant nodes while providing connectivity, coverage
or both. In the following, identifying a connected minimum node set to provide network
connectivity is discussed first. Then the problem of identifying a minimum active node set
providing complete coverage is discussed. Finally, schemes identifying an optimum node set
while providing both coverage and connectivity is discussed.
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Centre Angle <= 120 DegreeCentre Angle >= 120 Degree
Figure 4.1: The Relationship between the Centre Angle and the Intersecting Regions.
Minimum Connected Dominating Set (MCDS)
A connected minimum node set can provide complete network connectivity. To find a virtual
connected backbone, dominating set based routing algorithms are used. Routing based on a
Connected Dominating Set (CDS) is a well known approach, where the routing search space
is reduced to the nodes in the set. A set is dominating if all the nodes in the system are either
in the set or neighbours of nodes in the set [Alzoubi et al., 2002; Sivakumar et al., 1998].
CDS algorithms form virtual communication backbones by connected routing nodes [Das
and Bharghavan, 1997]. For example, Wu [2002] proposes a localised algorithm to form
CDS by marking a node non-redundant when it has two neighbours not connected to each
other. Since finding the Minimum CDS (MCDS) is an NP-hard problem [Guha, 1998], the
algorithm uses shortest distance based heuristics to find a pseudo-optimal solution. Such
approaches can dynamically construct network communication backbones, however do not
address network coverage.
Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS)
Another important challenge is providing the coverage with a minimum active node set.
One of the earliest coverage-centric sensor node redundancy calculation techniques is the
Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS) [Tian and Georganas, 2002; 2003]. This method depends
on a local geometric calculation of overlapping sensing regions to identify redundant nodes.
A SAS node turns itself off when each of its coverage sectors is already “sponsored” or
covered by other nodes. The sponsored area of a node is calculated using the centre angle of
intersecting circular sensing regions [Tian and Georganas, 2003]. A centre angle is created
at each node’s centre by two intersecting points as shown in Figure 4.1. For simplicity, SAS
considers neighbours having centre angles ranging from 120◦ − 180◦. By considering fewer
neighbours, SAS identifies those redundant nodes with a reduced computational overhead.
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Jiang and Dou [2004] identified several limitations of SAS. For example, the area of
sponsored region is always smaller than the area of the intersection. Due to unconsidered
overlapping areas, the technique cannot identify all possible redundant nodes.
k-Coverage Preserving Technique
Another well known area of research involves preserving a certain number of coverage degree
of a sensing region. For example, Huang and Tseng [2003]; Huang et al. [2006] propose a
perimeter coverage checking algorithm determining the k coverage of a region where a region
is k-covered if it is covered by k nodes. Their method proves that an area is k-covered when
each sensor in that region is k-perimeter-covered. A node is only considered redundant if its
sensing region is at least k + 1-perimeter-covered. The determination of perimeter coverage
requires that each sensor communicates with all neighbours twice. If N is the number of
neighbours, the computational complexity of this approach is O(NlogN). The coverage
information is then used to determine each node redundancy and inactive schedule periods
for redundant sensors. To avoid any coverage holes, a possibly redundant sensor asks all of
its neighbours to re-evaluate the coverage of their perimeter without considering that node.
This requires a sensor running the perimeter coverage N times, and the complexity of the
protocol increases to O(N2logN).
Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS)
Identifying and deactivating redundant nodes, while preserving network coverage and con-
nectivity, is a relatively new area of research. An example of such a technique is the Coverage-
Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS) [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2004; 2005]. This method
proposes a distributed approach to identify redundant nodes using CDS information. CCANS
is a sensing ratio based technique, where the coverage ratio is the ratio of all CDS nodes that
can cover a region and the coverage provided by a single node situated at that region. CCANS
is a two stage algorithm where each node evaluates its coverage ratio in stage 1, and the nodes
check the connectivity in stage 2. A token based approach is used to calculate potentially
redundant nodes by calculating the sensing ratio. If the sensing ratio of a node region is
greater than a predefined threshold, the node is marked as ‘unset’. Each neighbour of an
‘unset’ node recalculates its redundancy except for the fact that one of its neighbours is now
in the ‘unset’ state and sends the result to the ’unset’ node. If the node is still potentially
redundant, it enters into the inactive state.
Related Work 70
The computational complexity of CCANS is in the order of the square of the number
of neighbours. CCANS also does not consider the coverage hole problem and may leave
some regions uncovered. It was identified in our experimental analysis that CCANS cannot
identify all possible potentially redundant nodes due to its token based serial redundancy
checking approach.
Coverage Connectivity Protocol (CCP)
Zhang and Hou [2004] show that implying k-coverage also ensures k-connectivity when the
transmission range of a sensor node is at least twice of the sensing range. Using a simi-
lar proposition, a well known k-coverage and connectivity preserving solution is proposed
in [Wang et al., 2003; Xing et al., 2005]. Wang et. al., propose a redundancy identification
technique, called Coverage Connectivity Protocol (CCP) which can provide different degrees
of coverage and meanwhile maintain communication connectivity. CCP partitioned the sen-
sor field into a collection of coverage patches, each of them bounded by arcs of sensing circles
and/or the boundary of the sensor field, and all points in each coverage patch have the same
coverage degree. The redundancy is measured by examining the coverage degree of those
patches. In CCP, if a node is inside a k+1-covered sensing patch, it is deactivated. CCP can
maintain the coverage and connectivity when transmission range is at least twice of sensing
ranges. If communication ranges are less than twice of sensing ranges, CCP is integrated with
SPAN1 [Chen et al., 2002] to provide both sensing coverage and communication connectivity.
The limitation of CCP is its higher complexity. The computational complexity for the
redundant eligibility algorithm of CCP is O(N3) where N is the number of nodes in the
sensing neighbour set. Another limitation of CCP is that it is not able to optimise the active
node set because it considers the active node set optimisation as reducing coverage degrees
of sensing patches instead of observing node sensing regions.
Geometric Computation Approach
Geometrical computations can be used for identifying redundant nodes, whilst coverage and
connectivity are preserved. Carbunar et al. [2004; 2006] detected redundant nodes using
the localised information of a sensor field. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a
sensor to be redundant are derived using Voronoi polygon and Delaunay triangulation. A
1SPAN is a distributed coordination technique for multi-hop ad hoc wireless networks that reduces energy
consumption without significantly reducing the capacity or connectivity of the network [Chen et al., 2002].
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sensor s calculates the redundancy by creating a Voronoi diagram of the Voronoi neighbours
of s when s is excluded. The 2 Voronoi Vertices (2-VV) of a sensor s are the Voronoi
vertices of the 2-Voronoi diagram of s, and a 2-Voronoi Intersection Point (2-VIP) of s is
the intersection between an edge of the 2-Voronoi diagram and the coverage circumcircle of
s. If all the 2-VVs and 2-VIPs of s are covered by the Voronoi neighbours of s, sensor s
is redundant. Since each node can calculate their own 2-VV and 2-VIPs, the technique is
distributed and the complexity of locally determining redundancy is O(NlogN). However,
creating a Voronoi diagram needs global sensor field information, and which is not entirely
localised because Voronoi polygons of nodes resides at the boundary of a sensor field cannot
be created locally [Zhang et al., 2006].
Summary
Since coverage and connectivity are equally important for a sensor network to keep the
network operationally effective, any sensor node set optimisation technique should preserve
both. In earlier active node set research, network connectivity and coverage are addressed
individually [Wu, 2002; Tian and Georganas, 2002]. A combined effort of coverage and
connectivity checking is proposed in [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005] where the computational
complexity of this technique is high because two separate methods are used to check the
coverage and connectivity. Coverage and connectivity are integrated in a common framework
in [Xing et al., 2005; Carbunar et al., 2006], which simplifies the redundant node identification
problem more. These techniques still prove energy costly due to their complex computational
processes, and they cannot identify all possible redundant nodes due to their imprecise node
redundancy calculations.
4.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, the problem of identifying redundant nodes while preserving network require-
ments - complete sensing coverage and node connectivity, is formalised. Ideally, a network
that provides a higher degree of coverage and connectivity can guarantee a higher Quality
of Service. In reality, sensors are resource limited, especially energy, and the redundant de-
ployment of nodes can cause redundant energy consuming tasks such as sensing an object by
multiple nodes. To conserve energy, redundant nodes should be eliminated from the network.
Redundant nodes should be identified in such a way that the network Quality of Service is
preserved. For this reason, the redundant node problem is regarded as temporarily deactivat-
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Figure 4.2: Ensuring Coverage ensures Connectivity (with some Constraints).
ing the maximum possible set of redundant nodes, while the network remains operationally
effective. In other words, in the following, the node redundancy problem is formalised as
an active node set optimisation problem with coverage and connectivity constraints, and to
simplify that, coverage is related to connectivity.
Active Node Set Optimisation
Rather than having a dense deployment of nodes, it is sufficient to have a sparse but uniform
distribution of active nodes providing required network coverage and connectivity. To min-
imise active nodes, redundant nodes should be deactivated where a node redundancy depends
on the coverage degree of its sensing region. Since the degree of coverage of a region depends
on the presence of active nodes, redundancy depends on the node density in that particu-
lar region. To control redundancy, active node density should be minimised. Formally, the
problem is stated as follows.
• Objective : Minimise the density of active nodes.
• Subject to :
1. Maintain the same coverage and,
2. Maintain the same connectivity of the original set of nodes.
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Relationship between Coverage and Connectivity
There is a relationship between coverage and connectivity - Xing et al. [2005] show that en-
suring coverage can ensure connectivity under some constraints. Coverage is one of the fun-
damental problems relating to the provision of specified quality surveillance [Meguerdichian
et al., 2001], and connectivity ensures that all nodes are reachable from any other nodes
or base stations [Tian and Georganas, 2005]. The relationship between the coverage and
connectivity is important because devising algorithms to fulfil both conditions is, in general,
more difficult than fulfilling only one of them. If one condition (coverage) implies another
(connectivity), the problem of maintaining both conditions is simplified.
Zhang and Hou [2004] show that a complete coverage of a convex region can infer con-
nectivity provided that the transmission range of a sensor node is at least twice the sensing
range as shown in Figure 4.2. If the sensing range and the transmission range are denoted as
ts and tr respectively, the relationship between the coverage and connectivity can be stated
as follows.
Lemma 4.3.1 Assuming the number of sensors in any finite sensing region is finite, the
condition of tr ≥ 2ts is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that complete coverage of a
convex region implies connectivity [Zhang and Hou, 2004].
Zou and Chakrabarty [2005] show that coverage and connectivity can still be preserved
for a heterogeneous sensor network. Since they propose separate coverage and connectivity
checking methods, the technique can maintain network coverage and connectivity even for
varied sensing and communication ranges.
These simplifying assumptions give us the flexibility to concentrate only on ensuring
coverage. Since the aim of this research is to identify redundant nodes, they will be identified
for both tr = 2ts and tr = ts while preserving network coverage.
4.4 Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC) Method
Existing coverage and connectivity preserved redundant node elimination techniques exploit
the geometric properties of either the node sensing region [Carbunar et al., 2006] or the sensor
field [Xing et al., 2005; Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005]. Instead, the advantages of both are used
to maximise the identifiable redundant nodes set. Using the local information, the sensor
field is divided into grid points, and the sensing region of a sensor node is approximated
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Figure 4.3: The Proposed Redundant Node Detection Method.
using those points. The coverage information of points is used to identify and deactivate a
redundant sensor.
A node’s redundancy is identified by checking only redundant coverage because complete
coverage ensures complete connectivity (under some constraints) [Zhang and Hou, 2004; Zou
and Chakrabarty, 2005]. It is assumed that a node’s sensing region is uniform in all directions
and is circular. The radius of a circular sensing region is the sensing range (ts) of a sensor
node, and the centre of the circle is the location of the sensor. A sensor’s sensing region may
overlap other sensors’ regions due to random distribution of nodes. If a sensor sensing region
is completely overlapped, that sensor is treated as redundant.
4.4.1 Detecting Redundant Nodes
This section describes the proposed distributed redundancy identification scheme based on
available network information such as field and node coordinates. A node is redundant when
its sensing region is completely covered by neighbours so the sensing region and neighbours
are identified. Using these information, intersections between neighbour sensing regions are
computed to determine node redundancy. The process is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
The proposed method starts with a neighbour discovery phase to identify the neighbour
node set. After that a novel technique, named Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC),
detects node coverage redundancy by calculating overlapping sensing regions. This method
completes with a state determination phase to avoid any possible coverage holes. In this
phase, each potentially redundant node checks whether it is required.
Neighbour Discovery
Neighbours are identified to calculate redundant node sensing regions. Each node has a
specific neighbour set, and a node sensing region can overlap with only its neighbour’s sensing
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Algorithm 2: Neighbour and Neighbour Position Discovery
Notation:
MSG is the Control message
Neigh[i] is the neighbour information table
Id is the node ID
(x, y) is the node coordinate
state is the node current state
Initialize Neigh[i] ← φ;2.1
Initialize MSGi ← { Idi, (xi, yi), statei };2.2
Broadcast MSGi;2.3
while TRUE do2.4
Receive MSGj from neighbours;2.5
Store neighbour information - Neigh[j] ← { Idj , (xj , yj), statej } ;2.6
end2.7
regions. To detect node redundancy, overlapping regions need to be identified, and to identify
overlapping regions, neighbour information is needed. The neighbour discovery procedure is
given in Algorithm 2.
Every node starts its life-cycle with an initialisation phase where it sets network pa-
rameters and collects neighbour information [Sakib et al., 2005]. In this phase, each node
broadcasts its coordinate and state information to the nodes within its transmission range
as shown in Lines 2.2 and 2.3 in Algorithm 2. After receiving the broadcast message, the
nodes store their neighbour information in a table, called the neighbour information table
(Line 2.6). At the subsequent configuration phase, each node chooses to become active (for
example, gateway or sense node) or inactive (for example, hibernating node) based on these
information as shown in Figure 3.1, Chapter 3.
Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC)
A node calculates its redundancy by checking how much of its sensing region overlapped with
its neighbours. To check coverage, the Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC) technique
is proposed which calculates node redundancy based on distances between sensing points and
neighbouring nodes. The steps of SCRC are described below, and the method is defined in
Algorithm 3.
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  q_i
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− Covered points (q_1, q_2, ... ,q_i)
− Nodes (s_1, s_2, ... ,s_j)
Figure 4.4: Coverage Calculation: a Function of Distance from the Neighbouring Nodes.
• Discritised Sensing Region -
It is assumed that a sensor field is a plane, and the sensing region of a sensor is a circle
with the radius equivalent to the sensing range of that sensor. Chakrabarty et al. [2002]
show that a sensor field can be assumed as a grid if field location is available, so here
a sensor field is represented by a finite set of grid points, called sensing points. Since a
sensor covers a certain circular region, the sensing region of a sensor node is a subset
of that finite point set. This helps to quantify each node’s coverage by the coverage
information of those sensing points as shown below.
• Point Coverage -
If a sensing point qi belongs to the sensing point set of a node si, qi is called covered
by si. Point coverage is calculated using the distance between a sensing point and a
sensor node. For example, if the distance between qi and si is less than or equal to the
node sensing range ts, qi belongs to the sensing point set of si and hence, is covered.
Figure 4.4 shows how each sensing point is called covered if that point is within the
coverage range of at least one sensor node.
• Redundant Coverage of a Point -
A point is redundantly covered when it is within the sensing range of more than some
predefined number of nodes. Redundant coverage of a point is calculated using the
sensing point coverage given above. The coverage degree of a point qi is the number
of sensors that cover qi, and this is used to define the redundant coverage of a point.
Sometimes sensing applications require a high degree of redundancy to fulfil the specific
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Algorithm 3: SCRC - Self Calculated Redundancy Check
Notation:
Ni(s) is the set of neighbours for node i
Covi(p) is the set of points covered by node i
ts is the sensing range
RP[i] is the redundant point checking table
Flag is a Boolean variable generating {TRUE,FALSE}
Result :
Returning the Boolean value Flag denoting node redundancy. If the
value is FALSE, the node is redundant, otherwise non-redundant.
for Ni(s) - all sensors in the neighbour table do3.1
for Covi(p) - all points in the coverage point set do3.2
Calculate the distance between pi and si ;3.3
if the distance is less than the ts then3.4
RP[i] ← TRUE;3.5
end3.6
else3.7
RP[i] ← FALSE;3.8
end3.9
end3.10
end3.11
Initialize Flag ← TRUE;3.12
for all points belongs to Cov(pi) do3.13
if RP[i] == FALSE then3.14
Flag ← FALSE ;3.15
end3.16
end3.17
Return(Flag)3.18
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quality of surveillance. If a higher quality of surveillance is required, the coverage degree
of each point also needs to be higher. The minimal coverage degree is one to maintain
the network coverage and connectivity. If the coverage degree of a sensing point is
greater than a required coverage degree, the point is redundantly covered. Let us
assume that the required redundancy is ν - point qi is redundantly covered when it is
within the sensing range of more than ν nodes.
• Node Region Coverage/Redundancy -
A node’s sensing region is redundantly covered when all the sensing points inside that
sensing region are redundantly covered. The redundancy computation process is shown
in Algorithm 3. To calculate coverage redundancy, each node identifies the coverage
points that belong to their sensing region by comparing distances between each sensing
point and the sensing range. Each node can calculate point coverage and point re-
dundancy by comparing distances between a sensing point and its neighbours. This is
shown from Lines 3.2 to 3.10 in the algorithm. Using the coverage effects of each sens-
ing point, a node decides its redundancy as shown in Lines 3.13 - 3.17 in Algorithm 3.
The redundancy computation detail is also given in Subsection 4.4.2.
If all the sensing points belonging to a node’s sensing region are redundantly covered,
that node may not be needed. Such nodes are called “potentially redundant” because
multiple potentially redundant nodes can overlap with each other, and further network
hole checking is required before deactivating appropriate redundant nodes. On the
other hand, if at least one sensing point from a node sensing region is found to be
non-redundantly covered, that node is non-redundant.
State Determination
To avoid any coverage and/or connectivity holes, potentially redundant nodes from the same
neighbour set do not simultaneously enter the sleeping state. Since potentially redundant
nodes may have overlapping sensing regions, simultaneous deactivation of all of them could
leave regions uncovered. A random back-off method is used where redundant nodes are found
that can be deactivated without creating any holes. Random back-off is a simple contention
avoidance technique, widely used for medium access control in distributed systems [Stallings,
2007]. A similar approach is used here to prevent simultaneous deactivation of multiple
potentially redundant nodes from the same region, as illustrated in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4: State Determination Algorithm
Notation:
SCRC() is the Self Calculated Redundancy Check method
N is the number of neighbours
MSGw is the message to show intention to go to the hibernation
MSGc is the confirmation message to go to the hibernation state
rt is the round trip time
wp is the predefined wait time equivalent to rt
wr is the random wait time
Broadcast the MSGw among the neighbours;4.1
Wait for predefined wp time;4.2
if MSGw is received from other neighbours then4.3
Wait for wr time (1 rt ≥ wr ≤ N rt);4.4
if if MSGc received from neighbour i then4.5
Update neighbour table by marking i as inactive;4.6
Execute SCRC();4.7
end4.8
else4.9
Broadcast MSGc to the neighbours;4.10
Change the node state to Inactive;4.11
end4.12
end4.13
else4.14
Broadcast MSGc to the neighbours;4.15
Change the node state to Inactive;4.16
end4.17
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After calculating the probable redundancy, each potentially redundant node sends mes-
sages, called willingness messages, to their neighbours as shown at Line 4.1 in the algorithm.
After that, it waits for a predefined wp amount of time to receive such messages from its
neighbours. wp is carefully chosen allowing a node sufficient time to receive other willingness
messages from neighbours, so that it is set greater than the one hop round trip time. If
a potentially redundant node receives willingness messages within the waiting time wp, it
implies that there are multiple potentially redundant nodes from the same neighbour set.
Then it waits another random amount of time wr, chosen between one round trip time to the
number of neighbours round trip times (shown at Line 4.4). If a potentially redundant node
receives any confirmation messages within the wr time, it refrains from entering the inactive
state. Otherwise, it sends a redundancy confirmation message and goes to the inactive or
sleeping state.
If a potentially redundant node does not receive any willingness messages within the wait
time wp, it assumes that there are no other redundant nodes within its neighbour set. Hence,
it can enter the inactive state and sends a redundancy confirmation message to its neighbours
which is shown in Lines 4.14 - 4.17 in Algorithm 4. After receiving a redundancy confirmation
message, each node updates its neighbour table and recalculates node redundancy.
4.4.2 The SCRC Computation Detail
In this section, the computation detail of the proposed redundancy identification method
is described. Since redundantly covered sensing points reside in intersecting node sensing
regions, the identification of those regions is given. The union of intersecting regions of a
node contains all the redundantly covered sensing points and thus decides node redundancy.
In the following, coverage and redundancy definitions are summarised from the previous sub-
section, then the point redundancy calculation is given by showing that redundantly covered
points reside in the intersecting sensing regions. The symbols used for the computation are
summarised in Table 4.1.
Assumptions and Definitions
Let us assume that Q = {q0, qi, . . . , qm} is the sensor field, and S = {s0, s1, . . . , sn} is the
set of deployed sensors. Each node (si|si ∈ S) is represented by a set of points (Ki|Ki ⊂ Q)
where Ki = {qi0 , qi1 , . . . , qij}. Let us also assume that the sensing region of a node si is a
circle represented by κi. If the coverage degree requirement for each point is ν, the point
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Table 4.1: Symbol Table for SCRC Computation.
Symbol Denote
S The set of sensors
n Number of sensors in set S
si i th Sensor
κi A circle with radius ts and centre at si
Ki Set of points belongs to the sensing region of si
Q The sensor field
qi a point belongs to sensor field Q
ts Sensing range of a sensor
tr Transmission range of a sensor
ν Required coverage degree
N(si) The neighbour set of node si
coverage, region coverage, region redundancy and node redundancy are defined as follows.
Definition ν-Coverage of a point - if any point (qi|qi ∈ Q) in the sensor field is within the
coverage range of at least ν nodes, qi is called ν-covered.
Definition ν-Coverage of a region - if all the points qi inside a node region (κi|κi ⊆ Q) are
covered by at least ν nodes, κi is called ν-covered.
Definition ν-Redundancy of a point - if any point (qi|qi ∈ Q) in the sensor field is covered
by at least ν + 1 nodes, qi is called (ν-)redundant or redundantly covered.
Definition Node redundancy - a node is called redundant iff all the points (Ki|Ki ⊂ Q) of
its sensing region κi are ν-redundant.
Node Redundancy Calculation
A node is redundant if its entire sensing region is intersected by ν neighbours. Using neigh-
bour coordinates, a node calculates how much of its region is covered based on distances
between sensing points and neighbours.
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Intersecting points of s_i and s_j
Figure 4.5: Redundant Sensing Points in the Intersecting Region.
Points in the intersecting region have distances less than or equal to the sensing range
from any neighbour nodes. Since the coordinates of neighbours and their coverage ranges
are known, a node can calculate intersecting regions covered by its neighbours. If a point
q ∈ Ki (set of points belongs to sensing region of node si) also belongs to Kj , point q is in
the intersecting region of both si and sj as shown in Figure 4.5. If the coordinate of q and
sj are (xq, yq) and (xj , yj) respectively, the Euclidian distance between q and sj is calculated
by the following equation.
||q − sj || = δ =
√
(xp − xj)2 + (yp − yj)2 (4.1)
Since q is in the intersecting region of si and sj ’s sensing regions, the distance δ between
q and sj is also less than or equal to the sensing range ts. Formally, the condition is stated
as follows.
||q − sj || = δ ≤ ts (4.2)
A node is redundant if, and only if, all the points inside its node sensing region are
otherwise covered by at least ν neighbours. This implies that redundantly covered sensing
points of a node reside in the intersecting regions of at least ν + 1 nodes. For simplicity, let
us consider when ν is 1, then node redundancy is redefined as follows. A node i is redundant
if, and only if, each sensing point belonging to Ki is also covered by at least one of the
neighbours of i. The redundancy determination is then equivalent to checking whether the
sensing point subset Ki of i is a subset of the union of intersecting regions between node
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i and its neighbours’ sensing regions. If the neighbour node set of a node si is N(si), the
redundancy condition for si can be stated as follows.
Ki ⊆
⋃
j∈N(si)
Kj (4.3)
⇒ Ki ⊆
⋃
j∈N(si)
(Kj ∩Ki) (4.4)
All the sensing points of a node residing in the intersecting regions are identified using
equation 4.2 as shown in Algorithm 3 at Line 3.3. Then the node redundancy is calculated
based on those intersecting sensing points using equation 4.4 as shown in the algorithm from
Lines 3.13 to 3.16.
4.4.3 Complexity Analysis and Comparison
Required time, space (or memory) and number of messages to organise nodes are important
performance criteria for a resource limited sensor network. The time, space and message
complexity of SCRC are identified and compared against three well known existing redundant
node elimination techniques, namely Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS) [Tian and Georganas,
2003], Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS) [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005] and
Coverage Configuration Protocol (CCP) [Xing et al., 2005].
Complexity is identified based on some assumptions. Let λ be the node density, and each
node has an average of λ neighbours. Let us also assume that a single broadcast process
takes O(λ) time as shown in [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005]. The organising time is denoted
as the time taken to identify a node as a redundant node. Space complexity is the required
memory to hold information that is needed to calculate node redundancy. The number of
messages involved in the redundancy identification method is the message complexity. The
organising time, space and message complexity for SCRC along with other existing techniques
are derived in the following.
Complexity of Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC)
SCRC performs three steps to identify a redundant node as described in Figure 4.3. First,
each node discovers neighbours by receiving neighbour announcement messages. Second, it
calculates redundancy using SCRC by identifying intersecting sensing regions. Finally, if a
node finds itself potentially redundant, it enters the state determination phase. A potentially
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redundant node sends a willingness message to its neighbours and waits for a predefined time
wp. Within the wait time, if any other willingness messages are received, a node waits for
another random amount of time wr to confirm its redundancy.
To identify node redundancy, a SCRC node requires time to discover neighbours, to check
point redundancy and to determine the state of a potentially redundant node. According
to Algorithm 2, the neighbour discovery step consists of one broadcast of a neighbour an-
nouncement message, hence takes O(λ) time. Since set Ki is the point approximation of a
sensor si, coverage checking takes |Ki| time. The state determination (Algorithm 4) takes at
most two broadcasts and two waiting times, that is approximately (λ + wp + λ + wr) time.
Therefore, time complexity for the proposed technique is (3λ + |Ki| + wp + wr) which is in
the order of the node density, that is O(λ).
Assume there is no packet loss and that each node sends exactly one neighbour announce-
ment, one willingness and one redundancy confirmation message. Each node also receives
at most one neighbour announcement, one redundancy willingness and another redundancy
confirmation message from each neighbour. If there are λ neighbours per node, each node
receives at most 3λ messages from its neighbours. This implies that the message complexity
is also in the order of λ, that is O(λ).
A SCRC node needs to store its neighbour IDs, coordinate values and state information.
Hence, the space complexity is in the order of the number of neighbours which is O(λ).
Complexity of Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS)
In SAS [Tian and Georganas, 2003], each node goes through three steps similar to a SCRC
node which are neighbour discovery, redundancy calculation and state determination. For
the computational simplicity, SAS does not consider neighbours with centre angles less than
120◦, so that on average the technique leaves half of the neighbours out of the consideration.
As a result, the average node organisation time of SAS is less than SCRC but complexity is
still in the order of the number of neighbours, that is O(λ). In SAS, message communication
is restricted to neighbours, so the complexity is also in the order of λ. Since a SAS node has
to store all neighbour information, space complexity is the same as SCRC which is the order
of λ or O(λ).
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Table 4.2: Summary of Complexity Analysis for Various Redundant Node Elimination Tech-
niques .
Complexity is measured in terms of node density λ
Approach Time Space Message
SAS O(λ) O(λ) O(λ)
CCANS O(λ2) O(λ) O(λ)
CCP O(λ3) O(λ) O(λ)
SCRC O(λ) O(λ) O(λ)
Complexity of Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS)
CCANS [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005], described in Section 4.2, is a token based algorithm.
The node holding the token calculates its redundancy, after which it passes the token to the
next neighbour. Token based computation introduces a time complexity in the quadratic
order of the number of neighbours because each node has to wait for the token from one
of its neighbours. Zou and Chakrabarty [2005] give the complexity as O(λ2 + λ) which is
equivalent to O(λ2). The required space and message communication are restricted to the
neighbours, so that complexities are linear and in the order of the node density, that is O(λ).
Complexity of Coverage Configuration Protocol (CCP)
CCP [Xing et al., 2005] divides the sensor field into patches and identifies the coverage degree
of those patches with a view to reducing the degree to an acceptable level. A node turns
itself off to reduce the coverage degree of a patch. To maintain the required coverage degree,
neighbour collaboration is performed before sending a node to the sleeping state. If a node
finds its sensing region is in a redundantly covered patch, it declares itself as eligible to
be redundant. The eligibility algorithm has a reported computational complexity of O(λ3),
where λ is the node density [Xing et al., 2005], so the time complexity is also considered
O(λ3). The space and message complexity are the same as other techniques, that is in the
order of λ. The complexity of CCP also depends on an external algorithm (for example,
SPAN [Chen et al., 2002]), as CCP uses that algorithm to check required connectivity.
Table 4.2 summarises the time, space and message complexity for various approaches.
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Table 4.3: Symbol Table for Analysing the Redundant Node Identification Model
Symbol Denote
H The optimisation function, minimising active nodes
χ Coverage quantifier for points in the sensor field
βi A binary variable, Quantifying i-th point
RP [i] Point redundancy check vector
αi A binary variable, Quantifying i-th sensor
λ Node density of the sensor field
l Width and length of the sensor field
The table shows that SCRC has linear time, space and message complexity, and only SAS
has the same complexity. However, as SAS does not consider entire overlapping neighbours,
it cannot identify all the possibly redundant nodes from the network. Although CCANS and
CCP have linear space and message complexity, CCANS has a quadratic time complexity,
and CCP has a cubic computational complexity.
4.5 Analysis of the Redundant Node Identification Model
In this section, possible redundant nodes are identified mathematically which will help to ana-
lytically compare performances of redundant node identification techniques (see Section 4.6).
An expected value optimisation technique is used to identify the possible number of re-
dundant nodes. The technique assumes node location probabilistically using two different
node distributions, namely uniform and Poisson. The mathematical basis for the model
is described, and the model for those two node distributions are analysed. In addition to
Table 4.1, symbols used in this section are depicted in Table 4.3.
4.5.1 Mathematical Building Blocks
The redundant node elimination problem is defined as a function that identifies the minimum
number of active nodes required to maintain network coverage and connectivity. Instead of
complete deployed sensor set, a subset of active nodes may be sufficient to maintain the
network requirements. If S is the sensor set, the coverage- and connectivity-centric problem
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Figure 4.6: n Circles (κ), Centred by n Sensors in the Sensor Field.
is to find a minimal subset of non-redundant nodes, say S′ (S′ ⊆ S), that covers the sensor
field. That is only nodes in S′ are required to maintain the same coverage and connectivity
provided by S. In the following, the active node set minimisation function is formulated
based on some assumptions, and then the expected value optimisation technique is used to
solve the function.
Assume thatQ be a sensor field, andQ is approximated by a finite point set {q1, q2, ..., qm},
called the sensing point set. Let the cardinality of set S be n (that is |S| = n), and Q is
covered by the node set S. A node sensing region is a circle, so that Q can be treated as
the union of the n circles (κ = {κ1, κ2, ..., κn}) (see Figure 4.6). Since κi is a subset of Q,
the coverage information of a subset of sensing points that belongs of κi can measure the
redundancy of each κi. To compute the coverage of sensing points, a coverage detection
function χ is considered. By applying χ, each sensing point is described in terms of coverage.
The active node set optimisation task is denoted as a function H identifying the minimum
possible number of active nodes by minimising the density of κ with coverage and connectivity
constraints. That is function H identifies the number of circles (κ) that satisfies the coverage
function χ. If q is a sensing point in κi, function H is given as follows.
H(κ) =
n∑
i=1
∫
κi
χ(q)dq (4.5)
The objective function, minκ H(κ), is finding the minimum number of circles κ needed
to cover the sensor field, where the process of minimisation of active nodes is the process of
elimination of redundantly covered circles (κ).
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4.5.2 Expected Value Optimisation Technique
In this section, the expected value optimisation technique is used to solve equation 4.5 be-
cause probabilistic methods are specific and optimised for particular problems consisting
random variables [Huyse, 2001]. The technique depends on a set of values, called mass, and
a probability function computing the probability of an event occurring over the mass [John-
son, 2003]. This technique is applied to identify the maximum possible number of redundant
nodes using the deployed node set (as the mass) and the probability of a node to be redun-
dantly covered. In the following, the required active node set is formulated as an expected
value function, and then node distribution models are used to evaluate the function.
The sensing region of a sensor is approximated by a set of sensing points which enables
to define the node redundancy by considering the coverage of those points. It is assumed
that the sensor field is a grid having a finite set of sensing points and the sensing region of a
node is a subset of the sensor field. Using equation 4.1, the sensing point subset for a sensor
si is obtained by checking whether a point is within the sensing range of si. That is each
of the circles κi, representing sensor si, is approximated by a set of points Ki where Ki =
{q1, q2, ..., qm}.
Since nodes are capable of on-board computation, they can calculate the coverage in-
formation of points belonging to their sensing regions. Using neighbour coordinates, nodes
check whether those points are ν-redundant or not where a point is redundantly covered if it
is at least ν + 1-covered. To define qi in terms of coverage, a binary variable βi is associated
with each point qi ∈ Ki. If ci is the coverage degree of point qi, βi defines qi as redundantly
covered when ci is greater than ν, otherwise non-redundant. Then point coverage can be
defined as follows.
βi =
{
True if ci ≥ ν
False Otherwise
(4.6)
Each κi is identified redundantly or non-redundantly covered by using the stored point
coverage information. If all the points inside Ki, the point approximation of κi, are ν-
redundant, the product of βi is True. This implies that Ki or κi is redundantly covered.
If any point fails to be ν-redundant, the product of βi is False, and κi is needed. The
optimisation function described in equation 4.5 is then redefined from κi to Ki as follows.
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H(K) =
n∑
i=1
∏
Ki
βi (4.7)
In order to find the active node set, binary variable αi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is associated with each
sensor si where αi is the quantitative redundancy measurement of si. Node si discovers its
redundancy by accumulating the point coverage effects using equation 4.7. If si is needed,
αi will be True, otherwise False. The definition of α is given below.
αi =
{
True if si = ACTIV E
False Otherwise
(4.8)
Since Ki represents the i-th sensor node, S can be used instead of K in equation 4.7.
This leads us to find the minimum number of sensor nodes covering the sensor field. By
accumulating the sensing point quantifier βi, the node quantifier αi is found, and the sum of
αi gives us the required number of active nodes. The expected value operation is shown in
the following.
H(κ) =
n∑
i=1
∏
κi
βi (4.9)
⇒ Hκ(S) =
n∑
i=1
∏
si
βi (4.10)
∼= min
(
n∑
i=1
∏
si
βi
)
(4.11)
= E(S)
(
n∑
i=1
αi
)
(4.12)
4.5.3 Redundancy Distribution Models
In this section, the expected number of redundant nodes is derived using equation 4.12. Since
nodes are randomly distributed, there is a relationship between the overlapping coverage of
a region and the node distribution. A probability distribution function is used to find the
probability of a node present in a specific region. This enables identification of overlapped
node regions which include redundant nodes.
The overlapping coverage of a sensing region depends on how nodes are distributed. Two
most common and important node distribution techniques, namely uniformly random and
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Poisson distribution, are considered to predict the presence of a node in a region. Nodes
can be deployed with a predefined pattern having constant probability to cover a particular
sensing region which is modelled by uniformly random node distribution [Meguerdichian
et al., 2001]. A node deployment can also be random where overlapping coverage of a sensing
region is independent to occur. In such deployment related problems, Poisson point process
is used to model node distribution schemes [Du and Lin, 2005; Meguerdichian et al., 2001].
Both distribution models are analysed, and the probability of a node sensing region being
redundantly covered is identified.
Uniformly Random Node Distribution
The probability of a node being redundant is identified by identifying the probability of its
sensing region being redundantly covered when nodes are distributed uniformly randomly.
Node redundancy probability is used to identify the expected number of redundant nodes
present in a given network.
The probability of a sensing point being covered by a node is constant when nodes are
uniformly distributed. The probability of a sensing point qi covered by randomly deployed
node si is the ratio of areas of the sensing region of si and the sensor field. It is assumed
that the sensor field Q is a square region having length and width of l, and it is divided into
a l × l grid. If the sensing range of a sensor node is ts, the probability equation of qi being
covered by si is given as follows.
P (qi ∈ si) = πt
2
s
l2
(4.13)
Since nodes are uniformly distributed, equation 4.13 is also the probability of a region
equivalent to a node sensing region being covered by a node [Lazos and Poovendran, 2006].
If the area covered by a sensor si is Ai, equation 4.13 gives us the probability of covering an
area equivalent to Ai ⊆ Q. The probability of a region Ai being covered by node si is stated
as follows.
P (Ai = si) =
πt2s
l2
(4.14)
The probability of a sensing region being covered by multiple nodes also depends on node
density, so equation 4.14 is redefined using the node density of sensor field. Density is the
ratio of areas of all sensor nodes and the sensor field. If λ is the density of sensor nodes, it
is calculated by the following equation:
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λ =
nπt2s
l2
(4.15)
Then the probability of a region, equivalent to a node sensing region being covered by a
node becomes the ratio of the node density and the number of deployed nodes. Equation 4.14
is modified as follows.
P (qi ∈ si) = P (Ai = si) (4.16)
=
λ
n
(4.17)
Since equation 4.17 gives the probability of a point qi being covered by a sensor si, the
probability of qi not covered by si is derived as follows.
P (qi /∈ si) = 1− P (qi ∈ si) (4.18)
= 1− λ
n
(4.19)
=
n− λ
n
(4.20)
The probability of a sensing point being covered by ν nodes is identified as the product of
the probability of ν nodes that cover the point and the probability of rest of the nodes that
do not cover that point. Nodes are uniformly randomly distributed and there are n nodes
thrown with an equal probability, so the probability of first ν nodes (s1, ..., sν) covering qi is
computed as follows.
P (qi = ν) = P (qi ∈ s1, ..., qi ∈ sν , qi /∈ sν+1..., qi /∈ sn) (4.21)
= P (qi ∈ s1)...P (qi ∈ sν)P (qi /∈ sν+1)...P (qi /∈ sn) (4.22)
= P (qi ∈ si)νP (qi /∈ si)n−ν (4.23)
Since there are (nν ) possible choices to ν cover the point qi, the probability that point qi
will be ν-covered from n deployed nodes is computed as follows.
P (qi = ν) = (
n
ν )P (qi ∈ si)νP (qi /∈ si)n−ν (4.24)
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This is also the probability that an area Ai ⊆ Q will be ν-covered as well [Lazos and
Poovendran, 2006]. The probability of Ai being ν covered when there are n nodes, is stated
as follows.
P (Ai = ν) = P (qi = ν) (4.25)
= (nν )P (qi ∈ si)νP (qi /∈ si)n−ν (4.26)
Once the probability of a ν-covered sensing area is found, the probability of a sensing
area being redundantly covered can be derived. Redundancy probability function is given
below.
P (Ai > ν) = 1−
ν∑
i=0
P (Ai = i) (4.27)
⇒ P (si > ν) = 1−
ν−1∑
i=0
(nν )P (qi ∈ si)iP (qi /∈ si)n−i (4.28)
= 1−
ν−1∑
i=0
(nν )
(
λ
n
)i (n− λ
n
)n−i
(4.29)
Using equation 4.29, the probability distribution of redundant nodes was calculated for
various deployed node number and node coverage density. The value of ν was set to 1, and
the transmission range of a sensor node tr was set to 8 units. With node density ranging
from 1 to 10, n was varied from 50 to 300.
Results were calculated for two cases when the transmission range tr of a node was equal
to the sensing range ts, and when tr was twice of ts. Figure 4.7 shows that the probability of
a node being redundant increases when node density is also increased for both of the cases.
When tr = ts, it reaches to the maximum after adding certain number of nodes. For example,
when the number of deployed nodes was 50, the node redundancy probability was about 0.45
at node density 2, and the probability increases to about 0.99 at node density ≥ 5. When the
sensor field becomes completely covered, adding new nodes only increases node redundancy
probability. The figure also shows that the node redundancy probability linearly increases
when tr = 2ts but the increase rate is moderate compared to the case where tr = ts. This
is because smaller ts denotes smaller sensing regions and less overlapping regions between
neighbours.
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Figure 4.7: Probability Distribution of Redundant Nodes when the Node Distribution is Uni-
formly Random.
The required minimum number of active nodes is the integration of the probability of
a node not being redundant over the sensor field. The probability function given in equa-
tion 4.29 can predict the minimum number of required active nodes using equation 4.12. If
S is the sensor set in the sensor field Q, and αi is the binary variable quantifying i-th sensor
depending on P (si > ν), equation 4.12 becomes as follows.
Hκ(S) = E(S)
(
n∑
i=1
αi
)
(4.30)
=
∫
S
(1− P (si > ν))ds (4.31)
If H ′κ(S) is the function identifying maximum possible number of redundant nodes, H
′
κ(S)
is derived as follows.
H ′κ(S) =
∫
S
P (si > ν)ds (4.32)
Using Fubini’s theorem [Haaser, 1991], the expected number of potentially redundant
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Figure 4.8: Expected Number of Potentially Redundant Nodes when the Node Distribution is
Uniformly Random.
nodes is calculated where the redundancy probability for each of the sensor is given in equa-
tion 4.29.
H ′κ(S) =
∫
S
P (si > ν)ds (4.33)
= |S|
(
1−
ν−1∑
i=0
(nν )
(
λ
n
)i (n− λ
n
)n−i)
(4.34)
= n
(
1−
ν−1∑
i=0
(nν )
(
λ
n
)i (n− λ
n
)n−i)
(4.35)
Under various node density, the expected number of potentially redundant nodes is shown
in Figure 4.8. The graph shows that in both cases the number of potentially redundant nodes
linearly increases when the number of deployed nodes increases. The number of potential
redundant nodes increases more quickly when tr = ts than tr = 2ts because of the higher
redundancy probability. The figure also shows that node density has a significant impact
on the number of potentially redundant nodes. When tr = ts, the number of potentially
redundant nodes is about 70% of deployed nodes at low network density and it reaches to
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about 99% of deployed nodes at high network density. On the other hand, when tr = 2ts,
about 40% of deployed nodes was found potentially redundant at low network density and
about 90% of deployed nodes as potentially redundant at high network density. This is
because once the network is completely covered, deploying additional nodes increses the
number of potentially redundant nodes.
Poisson Node Distribution
The probability function for a node being ν-covered is derived when node distribution is
Poisson. If nodes are deployed following a Poisson point process and λ is the node density,
the probability of a node being ν-covered is derived using a similar formula presented at [Hall,
1988]. The equation is stated below:
P (si = ν) = exp
−λ
(
ν−1∑
i=0
λi
i!
)
(4.36)
When n nodes are deployed using Poisson distribution, the probability that a node is
ν-redundant is computed as follows.
P (si > ν) = 1− P (si = ν) (4.37)
= 1− exp−λ
(
ν−1∑
i=0
λi
i!
)
(4.38)
The probability of a node being redundant was computed for Poisson node distribution
when transmission range (tr) was the same as sensing range (ts) and tr = 2ts. Other pa-
rameters were the same as those were for redundancy probability computation when nodes
were uniformly distributed. Figure 4.9 shows that for both cases, probability increases more
quickly with increasing node density than their respective results obtained for the uniformly
random node distribution (Figure 4.7). For example, when the number of deployed nodes was
50 and node density was 4, the node redundancy probability was about 0.9 at tr = ts which
is about 20% more than the corresponding node redundancy probability when nodes were
distributed uniformly randomly. This is because nodes are usually deployed as clusters in
Poisson distribution so a node’s sensing region has higher probability to be overlapped by its
neighbours’ sensing regions. The figure also shows that when tr = 2ts, the node redundancy
probability is gradually increasing with the increasing node density, however when tr = ts,
the probability reaches to the maximum value after a certain node density.
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Figure 4.9: Probability Distribution of Redundant Nodes when the Node Distribution is Pois-
son.
For the Poisson node distribution, the probability distribution function in equation 4.35
is replaced to calculate the expected number of active nodes. The equation is derived as
follows.
H ′κ(S) = |S|(P (si ≥ ν)) (4.39)
= n
(
1− exp−λ
(
ν−1∑
i=0
λi
i!
))
(4.40)
The expected number of potentially redundant nodes under various node density is shown
in Figure 4.10. Result follows a similar trend as shown in Figure 4.9, and it shows that with
the increase of the node density, the number of redundant nodes increases for both cases. An
important observation from the figure is when tr = ts, the number of potentially redundant
nodes reaches to a saturation point after a certain number of node density. For example, when
the number of deployed nodes was 300 and node density was ≥ 4, about 99% of deployed
nodes were found potentially redundant. Due to higher node redundancy probability, the
number of potentially redundant nodes quickly reaches to the saturation when tr = ts than
tr = 2ts.
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Figure 4.10: Expected Number of Redundant Nodes when the Node Distribution is Poisson.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of SCRC is evaluated experimentally. An extensive sim-
ulation was performed to identify the performance of SCRC, and results are compared
against existing schemes such as Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS) [Tian and Georganas, 2003],
Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS) [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005] and Cover-
age Configuration Protocol (CCP) [Xing et al., 2005]. The experiment was performed under
uniformly random and Poission node distributions and a comparative study of experimental
results is given below.
Simulation Environment
To perform the simulation, the sensor field was considered as a (50 × 50) grid with spacing of
1 units between grid points. A similar consideration was used in [Tian and Georganas, 2003]
and [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005]. For node deployment, two different node distribution
schemes - uniformly random and Poisson distributions, were used. To vary node density,
the number of nodes varied from 50 to 300. All the deployed nodes were architecturally
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Table 4.4: Simulation Environment for Implementing Redundant Node Elimination Tech-
niques
Parameter Value
Sensor field area (Q) 50× 50 grid
Number of nodes (S) Varied from 50 to 300
Data transmission range (tr) 8 unit distance
Node sensing range (ts) 8 or 4 unit distance
identical. Nodes could communicate with each other, if they were within their transmission
ranges. Transmission range tr was fixed for all nodes, and it was set to 8 grid units. Sensing
range ts was variable to detect redundant node behaviour when tr = ts in one case and
tr = 2ts in another. Network parameters for the simulation is given in Table 4.4.
Compared Schemes
Various redundant node identification schemes were implemented to compare their perfor-
mances against SCRC. As a baseline, a brute force algorithm was implemented to find the ac-
tual number of potentially redundant nodes present in the simulation testbed. The expected
number of redundant nodes was analytically identified in Section 4.5. Both the baseline and
the analytical results are compared to the number of redundant nodes identified by differ-
ent redundant node identification schemes. The Sponsored Area Scheme (SAS) [Tian and
Georganas, 2005], Coverage-Centric Active Nodes Selection (CCANS) [Zou and Chakrabarty,
2005] and Coverage and Configuration Protocol (CCP) [Xing et al., 2005] were implemented
and compared to SCRC. Details of the existing schemes are given in Sections 4.2 and 4.4.3.
Performance Metrics
To compare the performances of various redundant node identification schemes, the number
of potentially redundant nodes and the number of nodes actually deactivated by compared
schemes were measured. Since the aim of this research is to identify and deactivate redundant
nodes, these two metrics are used as the performance criteria. Section 4.4.3 shows that the
algorithm complexity of all techniques are the same, except for time complexity. Therefore,
the average simulation time to detect a redundant node was also measured.
Performance Evaluation 99
For each experiment, nodes were deployed using either uniformly-random or Poisson
distribution to observe how different schemes behave under different node distributions. Node
density also has an effect on redundant nodes, so the simulation was performed under various
network density. For the sake of result discussion, a network is referred to as sparse when
the number of deployed nodes is ≤ 150, otherwise it is called dense. To observe the effect
of various sensing ranges, the simulation was performed for two cases - when sensing range
is equal to transmission range and when sensing range is half of transmission range. Each
experiment recorded the above mentioned metrics for comparison.
4.6.1 Case 1: Transmission Range (tr) = Sensing Range (ts)
Nodes with a large sensing range have a higher probability to be redundant. This is be-
cause the sensing range of a node is the radius of the circular sensing region, and a larger
node sensing region has higher probability to be redundantly covered by neighbours’ sensing
regions. In this experiment, sensing range ts was made the same as transmission range tr.
For two different node distributions, namely uniformly random and Poisson distribution, the
following results were observed.
Uniformly Random Distribution
Figure 4.11 shows the number of potentially redundant nodes under different node density.
The analytical, actual and simulation results are plotted together and the behaviour of SCRC
is consistent with analytical outcomes. The sensor field became completely covered after a
certain number of nodes are deployed. Figure 4.11 shows that SCRC identifies about 70%
of deployed nodes as potentially redundant when the network is sparse. It identifies almost
95% of nodes as potentially redundant when the number of deployed nodes is ≥ 150.
The results also show that CCANS and SAS identify about 5% less potentially redundant
nodes than SCRC. CCANS identifies redundant nodes using a sequential coverage checking
which may leave some potentially redundant nodes unconsidered. On the other hand, SAS
considers only a subset of neighbours to check its redundancy, so SAS identifies fewer poten-
tially redundant nodes than SCRC. The deviation of CCP from analytical and actual results
is noticeable. CCP cannot identify all possible redundant nodes because it reduces the cover-
age degree of sensing patches instead of considering node sensing regions. It identifies about
50% less potentially redundant nodes than SCRC.
The deactivation of all the potentially redundant nodes can create coverage and connec-
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Figure 4.13: Organising Time per Node when tr = ts and the Distribution is Uniform.
tivity holes. Innocuous redundant nodes, called actual redundant nodes, are identified from
the set of potentially redundant nodes to avoid network holes. Since the analytical result
does not consider the coverage hole problem, it is not included in Figure 4.12. The actual
number of potentially redundant nodes is shown for comparison with the number of actual
redundant nodes. Figure 4.11 shows that sensor field becomes completely covered after de-
ploying 150 nodes. As a result, the number of actual redundant nodes for all techniques
are close to their respective potential redundant nodes when the deployed node number is
≥ 150. SCRC identifies almost all the detected potentially redundant nodes as redundant up
to 150 deployed nodes. After that, it leaves about 10% potentially redundant nodes with-
out deactivating to maintain required network coverage. Similar scenario is also observed
for other techniques, except CCP. It deactivates all the potentially redundant nodes that it
detected because CCP identifies only those nodes as potentially redundant which reduce the
coverage degree of a sensing patch. Figure 4.12 shows that SCRC identifies about 40% more
redundant nodes than CCP. SCRC also outperforms SAS and CCANS by identifying 10%
more actual redundant nodes because of its distance based precise redundant node detection
scheme.
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Node organisation time is the redundant node identifying time. Figure 4.13 presents
the node organising time as the ratio of simulation seconds (simtimes) and the number of
redundant nodes. The figure shows that SCRC takes the least time up to the number of
deployed nodes reaches 150. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show that up until that point, it identified
at least 10% more redundant nodes than any other techniques and identified all the poten-
tially redundant nodes as redundant. This implies that there were no overlapping between
potentially redundant nodes so SCRC takes less time in the state determination phase (see
Algorithm 4). When the number of deployed nodes becomes greater than 150, SCRC leaves
about 40 potentially redundant nodes as active to maintain complete coverage. Determining
the state of those nodes takes more time and, as a result, SCRC node organisation time in-
creases to about 10 simtimes more than SAS. At high node density, SAS takes less organising
time per redundant node than SCRC because SAS identifies 10% less potentially redundant
nodes than SCRC and, as a result, SAS spent less time determining the state of potentially
redundant nodes. When the network is sparse, CCANS takes less time to identify a redun-
dant node than SAS because it identified more redundant nodes compared to SAS. When
the number of deployed nodes increased, CCANS takes four times more organising time than
SAS. This is because CCANS goes through a serialised algorithm to find appropriate redun-
dant nodes from the potentially redundant nodes to ensure network connectivity. A similar
result is also noticed for CCP which has a cubic computational complexity. Another obser-
vation is that the differences between times per detected redundant node for all techniques
are less when the network is dense. At high node density, the number of redundant nodes is
significantly increased, and this reduces the detection time per redundant node.
Poisson Distribution
To observe the effect of node distribution, the experiment was repeated using Poisson node
distribution instead of uniformly random. In this experiment, all other parameters were the
same as stated above, and following results were observed.
Figure 4.14 shows the potentially redundant nodes identified by different schemes when
Poisson node distribution was used. Nodes are usually distributed as clusters with indepen-
dent overlapping probability in a Poisson node distribution. In such a network, the possibility
of covering the same sensing area by multiple nodes is higher than a network of uniform node
distribution. The effect of node distribution was also noticed in the experiment as the ex-
pected number of potentially redundant nodes reached more quickly 99% of deployed nodes
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Figure 4.14: Potentially Redundant Nodes when tr = ts and the Distribution is Poisson.
than in the uniformly distributed node network. There is a little deviation between SCRC
and analytical results at low node density, as in reality, nodes have less overlap between
sensing regions when the density is low. With the increase of node density, the sensor field
became completely covered and SCRC became consistent with the expected number of po-
tentially redundant nodes. Figure 4.14 shows that SAS and CCANS also follow the same
trend as SCRC, however they identify 5-10% less potential nodes than SCRC. Because of
their imprecise coverage calculation methods, they cannot identify all the potentially redun-
dant nodes. CCP performed badly and identified only 40% of analytically expected outcomes
as potentially redundant. To identify a node redundancy, CCP calculates the redundancy of
the sensor field whereas all other techniques check the redundancy of a node region.
Figure 4.15 shows the number of actual redundant nodes that have been deactivated by
different techniques. Actual potentially redundant nodes are also shown in the figure to show
the differences between potential and redundant nodes. When the node distribution is Pois-
son, the node density is uneven throughout the sensor field. This decreases the probability
of overlapping between potentially redundant nodes’ sensing regions. As a result, it has been
noticed from Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 that the differences between numbers of identified
Performance Evaluation 104
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 50  100  150  200  250  300
N
um
be
r o
f R
ed
un
da
nt
 N
od
es
Number of Nodes
Deployed Nodes vs Redundant Nodes (T_r = T_s)
SCRC
SAS
CCP
CCANS
Actual Potential Nodes
Figure 4.15: Actual Redundant Nodes when tr = ts and the Distribution is Poisson.
potentially redundant nodes by different schemes and their respective numbers of deactivated
redundant nodes are insignificant. Figure 4.15 also shows that SCRC identifies more actual
redundant nodes as it identifies more potentially redundant nodes than others. SCRC iden-
tifies about 40% more redundant nodes than CCP, and it also outperforms CCANS and SAS
by identifying about 5-10% more redundant nodes than those.
Figure 4.16 shows the average time to detect a redundant node. SAS takes about 8
simtimes to detect and deactivate a redundant node and outperforms others including SCRC.
Previous results (Figure 4.14 and 4.15) show that it identifies about 10% less redundant nodes
than SCRC. SAS does not consider all the overlapping regions created by neighbours, so it
cannot detect all the potentially redundant nodes. A smaller number of potentially redundant
nodes results in less possibility of having overlapping between two neighbouring redundant
nodes and thus SAS takes less time to determine the state of a potentially redundant node.
The average time to organise nodes for CCANS is quadratic due to their token based serial
approach. CCP takes less time than CCANS when node density is high but it identifies
almost 40% less redundant nodes than CCANS. Both techniques take almost double the
time than SCRC which takes about 20 simtimes to detect a redundant node.
Performance Evaluation 105
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 50  100  150  200  250  300
Si
m
ul
at
io
n 
se
co
nd
s (
sim
tim
es)
Number of Nodes
Simtimes per redundant node (Transmission Range = Coverage Range)
SCRC
SAS
CCP
CCANS
Figure 4.16: Organising Time per Redundant Node when tr = ts and the Distribution is
Poisson.
4.6.2 Case 2: Transmission Range (tr) = 2 × Sensing Range (ts)
A smaller sensing range denotes a smaller sensing region for a sensor node, so the probability
of a node’s sensing region being redundantly covered with neighbours’ sensing regions is
less. To observe the effect of smaller sensing range, ts was made half of tr in this case.
Other parameters remained the same as those stated above. This experiment is important
as Zhang and Hou [2004] show that having complete coverage ensures complete connectivity
when sensing range is less than or equal to half of transmission range. As before, nodes
were distributed using uniformly random and Poisson node distributions. The proposed and
existing schemes were implemented on top of the deployed sensor nodes, and the results are
given below.
Uniformly Random Distribution
Figure 4.17 shows the number of potentially redundant nodes when nodes are uniformly
randomly distributed. The number of potentially redundant nodes is noticed less than in
case 1. Because of the reduced sensing range, intersecting regions between neighbours are
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Figure 4.17: Potentially Redundant Nodes when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is Uniform.
also reduced which reduces the number of potentially redundant nodes. The analytical
result showed that the number of potentially redundant nodes drops 10% from case 1 and
the actual number of redundant nodes also shows a similar result. The figure shows that
SCRC is consistent with analytical and actual results by performing closely to them. CCANS
follows SCRC closely but identifies about 5% less number of potentially redundant nodes than
SCRC. SAS identifies about 40% less potentially redundant nodes than the expected number
of potentially redundant nodes. SAS considers only those neighbours having ≥ 120◦ centre
angles, and reduced sensing range limits the considered neighbours. The result also shows
that CCP performs similarly to SAS. CCP considers the coverage degree of a sensing patch to
reduce the redundancy, and the redundant coverage probability is drastically reduced when
sensing range is reduced.
Figure 4.18 shows the actual number of redundant nodes that have been deactivated.
The actual number of redundant nodes and potentially redundant nodes for all schemes are
the same at low node density. With the increased number of deployed nodes, the number
of redundant nodes reduces from their corresponding potential redundant nodes, except for
CCP. CCP deactivates all the potentially redundant nodes. The differences between poten-
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Figure 4.18: Actual Redundant Nodes when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is Uniform.
tially redundant nodes and actual redundant nodes for other approaches are smaller, even
when the node density is increased. This is because the smaller sensing range reduces the
probability of overlapping between potentially redundant nodes. The result also shows that
SCRC can deactivate about 40% more redundant nodes than SAS or CCP and about 10%
more than CCANS.
The organisation time or simulation time per redundant node for each scheme is shown in
Figure 4.19. Result shows that all the techniques require a significant time per detected re-
dundant node at low network density. The organising time for each scheme is almost doubled
the organising time those methods took at the same network density when tr = ts. Although
each node performed the same procedure it previously performed at tr = ts, the detection
time increased because shorter sensing range reduces the number of redundant nodes. Once
the network becomes completely covered, the detection time for each technique was reduced
because after that, deploying new nodes increased the number of redundant nodes. Fig-
ure 4.19 shows that SAS takes less time to identify and deactivate redundant nodes due to
the fact that it identifies fewer potentially as well as actual redundant nodes than SCRC.
CCANS takes almost 250 simtimes when the network is sparse, however the organisation
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Figure 4.19: Organising Time per Redundant Node when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is
Uniform.
time per redundant node reduces to about 60 simtimes when the network is dense. The
organisation time for CCANS is still about three times higher than other techniques because
of its serialised token based redundancy calculation.
Poisson Distribution
Figure 4.20 shows the number of potentially redundant nodes identified by various techniques
when the node distribution is Poisson and tr = 2ts. The figure shows that SCRC is consistent
with the actual number of redundant nodes. For example, when the network is sparse, there
are about 43% of deployed nodes which have the potential to be redundant in the simulation
testbed, and SCRC identifies about 41% of deployed nodes potentially redundant. When the
node density increased, SCRC identifies about 90% of deployed nodes potentially redundant,
which is about 1% fewer than the actual redundant nodes. The figure also shows that at low
node density, CCP is hardly able to identify any potentially redundant nodes because of the
low coverage degree of sensing patches. When the node density increases, it identifies about
30% of deployed nodes as potentially redundant which is about 13 of SCRC’s identification
rate. SAS does not perform well either because by considering only a subset of neighbours, it
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Figure 4.20: Potentially Redundant Nodes when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is Poisson.
identifies 50% of expected possibly redundant nodes as potential to be redundant. CCANS
performs similarly to SCRC by identifying about 80% of expected potentially redundant
nodes as potential, and this is about 5% less than SCRC. CCANS used sequential token
based redundancy computation and sequential computation may have left some potential
redundant nodes unconsidered.
Figure 4.21 shows the number of redundant nodes identified after considering coverage and
connectivity. SCRC identifies the maximum number of redundant nodes among compared
techniques and is close to the actual number of potentially redundant nodes in the network.
The figure shows that 43% of deployed nodes have the potential to be redundant at low
network density, and SCRC deactivates about 95% of them. When the network is dense,
there are about 90% of deployed nodes which have the potential to be redundant, and SCRC
identifies about 70% of deployed nodes as actual redundant nodes. The rest are left as active
to avoid possible coverage holes. Although CCANS performs closely to SCRC, it identifies
about 5% less redundant nodes than SCRC. SAS identifies about 40% less redundant nodes
than SCRC, and CCP is outperformed by SCRC by about 70% because their redundancy
calculation techniques could not identify all potentially redundant nodes.
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Figure 4.21: Actual Redundant Nodes when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is Poisson.
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Figure 4.22: Organising Time per Redundant Node when tr = 2ts and the Distribution is
Poisson.
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Figure 4.22 shows that the organising time per redundant node for SCRC and SAS are
close to each other. The time difference between these two techniques is almost the same
for all network densities, except for an extremely high network density. When the network
is sparse, SAS and SCRC take 4 and 8 simtimes per redundant node respectively. The time
difference reduces to 1 simtime when the number of deployed nodes increases to 275 - 300, as
the figure shows that those methods take 14 and 15 simtimes respectively at that period. The
detection time for SAS increases because of the increasing number of overlapped potentially
redundant nodes at high node density. When the network is sparse, CCP takes three times
more simtimes than SAS to identify and deactivate redundant nodes. The organising times
for CCP show a sharp increase rate with the increase of the node density, and it reaches from
15 to 45 simtimes when the number of deployed nodes increases to 300. This is because CCP’s
computational complexity increases on a cubic order of the average number of neighbours
per node. CCANS has a higher organising time per redundant node at low network density
which is about 65 simtimes. With the increase of deployed nodes, the ratio of organising
time and redundant nodes decreases up to a certain number of deployed nodes because the
number of redundant nodes is also increased. After that, the organising time per detected
node shows a polynomial increase due to their token based serial algorithm.
4.7 Discussion
In this section, the implication of experimental results are discussed for both uniformly ran-
dom and Poisson node distributions. Simulations were performed for two different sensing
ranges to identify redundant nodes for different network conditions. The possible number of
redundant nodes were calculated analytically from Section 4.5. This gives us the expected
number of redundant nodes for our simulation testbed. A brute force algorithm was also per-
formed to identify the actual number of redundant nodes in the simulation testbed. These
two results are used to compare redundant node identifying techniques, namely SCRC, SAS,
CCP and CCANS. The summary of the experimental performance analysis of various redun-
dant node identification techniques are given in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In the summary table, a
network is denoted sparse when the number of deployed nodes is ≤ 150, otherwise dense.
When the node distribution is uniform, intersections between neighbours’ sensing regions
have equal probability to occur. The sensor field becomes completely covered after a certain
number of nodes are deployed and, after that, deploying additional nodes increases potentially
redundant nodes. Since the network is completely covered, those potentially redundant nodes
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Table 4.5: Summary of Simulation Results of Redundant Node Elimination Techniques -
Case: 1.
Percentage of Identified Redundant Nodes when tr = ts
Uniform Distribution Poisson Distribution
Approach Sparse Dense Sparse Dense
SCRC 70% 90% 60% 90%
CCANS 50% 82% 56% 85%
CCP 20% 50% 15% 30%
SAS 15% 80% 30% 80%
have higher probability of being redundant. For this reason, the number of actual redundant
nodes should be close to the number of potential redundant nodes at high network density.
Figure 4.11 shows that at high network density, about 99% of deployed nodes are potentially
redundant when tr = ts. Table 4.5 reveals that SCRC identifies 90% of deployed nodes as
redundant when the network is dense. Similarly, Figure 4.17 shows that at high network
density almost 90% of deployed nodes are potentially redundant when tr = 2ts and SCRC
identifies about 85% of deployed nodes as redundant (Table 4.6). The experimental results
show that SCRC is consistent with analytical results for both cases. Other techniques cannot
exactly follow the analytical results due to their imprecise coverage calculation methods.
For example, CCANS nodes calculate their coverage ratio serially, and serial redundancy
computation may leave some potentially redundant nodes unconsidered.
When the node distribution follows a Poisson distribution, nodes are often distributed in
clusters so, in such a network, the number of redundant nodes should be close to the number
of potentially redundant nodes for all network densities. At low network densities, about 80%
and 60% of deployed nodes were potentially redundant for tr = ts and tr = 2ts respectively.
SCRC identified about 80% of them as redundant for both cases. When the network was
dense, about 99% and 85% of deployed nodes had the potential to be redundant for tr = ts
and tr = 2ts respectively. The experimental result shows that SCRC identified about 90%
of them as redundant for both cases. The results also demonstrated that SCRC outperforms
existing techniques because it uses precise distance based redundancy computation.
The algorithm analysis shows that complexity varies only for computational time, so the
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Table 4.6: Summary of Simulation Results of Redundant Node Elimination Techniques -
Case: 2.
Percentage of Identified Redundant Nodes when tr = 2 × ts
Uniform Distribution Poisson Distribution
Approach Sparse Dense Sparse Dense
SCRC 30% 85% 40% 70%
CCANS 30% 80% 36% 65%
CCP 10% 40% 10% 30%
SAS 10% 40% 15% 45%
simulation time taken per redundant node was also observed. The result shows that SCRC
takes almost a constant time for various node densities due to its distributed algorithm. This
also implies that SCRC is scalable. Although the number of identified redundant nodes by
CCANS was close to SCRC’s, CCANS had a detection time in the order of square of the
number of neighbours. The results also show that CCP has node organisation time similar
to CCANS. SAS takes the least time to organise, however this technique does not identify
all possible redundant nodes.
Section 4.4.3 presents the complexity analysis of various techniques, where SCRC and
SAS show the least complexity in terms of time, space and message passing. However,
the limitation of SAS is not being able to identify all possible redundant nodes which is also
noticed from experimental results. SCRC outperforms SAS by identifying maximum possible
number of redundant nodes with the same order of complexity of SAS. On the other hand,
CCANS and CCP have higher computational complexity than SCRC and SAS.
4.8 Conclusion
The redundant node deployment can cause redundant energy consuming activities and thus
affect the sensor network operational lifetime. To extend network lifetime, redundant nodes
are identified and deactivated. Redundant nodes and their activities are eliminated by us-
ing sensor and sensor field local information. A method, called Self Calculated Redundancy
Check (SCRC), is proposed to identify redundant nodes in a distributed manner. SCRC con-
siders the sensor field as a finite set of sensing points, and assumes that a sensor node covers a
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fixed subset of those points. Each SCRC node calculates the coverage information of a subset
of sensing points and decides possible node redundancy based on those. Since there may be
overlapping sensing regions between multiple potentially redundant nodes, a random back-off
technique is proposed to identify actual redundant nodes. Complexity analysis shows that
SCRC has a linear combinatorial complexity by having time, message and space complexity
in the order of node density λ, that is O(λ). A statistical analysis was also performed for
calculating the expected number of redundant nodes under two different node distributions,
uniform and Poisson. The analytical result validates the proposed method because an ex-
tensive experiment showed that SCRC was consistent with the analytical outcome. Existing
techniques such as SAS [Tian and Georganas, 2003], CCANS [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005]
and CCP [Xing et al., 2005] were also implemented and the result shows that SCRC identifies
at least 5-10% more redundant nodes than those techniques.
In this chapter, potentially redundant nodes and deactivated actual redundant nodes have
been identified to extend network operational lifetime. If deactivated redundant nodes are
properly reused, network lifetime can be extended more. In the next two chapters, further
work is done examining the reactivation of redundant nodes to recover network holes that
occur due to active node failures.
Chapter 5
Failed Node Detection
5.1 Introduction
Sensors are redundantly deployed to meet coverage and connectivity requirements, and a
sensor network identifies and deactivates redundant nodes to reduce energy wastage. In such
a network, only a subset of nodes remains active and provide complete network coverage. In
such networks, if an active node fails, it creates a coverage and/or connectivity hole. This
may also affect the network lifetime because neighbours of a failed node have to perform
additional tasks, such as sensing and data communication on behalf of the failed node. To
maintain the network effectiveness, failed nodes should be properly identified and be replaced
by deactivated redundant nodes.
A node is considered to have failed when it becomes disconnected from its neighbours
(although it may be still fully functional). Protocols devised for detecting failed sensor nodes
need to be energy efficient by having low overheads because a sensor network has limited
resources, especially energy. To minimise the control overhead, existing network mechanisms
(such as data packet transmissions between neighbours) can be used for failure identification,
instead of continuous explicit node monitoring techniques (for example, probing [Zhuang
et al., 2005]). A proper identification of failed nodes needs synchronisation of failure detectors
to validate a failure assumption. The distributed clocking mechanism to synchronise failure
detectors consumes significant energy, so failure detection method should be asynchronous.
The method should also be complete by identifying all failed nodes and accurate by avoiding
false positives.
Traditional failure detection mechanisms for distributed systems do not consider com-
putational overheads because nodes are considered limitless resources. For example, with
115
Introduction 116
active or passive failure detection methods, a node periodically sends probe packets to its
neighbours and waits for acknowledgements [Hayashibara et al., 2002]. In such techniques,
packets can be lost during transmission, and as a result, a live node can be considered as
failed. Although wrong suspicions are avoided by synchronisation between failure detectors,
detection schemes rely on the global clocking mechanism to synchronise detectors [Renesse
et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 2001]. In distributed systems, a considerable amount of control
overheads is involved to maintain a global clock. To avoid clocking, asynchronous failure
detection systems allow detectors to suspect a node mistakenly [Chandra and Toueg, 1996],
and a different mechanism such as the consensus method [Fetzer, 2003] is proposed to correct
false positives. Other than that, failure detection mechanisms for distributed systems are
based on fixed network topologies [Chandra and Toueg, 1996]. Methods devised for fixed
networks may not be applicable to dynamic networks such as sensor networks.
To detect a failed node, the data packets sent and received are monitored instead of
separate probe or acknowledgement packets. The numbers of sent and received messages are
compared, and in case of discrepancy node failure is assumed. To validate the assumption,
a consensus mechanism is proposed among failure detectors selected dynamically. The self-
organising capability of a sensor network is used to choose failure detectors from the deployed
nodes. This also suits the dynamic structure of a sensor network.
The proposed method, called Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD) aims
at minimising energy and control overheads, while detecting all the failed nodes. Sensors
are organised into clusters, and separate detection protocols are assigned to gateways (or
cluster heads) and non-gateways (or cluster members). Each gateway node detects failed
neighbours by tracking the data packet exchange with them, and similarly each non-gateway
node tracks its gateways. To keep track of messages sent to and received from neighbours,
a node running AFSD maintains a counter for each of its neighbours. These counters are
called failure counters, and AFSD modifies the failure counter in such a way that, for a live
node, the value of the counter is bounded and tends to zero. The value of the failure counter
for a failed node is unbounded and tends to infinity. For a failed node, eventually the value
will cross a predefined threshold at a live node, and that failed node becomes suspected. A
node can fail to communicate with some of its neighbours while it still has connectivity with
others. To avoid such false positives, a consensus is sought among the gateways from the
same cluster before declaring a node as failed. The method analysis shows that AFSD is
accurate and complete. The complexity analysis shows that the control, energy, and time
overheads of AFSD are linear, in the order of number of neighbours and gateways.
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Extensive simulation was performed to compare the performance of AFSD to other exist-
ing methods such as Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN) [Zhuang et al., 2005], the Cluster
method [Ranganathan et al., 2001] and Clustering with Backpointers (CB) [Tai et al., 2004].
The experimental results show that AFSD is consistent with the analytical result obtained
from the complexity analysis, and that it is at least three times more energy efficient than
any of those existing methods. AFSD reduces the control overhead by monitoring the data
communication between neighbours instead of periodic probing. The result also shows that
the average time for AFSD to detect a failed node is at least as good as other existing methods
when the packet generation rate is high. However, existing methods are faster than AFSD
when the packet generation rate is low.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Failure detection schemes in traditional
distributed systems and sensor networks are described in Section 5.2. The model of the pro-
posed AFSD method is given in Section 5.3. Details of AFSD scheme is given in Section 5.4.
The completeness and accuracy of AFSD is showed in Section 5.5. AFSD and some existing
methods are analysed in Section 5.6 and 5.7. Finally, results are discussed in Section 5.8 and
this chapter is concluded with future directions in Section 5.9.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, synchronous and asynchronous failure detection methods in traditional dis-
tributed systems are discussed and analysed. Node failure is also noticed in sensor networks
where failure detection is addressed to be a means towards reliability.
5.2.1 Failure Detection in Synchronous Distributed Systems
Failure detection techniques for synchronous distributed systems have received considerable
attention. In such systems, failure detection is comparatively easy, because timing is used to
validate failure assumptions. For example, “Keep-Alive” algorithms [Coulouris et al., 2005]
are widely used to detect failures in synchronous systems where globally synchronised nodes
periodically probe each other to detect a failed node. Zhuang et al. [2005; 2003] identify
two different approaches for Keep-Alive algorithms - gossiping and probing. In a gossip
approach, a node periodically sends “I’m alive” messages to its neighbours [Renesse et al.,
1998]. If a node fails to receive such a message from a neighbour, it considers that neighbour
as failed. The drawback of this technique is high control message overhead and bandwidth
requirements due to periodic flooding of live nodes. In a probe based approach [Stoica et al.,
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2001], a node sends a particular neighbour an “are you alive?” message, to which a live
neighbour replies with a positive message. If a node fails to reply, it is considered failed.
Although the control overhead is less in the probing technique compared to the gossiping, it
is still considered high, especially for a resource limited network.
To minimise the control overhead for Keep-Alive algorithms, sharing failure informa-
tion among live nodes is investigated in [Han and Shin, 1997] to avoid redundant node
probing. There are two types of (failure information) sharing mechanisms - positive and
negative information sharing [Gupta et al., 2001]. In a Keep-Alive Sharing Positive (KASP)
method [Zhuang et al., 2005], the failure detector always announces the information of a
live node. In Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN) method [Zhuang et al., 2005], a failure
detector announces If a node has failed. KASP control overhead is much higher than KASN,
because KASP periodically broadcasts messages when a node is alive.
5.2.2 Failure Detection in Asynchronous Distributed Systems
Failure detection is comparatively complex in an asynchronous environment due to lack of
timing mechanisms [Fetzer, 2001; 2003]. To alleviate the problem, asynchronous failure de-
tection schemes allow detectors to suspect a node mistakenly as failed for example, unreliable
failure detectors [Chandra and Toueg, 1991]. Chandra and Toueg [1991] divide failure de-
tectors into different classes, and the unreliable failure detector is in the weakest failure
detection class [Chandra and Toueg, 1996]. The unreliable failure detectors are allowed to
suspect a live node as failed, and wrong failure suspicions are corrected by a consensus among
all the failure detectors [Chandra et al., 1992]. Each consensus participating node sends its
observation for the suspected failed node, and eventually a common decision is made based
on those observations. Chandra et al. [1992] theoretically prove that weakest failure detec-
tors can solve the consensus problem in asynchronous failure detection systems [Chandra
and Toueg, 1996]. Since sensor networks are a special type of asynchronous systems, the
proposed theoretical basis can be used in such a network with energy efficiency measures.
Implementing a failure detection module in each node is inefficient, instead, clusters are
formed where a cluster head monitors a group of nodes [Fox et al., 1997; Burns et al., 1999].
This reduces the control overhead for detecting a failed node. Cluster heads can implement
any kind of keep-alive algorithms [Coulouris et al., 2005] to check their member nodes, and
they are responsible for monitoring their own vicinity. For example, Ranganathan et al.
[2001] propose to cluster distributed nodes in small groups, where the cluster head uses a
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gossip based Keep-Alive algorithm to identify failed nodes within the cluster. The drawbacks
of such a technique include the overhead for gossiping and the vulnerability of a cluster head
in a promiscuous system, for example, in sensor networks.
The failed node detection overhead for a Clustering method can be reduced by sharing
failure information. Such as in the Clustering with Backpointers (CB) [Tai et al., 2004]
nodes maintain a list of neighbours to inform about a failed node. Failure detectors are
implemented in a distributed manner and a cluster-based communication architecture is used.
The method uses intra-cluster Keep-Alive message diffusions to detect a failed node. Cluster
heads forward a failure report across clusters through the upper layer of the communication
hierarchy. By propagating failure information, CB reduces the control overhead because an
already informed node does not need to further query a failed node. However, in addition to
Keep-Alive messages, creating backpointers imposes additional overhead in such techniques
such as every time the network topology changes, failure detectors need to rediscover their
backpointers.
5.2.3 Failure Detection in Sensor Networks
Failure detection techniques in sensor networks are often linked to other research problems.
For example, detecting failures is important in data aggregation where messages from a faulty
sensor can produce misleading data. Krishnamachari and Iyengar [2004] propose a solution
to the fault-event disambiguation problem in sensor networks. The method uses a Bayesian
algorithm to correct the sensed event from a sensing region where 5-10% faulty nodes are
allowed, but does not identify individual sensor node failures.
Reliability is another area where failure detection is needed. Creating an end to end
reliable communication path is an important challenge. To maintain reliability, failed nodes
should be replaced. Such a technique is proposed in the event-to-sink reliable transport
protocol [Akan and Akyildiz, 2005], where a relationship between the message reporting
frequency and reliability is established. This technique increases node density whenever
network reliability decreases. The problem of this protocol is identifying the exact location
of reinforcement, which requires the detection of failed nodes.
Failure of a group of nodes can partition the network. For example, Shrivastava et al.
[2005] focus on identifying sensor network partitions by monitoring the status of a subset
of deployed nodes. In this centralised approach, the base station monitors node failures to
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identify an ǫ-cut 1 in the network. Nodes to be monitored are identified by using the node
local information and the minimum link separator 2 computation. The algorithm does not
scale well in such a network because the computational complexity increases exponentially
with the increase of node density due to periodical node monitoring.
5.2.4 Summary
In summary, synchronous failure detection methods are not feasible in sensor networks due
to lack of global clocking mechanisms and high control overheads. The theoretical basis for
asynchronous failure detection methods can be used in sensor networks. However, existing
asynchronous methods (for example, the Cluster method [Ranganathan et al., 2001]) are
related to distributed systems with fixed network architecture, and node resources are con-
sidered limitless. Although failure detection is essential for data aggregation and reliability,
none of the existing methods explicitly identify failed nodes in sensor networks.
5.3 The Proposed Failure Detection Model
The aim of this section is to find failed sensors in an asynchronous manner. Operations in a
synchronous system are coordinated by a centrally controlled fixed-rate clocking signal [Li and
Rus, 2004]. In contrast, asynchronous systems have no global clocks, instead, they operate
under distributed control with concurrent components communicating and synchronising
locally [Arjomandi et al., 1983]. A sensor network is considered to be asynchronous system,
where nodes can use their local clocks for internal synchronisation.
Node Failures and Failure Patterns
If a node is unreachable from any other nodes, the node is considered failed. A node can
be disconnected from its neighbours due to software problems, hardware malfunction, link
failure, external hindrances or depleted battery. Once a node fails, it is considered unrecov-
erable. The self-organising capability of a sensor network includes a mechanism to adopt
1An ǫ-cut, for any 0 < ǫ < 1, is a linear separation of ǫ nodes from the base station [Shrivastava et al.,
2005].
2Given two disjoint simple polygonal curves, γ1 and γ2, in the plane, a separator is a polygonal curve that
partitions the plane into two parts such that γ1 and γ1 lie on opposite sides of the separator. A minimum link
separator for γ1 and γ1 is such a separator with the minimum number of vertices [Shrivastava et al., 2005].
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new nodes (see Chapter 3), so that a node recovered from a temporary failure is viewed as a
new node with different energy capacity.
Each node maintains a neighbour list, and nodes continuously update their neighbour
list with the current neighbour status. Let us assume that a sensor network consists of a set
S of n nodes, defined as S = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn}. A failure pattern Failed is also considered
where Failedt(S) denotes a set of nodes that have failed during time t. The function Failed
is also defined for each node belonging to S. Neighbour(si) (where Neighbour(si) ⊆ S)
denotes the neighbour set of node si, and Failedt(si) represents the subset of failed nodes
that belong to Neighbour(si). A neighbour can fail at any time, and neighbour lists are
updated incrementally. Then the failure pattern at node si can be stated as follows.
∀t Failedt(si) ⊆ Failedt+1(si) (5.1)
Similarly, another function Alive(S), where Alivet(S) ⊆ S, produces a set of live nodes
at time t in the network. The set of live nodes within the communication range of a node si
is Alivet(si) and is formally defined as follows.
∀t Alivet(si) = Neighbour(si)− Failedt(si) (5.2)
Failure Detectors
Nodes perform different tasks at different states (such as gateway state or non-gateway state
as described in Chapter 3) over their lifetimes, and the failure detection module needs a
different detection scheme for each state (see Subsection 5.4.2). The module has access
to local failure patterns, that is to Failed(si) and to Alive(si), to synchronise failed node
assumptions locally. When a failure is detected, the detector subsequently registers it in the
neighbour list maintained within the node.
5.4 Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD) Method
Existing failure detection methods for distributed systems focus on detection of failed nodes
without considering control or energy overheads [Zhuang et al., 2005]. This makes those
methods unsuitable for resource limited sensor networks. In this section, a method is pro-
posed called Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD), to identify failed nodes
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in an energy efficient manner. AFSD does not require any global timing mechanism, unlike
conventional failure detectors [Larrea et al., 2004; Chandra and Toueg, 1996; Guerraoui et al.,
1995]. It uses the data packets exchanged between neighbours to suspect a failure and then
confirms the failure using a consensus procedure among gateway nodes.
5.4.1 Properties of AFSD
To keep track of neighbours, every node maintains a failure counter for each of its neighbours.
An AFSD node modifies the failure counter whenever a message is sent to or received from
a neighbour. AFSD maintains the failure counter in such a way that the value of the failure
counter is always bounded for a live node, and the value is unbounded for a failed node. AFSD
produces a list (s1, d1), (s2, d2), . . . , (sk, dk) at each sensor node s, where {s1, s2, . . . , sk} are
neighbours of s, and {d1, d2, . . . , dk} are failure counters attached to corresponding neigh-
bours. These integers are used to track messages sent to, and received from, each of those
neighbours. When a message m is sent from s to sj , AFSD modifies the corresponding integer
variable dj . When s receives any message or acknowledgement from a neighbour sj , AFSD
also updates the corresponding variable dj . Counter is modified such that dj for a live node
sj will eventually be zero, and for a failed node it will be increasing to infinity. When the
value of a counter dj reaches a predefined threshold cmax, node s suspects that node sj has
failed. The value of cmax is chosen based on the packet loss rate of a particular network. If
the loss rate is high, cmax is also set high to give failure detectors sufficient time to establish
a well-founded suspicion.
Let us assume that each sensor si maintains a vector F containing the list of si’s neigh-
bours as well as the corresponding failure counters. Fsi(t) at node si can be assumed as the
result of AFSD at time t. That is, the vector is holding the neighbour failure counter values.
The failure counter value at node si of neighbour sj is defined as:
Fsi(t)[sj ] = dj (5.3)
To suspect a node, the value of failure counters are compared to cmax. If the value of dj
reaches cmax, node sj is marked as suspected to be failed, otherwise sj is alive. The failed
and live node properties are stated as follows.
1. At each live sensor node, the value of the failure counter of every failed neighbour is
unbounded. For a given time t, ∀si ∈ Alive(S), we have:
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Member to Cluster Head
− Cluster Member
Cluster Head to Cluster Heads
− Cluster Head
− Active Scheme
− Passive Scheme
Figure 5.1: Detection Protocols Used in the Proposed Method.
if ∀sj ∈ Failed(S) ∩Neighbour(si) then Fsi(t)[sj ] > cmax (5.4)
2. At each live sensor node, the value of the failure counter of every live neighbour is
bounded. For a given time t, ∀si ∈ Alive(S), we have:
if ∀sj ∈ Alive(S) ∩Neighbour(si) then 0 ≤ Fsi(t)[sj ] ≤ cmax (5.5)
5.4.2 Failure Detection Protocols
Failure detection protocols for gateways (or cluster heads) and non-gateways (or cluster
members) are defined in this section. Failure detection schemes follow various protocols and
are broadly classified as either active or passive [Zhuang et al., 2005]. In an active approach,
a node periodically sends explicit messages such as keep-alive packets to detect a failed node.
Explicit messages in fact can be data packets sent between nodes. A passive approach uses
only data packets to convey aliveness information. AFSD uses both approaches as shown in
Figure 5.1. Since non-gateway nodes are attached to gateways, an active detection scheme
is used at gateways to monitor the cluster members. Non-gateway nodes are only allowed to
communicate with gateways, so that they can use their data packets and acknowledgements
as aliveness notification.
Failure Detection by Gateways
Gateway nodes, communicating with non-gateway members and other gateways, use an active
failure detection approach. A gateway collects data from its cluster members and forwards
data toward base stations using multi-hop data communications. Intermediate nodes of a
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multi-hop path are also gateways. Since gateway nodes may not have to send data regularly,
the Gateway-to-Non-gateway failure detection protocol is an active approach. A gateway
node uses implicit messages to monitor its gateway members using received data packets. It
only sends explicit keep-alive messages to its members, if nothing is sent or received for a
certain period of time tmax. The value of tmax depends on the packet arrival rate at a live
node. If the data communication is regular, tmax can be set to a minimum value.
A gateway node does not send any data packets to its non-gateway neighbours, instead, it
only receives data from them and received packets are acknowledged. If a non-gateway fails
to send data packets for tmax time, only then a gateway probes that node. For a successful
packet transmission (that is, packet receiving and acknowledging), the failure counter value
should be unchanged. In order to keep the failure counter value positive, it is incremented
when a data packet is received and decremented when the corresponding acknowledgement
is sent. In a gateway node, the counter value of a non-gateway node will be increasing
only when the gateway node starts probing. The Gateway-to-Non-gateway failure detection
scheme is described as follows.
1. Upon receiving a message from a member sj at time t, Gateway si increments the
corresponding failure counter Fsi(t)[sj ] by one. After sending an acknowledgement, si
decrements the failure counter Fsi(t)[sj ] by one.
2. If nothing is received at gateway si from a member sj for a certain period of time tmax,
si sends a probe message and increments the failure counter Fsi(t)[sj ] by one and waits
for the probe acknowledgement ackj .
The Gateway-to-Gateway failure checking also needs to be an active approach because
data communication between gateways depends on data received from non-gateway nodes.
The failure detection scheme is optimised, that is, data packets replace explicit detection
messages. In contrast to Gateway-to-Non-Gateway protocol, here the failure counter value
of a gateway node can be increased either by repetitive sending of a failed data packet or by
probe packets. The Gateway-to-Gateway Protocol is as follows.
1. After sending a message from a gateway si to another gateway sh at time t, si incre-
ments the corresponding failure counter Fsi(t)[sh] by one. After receiving the acknowl-
edgement, it decrements Fsi(t)[sh] by one.
2. If nothing is received at gateway si from gateway sh for a certain period of time tmax,
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Algorithm 5: Failure Counter Modification - Gateway Side Algorithm
Notation:
msg - the data/control message
t, t′ - storing current and previous time respectively
TD[i] is the time keeper
ClusterHead(s) - checks whether s is a cluster head.
while TRUE do5.1
if msgj received from node sj then5.2
t ← msgj(time);5.3
t′ = TD[j];5.4
TD[j] = t ;5.5
if sj ∈ ClusterHead(si) then5.6
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] - 1;5.7
send acknowledgement ackj ;5.8
end5.9
else5.10
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] + 1;5.11
send acknowledgement ackj ;5.12
end5.13
end5.14
if msgk is sent to node sk then5.15
if sk ∈ ClusterHEAD(si) then5.16
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] + 1;5.17
end5.18
else5.19
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] - 1;5.20
end5.21
end5.22
for all entries in TD[i] do5.23
if (currenttime - TD[i]) ≥ tmax then5.24
send a probe msgi(probe) ;5.25
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] + 1;5.26
end5.27
end5.28
end5.29
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si sends a probe message and increments the failure counter Fsi(t)[sh] by one. Then it
waits for the probe acknowledgement ackj .
The various steps of the failure detection scheme for a gateway node are shown in Al-
gorithm 5. At gateway si, if a packet is received from another gateway, si decrements the
corresponding failure counter by one, where the received message is considered to be an im-
plicit keep-alive message. This is shown in the algorithm, Lines 5.6 - 5.9. If the received
message is from a cluster member node, si increments the corresponding failure counter (see
Lines 5.10 to 5.13). To keep the counter value between zero and cmax, si modifies the failure
counter inversely for acknowledgement messages, that is, if the acknowledgement recipient
is a member node, it decrements the failure counter by one. Otherwise, it increments the
failure counter by one which is shown in Lines 5.15 - 5.21.
If a gateway node si fails to receive any messages from a neighbour for tmax time after
receiving the last message, si voluntarily sends a probe packet to that member and increments
the corresponding failure counter by one. This is shown in Lines 5.23 to 5.28 of Algorithm 5.
The protocol ensures that failure counters for any live sensor node will eventually become
zero. However, if a node fails, the corresponding failure counter will be gradually increasing.
There is a failure counter threshold cmax, where the value of the cmax can be decided on the
packet loss ratio of the network. If the packet loss ratio is high, cmax should also be high.
Otherwise, it can be set to a minimum value. When a failure counter value for a neighbour
reaches the threshold cmax, the cluster head initiates a consensus procedure among gateway
nodes in its neighbour list to find out if others are also suspecting the node in question. The
consensus procedure is given in Subsection 5.4.3.
Failure Detection by Non-gateways
A different protocol is proposed for the non-gateway side because tasks performed by a
gateway and a non-gateway node are not the same. Non-gateway nodes communicate only
with gateways that forward data to a base station. Nodes are regularly sensing and send-
ing sensed data, so the non-gateway to gateway failure detection scheme can be passive to
minimise failure detection control overhead. The non-gateway failure detection protocol is
described below.
1. Non-gateway nodes only monitor their gateways.
2. Whenever a non-gateway node sm sends data to a gateway si at time t, it increments the
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Algorithm 6: Failure Counter Modification - Non-gateway Side Algorithm
Notation:
msg is the data/control message
ack is the acknowledgement
t, t′ are storing current and previous time of the last received
message
TD[i] is the time keeper
while TRUE do6.1
if msgj received from node sj then6.2
t ← msgj(time);6.3
store the time of last received message;6.4
t′ = TD[j] ;6.5
TD[j] = t ;6.6
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] - 1;6.7
send acknowledgement ackj ;6.8
end6.9
if msgk is sent to node sk then6.10
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] + 1;6.11
end6.12
for all entries in TD[i] do6.13
if (t - TD[i]) ≥ tmax then6.14
send a probe msgi(probe) ;6.15
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← Fsi(t′)[sj ] + 1;6.16
end6.17
end6.18
end6.19
Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD) Method 128
corresponding failure counter Fsm(t)[si] by one. Upon receiving an acknowledgement,
sm decrements the failure counter Fsm(t)[si] by one.
Identifying a failed gateway is important because a non-gateway node forwards the data to
attached gateways only. If a non-gateway node is unable to communicate with its gateways,
it can initiate a new gateway selection procedure (see Chapter 3). Since the gateway selection
request message implicitly piggybacks gateway failure information, non-gateway nodes do not
need to inform gateway failures to others. The non-gateway side failure detection is shown
in Algorithm 6.
The non-gateway node or the cluster member decrements the corresponding failure coun-
ters whenever it receives a message or an acknowledgement from a gateway node. This is
shown in Lines 6.2 - 6.9 in the algorithm. If a non-gateway sends any message to a gateway,
it increments the corresponding failure counter (Lines 6.10-6.12). A non-gateway can probe
a gateway to check the aliveness by repeatedly sending its previous message if it does not
receive any requests or acknowledgements from a gateway (Lines 6.13-6.17). For a failed
gateway, the failure counter will be increasing and will eventually cross the threshold.
5.4.3 Informing/Confirming Failures
After suspecting a node as failed, a gateway initiates a consensus procedure to avoid false
positives. Using the failure counter, a gateway can only suspect a node but cannot declare
failures for certainly because the suspected node can temporarily be unreachable from that
gateway only. The gateway that suspects a node sends a message to other gateways within its
communication range. All the gateways that receive this message further probe the suspected
node before declaring it as failed.
In a cluster based node organisation, gateways are responsible for monitoring cluster
members for any possible node failures. To share failure information, a gateway node an-
nounces a node failure after the consensus has been reached. The consensus procedure is
described below.
Dolev et al. [1987] show that consensus may not be achieved in an asynchronous system
where nodes can crash. However, Chandra and Toueg [1996] prove that a class of failure
detectors that satisfy weak accuracy can solve the consensus problem. The condition, called
weak accuracy, allows failure detectors to suspect nodes mistakenly. In the consensus, all
live nodes agree to a final decision on a suspected node. A similar mechanism is proposed for
sensor networks here. In a self-configuring sensor network, nodes are organised as overlapping
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Algorithm 7: Solving Consensus
Notation:
msg is the data/control message
for All nodes in the Neighbour(si) do7.1
if F (si, t)[sj ] ≥ cmax then7.2
Send msgSuspect(sj) ;7.3
Wait wp time for the reply ;7.4
if msgreply received then7.5
Fsi(t)[sj ] ← 0 ;7.6
end7.7
else7.8
Delete sj from the Fsi(t) ;7.9
Confirm failure of sj ;7.10
Broadcast msgfailed(sj) ;7.11
end7.12
end7.13
end7.14
if msgSuspect(sj) received from sk then7.15
Check Fsi(t) ;7.16
if sj ∈ Neighbour(si) then7.17
if Fsi(t)[sj ] ≥ cmax then7.18
Do nothing ;7.19
end7.20
else7.21
Send a probe message to sj ;7.22
wait for the reply ;7.23
if probe reply received then7.24
Send msgreply to sk7.25
end7.26
end7.27
end7.28
end7.29
if msgfailed(sj) received then7.30
if sj ∈ Neighbour(si) then7.31
Delete sj from the Fsi(t) ;7.32
end7.33
end7.34
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clusters, and a cluster member can be attached to multiple cluster heads or gateways. In
such a network, instead of seeking consensus from all the deployed nodes, only gateways
connected to the suspected node can participate in the consensus procedure to minimise the
control and energy overhead.
The consensus problem is about agreeing on a common decision after one or more of
gateways has proposed what that decision should be [Fischer, 1983]. In the AFSD method,
gateway nodes propose a possible state of a suspected node, and they reach a unanimous
and irrevocable decision based on their proposed state values. In other words, gateways may
erroneously add nodes to their suspect list, and there is a time after which that gateway
avoids false positives by consulting with other live gateways. Informing failures by solving
the consensus problem is described in Algorithm 7.
If a gateway encounters an unreachable node, it announces this to its neighbour gateways,
as shown in Line 7.3 in the algorithm, then it waits for a predefined time wp to receive
messages from others as shown at Line 7.4. wp is set large enough to give gateways sufficient
time to send back a reply message. Since gateways can further probe the suspected node, wp
is at least three round trip times long.
If a gateway receives a suspect message, it checks the suspected node to see whether
it is alive. If the suspected node is in the neighbour list, it sends a probe message to
the suspected node, and if the suspected node responds, it sends a dispute message to the
consensus originator. Otherwise, it refrains from sending any reply (or can send a negative
reply). This is shown in Lines 7.15 to 7.28 in the algorithm.
The failure decision depends on the responses of gateways. If the originator does not
receive any messages from other gateways within the wp time, it assumes that all the gateways
agree with the suspicion and declares it by broadcasting the failure confirmation message
(Lines 7.8 - 7.12). Nodes that received the confirmation message update their neighbour
table as shown in Lines 7.30 to 7.33 in the algorithm. If the consensus originator receives
any dispute messages, it refrains from announcing the failure and resets its failure counter.
5.5 Proof of Completeness and Accuracy of AFSD
Chandra and Toueg [1996] identify two performance criteria for failure detectors in distributed
systems, which are Completeness and Accuracy. In this section, definitions of completeness
and accuracy are redefined for sensor networks, and the completeness and accuracy of AFSD
are proved.
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Definition of Completeness. There is a time after which every failed sensor node is perma-
nently detected by other neighbour nodes that are alive.
Definition of Accuracy. There is a time after which a live node is suspected by no other
live nodes.
5.5.1 Achieving Completeness
The Completeness of a failure detector ensures that all the failed neighbours will be detected
by that failure detector. The completeness of AFSD is shown in the following.
Theorem 5.5.1 AFSD method satisfies the Completeness.
Proof Let sj be a sensor node that has failed. Suppose, there is a time t after which some
live neighbours of sj suspect sj . We have to show that there is a time after which every live
neighbour node detects sj as failed.
The first property of AFSD (in Equation 5.4) describes that the value of a failure counter
for a failed node is unbounded in another live node. The failure counter for a failed node is
increasing whenever a message is sent to that node. Since sj has failed, there is a time t
′
after which no node receives any messages from sj . Those live nodes may be still sending
messages or probe packets to sj . Since live nodes are not receiving any acknowledgements
or messages, corresponding failure counters for sj in all live nodes are increasing. When the
failure counter reaches the threshold cmax, a node, say si, sends a “node suspect” message to
other gateway nodes to initiate the consensus procedure. Gateways that receive the message
verify the suspected node either by checking its failure counter or by probing, and eventually
identify the node as unreachable. Finally, si announces the failure by broadcasting the failure
confirmation message, and all other live neighbours update their neighbour table accordingly.
This implies that there is a finite time after which every live neighbour detects sj as failed.
5.5.2 Achieving Accuracy
Accuracy is ensured, if there is a time after which no live node suspects another live node
sj . That is, there is a time after which no node will mark sj as failed when sj is alive. To
show the accuracy of AFSD, we have to show following two things.
1. A sensor node that is alive cannot take any decision alone, instead it can only suspect
a node as failed.
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2. A decision is made after consensus.
Lemma 5.5.2 A live sensor node only suspects another sensor node as failed.
Proof Let sj be any node. We have to show that if no node suspects sj as failed before time
t, no node can declare node sj as failed before time t.
According to the properties of AFSD describes in Section 5.4.1, if sj is a live node, the
value of corresponding failure counters at neighbouring nodes is between 0 and cmax as shown
in Equation 5.5. If the transmission is obstructed, some of the neighbours can fail to receive
acknowledgements or messages from sj . After a certain time t, the increasing failure counters
for node sj may cross the threshold cmax. According to AFSD, a live node only suspects
a node, if the corresponding failure counter reaches cmax. The node that first identifies the
failure counter for sj reaches cmax, sends a suspect message to other cluster heads within
that region to initiate the consensus procedure. This implies that no node declares a node
as suspected before time t, and no node can declare node sj as failed before that time.
Lemma 5.5.3 Every node must agree before a suspected node is marked as failed.
Proof To reach consensus, each node si begins from the undecided state, and it progresses
to a common decision value for example, the state of a suspected node where NodeState =
{Alive, Failed}. The node si communicates with other cluster heads and exchanges its state
decision on a suspected node. Based on gathered information, node si decides the final state
value of that suspected node.
Coulouris et al. [2005] define the requirements of a consensus algorithm, which are given
below:
• Termination : Eventually each live gateway sets its state decision value for a suspected
node.
• Agreement : The decision value of all live gateway nodes is the same.
• Integrity: If all live gateways propose the same value, any live node that has already
chosen a decision value, has chosen that value.
In the proposed consensus procedure described in Section 5.4.3, there are three explicit
phases. In the first phase, a gateway node checks its failure counter vector for the suspected
node. If the failure counter reaches the threshold cmax, it sends a node suspect message
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to its live gateway neighbours and waits for a predefined time to get replies from gateway
neighbours. During the waiting period, if the node receives any reply, this implies that the
suspected node may not have failed yet, so it refrains from deleting the node from its live
neighbour list. If the node does not receive such messages within the waiting time, the
suspected node is deleted from the neighbour list, and a failure confirmation message is sent
to all neighbours. Eventually the live node sets its decision value for the suspected node
either way which satisfies the termination condition.
In the second phase, a gateway checks its own failure counter when it receives a node
suspect message. If the counter value is already greater than or equals to cmax, it does not
send any reply to the node suspect message which is supporting the value that it receives.
Otherwise, it probes sj and waits for the reply. If the suspected node replies within the
expected time, the gateway sends a disagreeing reply to the node suspect message. To reach
the decision, the logical AND is performed. In this method, if any one disagrees, everyone
will refrain from suspecting. This implies that the decision at all live nodes is the same which
satisfies the agreement condition.
In the third phase, after receiving a failure confirmation message and only then will the
gateway delete the suspected node from its live neighbour node list. This implies that the
decision is taken based on the final message from the consensus originating node, and integrity
is ensured.
Theorem 5.5.4 AFSD Method satisfies the Accuracy.
Proof Lemma 5.5.2 and lemma 5.5.3 prove that the proposed failure detection method
satisfies the accuracy.
5.6 Performance Modelling
Simple analytical models are developed to quantitatively compare the performance of failure
detection methods. Since Keep-alive algorithms can be applied to any distributed networks,
Keep Alive Sharing Negative (KASN) [Zhuang et al., 2005] method is considered for com-
parison. The Cluster method [Ranganathan et al., 2001] and Cluster with Backpointers
(CB) [Tai et al., 2004] are two other prominent failure detection methods for asynchronous
systems which are also considered and analysed together with Asynchronous Failed Sensor
node Detection (AFSD) method. All these methods are analysed and a comparative study
is performed. Symbols used for the performance model computation are given in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Symbol Table for Analysing Failure Detection Methods
Symbol Denoting
n Number of average neighbours
∆ Probing rate
SN Failed information sharing packets
τ Average node failing time
g Number of gateways in a cluster
U Detection time of a failed node
k Number of nodes sending
probe packets after a node fails
δ Time to generate a packet
cmax Failure counter threshold
wp Waiting time for consensus
AFSD uses an existing message passing system to detect failed nodes, where sent and
received messages are compared. In KASN, nodes periodically send keep-alive messages to
their neighbours and update the neighbour table by receiving acknowledgements. If a failed
node is found, the method shares the information with other neighbours [Zhuang et al.,
2005]. By contrast, in a cluster based failure detection method only cluster heads send keep-
alive messages to their neighbours and check node availability [Ranganathan et al., 2001].
To minimise the control overhead more, cluster heads can propagate failure information to
other interested nodes. In CB [Tai et al., 2004], cluster heads use the keep-alive messages to
identify failed nodes, and failure information is shared with other interested cluster heads.
The computational complexity of each of the failure detection methods in terms of network
traffic and required time are analysed in the following.
5.6.1 Calculating Control Overhead
The control overhead is important for any sensor network protocol because it affects en-
ergy efficiency. Overheads are computed for various failure detection methods with some
assumptions, and the results are summarised in Table 5.2 for comparison.
Let us assume that packet sizes are the same for data, probe, acknowledgement, and
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Table 5.2: Analytical Results of Failure Detection Methods - Control Overhead
Methods Control Overhead
AFSD g(n+ cmax)
Cluster method 2g( τ∆n+ 1)
CB g( τ∆2n+ 3)
KASN n( τ∆2n+ 1)
information sharing. It is also assume that a node fails at every τ time. Since clusters are
overlapped (Chapter 3), a cluster may contain multiple cluster heads or gateways. The worst
case scenario is considered that there are an average g number of gateways within a cluster,
and each gateway has n number of neighbours or cluster members.
Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD)
AFSD starts failure detection when a gateway node suspects a cluster member. To suspect
a node, a gateway needs a constant number (cmax + 1) of sent messages. If all the gateways
within the cluster are communicating with the failed node, the number of messages required
to suspect a node is g(cmax +1). The suspecting node initiates the consensus procedure with
other (g − 1) gateways by sending (g − 1) node suspect messages. The consensus procedure
can consist at most 3(g−1) packets because gateways can probe the suspected node and send
a dispute to the consensus initiator should they receive any reply from the suspected node.
If the node is found failed, the consensus originator should not receive any reply from those
gateways, so the control overhead for a failed node to reach a consensus becomes 2(g − 1).
The consensus originator then shares the negative information with its n neighbours. Each
gateway also shares the information with its n neighbours. Then the maximum control
overhead to detect a failed node is g(cmax + 1) + 2(g − 1) + gn. This can be approximated
as g(n+ cmax) where cmax is a constant.
The Cluster Method
In the Cluster method, cluster heads or gateways probe their neighbours and receive ac-
knowledgements from cluster members [Ranganathan et al., 2001]. If the probing rate is
∆, g gateways will send and receive 2gn messages during that time. A node is failing in
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every τ times, so the average control overhead for a failed node is τ∆2gn. Since the cluster-
based failure detection method is asynchronous, a failure validation mechanism is needed.
For the Cluster method, the same consensus mechanism that is proposed in this chapter is
considered. The consensus method takes another 2(g− 1) messages to confirm a failure, and
the control overhead increases to τ∆2gn + 2(g − 1). The control overhead for the clustering
method can be approximated as 2g( τ∆n+ 1).
Cluster with Backpointers (CB)
In the CB [Tai et al., 2004] method, in addition to detect a failed node, gateway nodes also
share negative information with other gateways within the cluster. If SN is the overhead
for sharing the negative information, the control overhead for CB becomes 2g( τ∆n + 1) +
SN . For simplicity, let us assume that the method shares the negative information with only
gateways within the cluster, that is, SN = g. Finally, the average control overhead to detect
a failed node becomes g( τ∆2n+ 3).
Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN)
In Keep-Alive algorithms [Zhuang et al., 2005], the control overhead consists of probes,
acknowledgements and sharing failed information with neighbours. A node probes its neigh-
bours every ∆ times. During that time, the average number of keep-alive messages sent and
received by each node with n neighbours is 2n. Since there are n nodes probing each other,
the control overhead for a cluster of n nodes during ∆ times is 2n2. If τ is the average time
to occur a failure, the control overhead for a failed node is τ∆
(
2n2
)
. If a node is encountered
as failed, the information is also shared with other live neighbours. The information sharing
requires SN packets. For computational simplicity, let us assume that the information is
shared with all cluster members, that is, SN = n. Then the control overhead to detect a
failed node becomes n( τ∆2n+ 1).
Table 5.2 summarises the required control overheads for all methods. AFSD, like two
other clustering methods, has linear control overhead in the order of number of gateways and
cluster members. KASN requires control overhead in the order of the square of the number of
cluster members. On the other hand, control overheads for all three existing methods depend
on the probing rate. AFSD is free of such dependency because it keeps track of messages
sent and received to identify a failed node.
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Table 5.3: Analytical Results of Failure Detection Methods - Detection Time
Methods Detection Time
AFSD δ(cmax + 1) + wp
Cluster method ∆2 + wp
CB k∆
g
+ wp
KASN k∆
n
5.6.2 Calculating Detection Time
In the following, failed node detection times for various failure detection methods are ana-
lytically computed. A method should detect a failed node as soon as it fails, to minimise the
effect of failed nodes such as futile communications with a failed neighbour. The analytically
computed detection times are summarised in Table 5.3 for comparison.
Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD)
In AFSD, nodes modify failure counters based on data packets sent and received, and a
failed node is only suspected when the failure counter reaches the threshold cmax. How fast
a failure counter reaches the threshold depends on the packet generation rate at each node.
That means that the failed node detection time for AFSD depends on the packet generation
rate. If the time to generate a packet at each node is δ, approximated failure detection time
is the time to generate (cmax + 1) packets and the time to reach a consensus. A gateway
that suspected a node informs the other gateways and waits for a predefined time wp. The
average failed node detection time for AFSD method then becomes δ(cmax + 1) + wp.
The Cluster Method
In the Cluster method, cluster heads periodically probe their neighbours to monitor failed
nodes. Let us assume that the probe interval is ∆. If a node fails at time t1, and a cluster
head is scheduled to probe at time t2, the detection time U has a uniform distribution on
[0,∆]. The expected value of U is ∆2 . To reach a consensus, it takes wp time as noted above,
so that the failure detection time of the Cluster method is given as ∆2 + wp.
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Cluster with Backpointers (CB)
In CB, cluster heads share information of overlapped neighbours with other cluster heads.
Using order statistics, Zhuang et al. [2005] showed that if the probe interval is ∆ and there
are g number of gateways within a cluster, it will take on average k∆
g
time for the first k out
of g gateways to send a probe to a failed node after it fails. This is also the time to suspect
a node as failed. To reach consensus, another wp time is required. With that, the average
time to detect a failed node is approximated as k∆
g
+ wp.
Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN)
In KASN, if a node fails at t1 time, and t2 is the time when a neighbour detects it, the
detection time U will be t2 − t1. If ∆ is the probe interval, the detection time has a uniform
distribution on [0,∆] with an expected value of ∆/2. Since the information is shared, the
expected value of U is k∆/n for the first k neighbours to send a probe to the failed node
which is also the failure detection time of KASN [Zhuang et al., 2005].
Table 5.3 summarises the detection times for all the failure detection methods. While
the detection time for AFSD depends on the packet generation rate, for the other methods
it depends on the probing rate. For CB and KASN it also depends on the backpointer list,
where the failure information is propagated.
5.7 Experimental Analysis
In this section, simulation and experimental results are presented evaluating the benefits
and cost of the proposed AFSD method for sensor networks. Existing methods to detect
failed nodes such as Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN) [Zhuang et al., 2005], the Cluster
method [Ranganathan et al., 2001] and Cluster with Backpointers (CB) [Tai et al., 2004]
were also implemented to compare against AFSD.
5.7.1 Simulation Environment
For implementing failure detection methods, a simulation testbed is created where a base
station was considered at a corner of the testbed collecting data. The base station was a
node with unlimited resources. The network was formed with 500 sensor nodes randomly
distributed. Nodes within the transmission range are considered neighbours of each other and
the transmission range was set to 4 units. Nodes were organised using the Energy Balanced
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Clustering (EBC) mechanism described in Chapter 3 where they were broadly classified as
gateways and non-gateways. Clusters were formed around gateway nodes and neighbours
of such a node were cluster members (gateways and non-gateways). To maintain network
connectivity, each cluster contained at least two but no more than three gateways.
Different failure detection protocols were implemented on different nodes (for example,
gateway and non-gateway nodes). AFSD has different detection protocols for gateway and
non-gateway nodes so that the failure detection module activated appropriate protocols ac-
cording to the node state. The Cluster method and CB were only implemented on gateway
nodes as gateway nodes were regarded as cluster heads. Since KASN nodes detect failures
by probing each other, KASN was implemented on every deployed node.
The simulation was performed with some fixed parameters such as the node failure rate
τ was set to 100 simulation times (simtimes). Existing methods depend on probing rate ∆
to detect a failed node. ∆ was set to 50 simtimes to maintain the failure to probing rate
ratio of two as mentioned in [Zhuang et al., 2005]. An AFSD node only needs to probe a
neighbour after not receiving any message from that neighbour for a period tmax. The value
of tmax was set 50 simtimes similar to node probing rate ∆ times. An AFSD node becomes
suspected when its failure counter reaches the threshold cmax at another live node. cmax was
set to 5 considering network congestions.
5.7.2 Simulation Methodology
Three different cases with various network conditions were considered. To vary the network
condition, three parameters were varied:
• Number of neighbours per node.
• Number of failed nodes.
• Data packet generation rate.
The number of neighbours per node has an effect on control overhead because most of
the existing methods are based on periodic probing of neighbours. For a dense network, the
control overhead for existing schemes should be higher than for a sparse network because of
the higher number of neighbours. A dense network, in contrast, can identify failed nodes
earlier than a sparse network because the number of interacting neighbours of a failed node
is higher. The overhead for all methods should be decreasing with the increasing number of
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failed nodes as failed nodes decrease the number of active neighbours. Since AFSD detects
a failed node by comparing the sent and received messages, the data packet generation rate
effects the detection time.
For each experiment, three performance metrics are considered - average control overhead,
energy overhead and detection time per failed node. Results were observed when 70% of
deployed nodes have failed similar to some of the existing work (such as [Zhuang et al., 2005;
Parikh et al., 2006]). The network was assumed effective up to this point. Experimental
conditions for observing those performance metrics are described below.
• In the first experiment, the data packet generation rate was set to 1 packet/simtime,
and the size of the neighbour set was varied by varying the area of the sensor field from
100× 100 to 50× 50 square units. Performances of various methods were observed for
2 to 10 neighbours per node when 70% of deployed nodes became failed.
• In the second experiment, the average number of neighbours per node was set to five,
and performance metrics were observed for 10% to 70% of deployed nodes as failed.
• In the last experiment, the network state was fixed, similar to the second experiment,
and only the packet generation rate was varied. Results were observed for packet
generation rates from 1 packet/simtime to 10 packets/simtime when 70% of deployed
nodes have failed.
Case 1: Effects of Node Density
The node density or the average number of neighbours per node has an effect on failed node
detection performance. Sensor nodes communicate with each other, so a relatively dense
sensor network should able to identify a failed node faster than a sparse network. However,
the control or energy overhead for a dense network will be higher as the number of monitored
nodes per detector is higher. Various failure detection schemes were implemented to observe
performance, and the number of neighbours per node was varied from 2 to 10. Results are
described in the following.
Figure 5.2 shows the control overhead per detected failed node within a cluster. The
figure shows that AFSD only needs around 10 control packets to detect a failed node at low
node density. When a non-gateway node fails, gateway nodes keep communicating with that
node until the failure counter reaches Cmax. At low node density, the number of gateway
nodes within a cluster is small, so the control overhead is also less. The overhead increases
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Figure 5.2: Control Overhead to Detect a Failed Node when the Number of Neighbours Varied.
to 60 control packets at high node density because more gateway nodes are communicating
with the failed node (while also incrementing their failure counters). AFSD only counts
messages up to cmax which keeps the change in overhead linear. Control overheads for the
Cluster method and CB are also linear, however they need three times more control packets
than AFSD to detect a failed node. The periodical probing mechanism also increases their
overhead more than AFSD. The figure also shows that the control overhead is polynomial
for KASN, because each node probes all others within the cluster. KASN requires about 20
control packets when the number of neighbours per node is 1, and it increases to 500 control
packets when the number of neighbours per node increases to 10. This is about three times
greater than the Cluster and CB need.
The energy overhead shown in Figure 5.3 shows a similar trend to that in Figure 5.2. The
energy overhead is the energy consumption incurred by control packets that detect failed
nodes. It is directly proportional to the control packet overhead. The figure clearly shows
that for all network densities, AFSD outperforms both clustering methods by consuming
only about 13 of the energy those methods consume. This is a direct consequence of using
fewer control packets to detect a failed node. In Cluster and CB methods, cluster heads
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Figure 5.3: Energy Overhead to Detect a Failed Node when the Number of Neighbours Varied.
periodically broadcast probe messages to their neighbours thus consuming more energy than
AFSD. KASN performs badly here by consuming on average ten times more energy than
AFSD. KASN’s energy inefficiency due to its periodical probing mechanism.
The detection time of AFSD depends on the packet generation rate, and in this experi-
ment, the rate is only 1 packet/simtime. This can be considered the worst case scenario for
AFSD. Figure 5.4 shows that the required time to detect a failed node for AFSD is about
three times more than the time required for the Cluster method. A cluster head in a cluster
method periodically probes its neighbours. If a failure is detected, a consensus procedure is
initiated to confirm the failure. This implies that detection time for the Cluster method is
constant. The figure also shows that the failed node detection time for the Cluster method is
fairly stable from low to high node densities at about 20 simtimes. KASN closely follows the
Cluster method and requires on average 2% more simtimes to detect a failed node than the
Cluster method does. CB takes 5% more simtimes than the Cluster method because a CB
node, like a KASN node, has to propagate the failure information to other interested nodes.
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Figure 5.4: Average Detection Time of a Failed Node when the Number of Neighbours Varied.
Case 2: Effects of Percentage of Failed Nodes
In this case, the performance metrics for various failure detection methods are observed when
10% to 70% of deployed nodes are failed. The network was fixed with each node having on
average five neighbours.
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of percentage of failed nodes on control overheads for various
methods. As nodes are failing, the number of neighbours per node is also decreasing. In
the previous case, it was noticed that the control overhead is low for all methods when the
network is sparse. Something similar can also be observed in Figure 5.5, the increasing
number of failed nodes reduces the control overhead for all methods. AFSD takes about
30 control packets to identify a failed node until about 10% of deployed nodes fail, and it
gradually reduces to 15 control packets when the number of failed nodes reaches 70%. For
the same percentage of failed nodes, the control overhead for both of the clustering methods
is decreased from about 80 packets to 40 packets. CB performs about 5% better than the
Cluster method because it shares the failure information with other cluster heads. KASN is
more sensitive to the percentage of failed nodes than other methods. It relies on periodical
broadcasting, so reducing the number of neighbours also reduces broadcast traffic. It takes
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Figure 5.5: Control Overhead to Detect a Failed Node for Various Percentage of Failed Nodes.
140 control packets to detect a failed node when 10% of deployed nodes fail, and takes 60
packets when the number of failed nodes reaches 70%.
When energy efficiency was considered, Figure 5.6 shows that AFSD outperforms others
by consuming the least energy to detect a failed node. It takes 18 energy units when 10% of
deployed nodes fail, and the energy requirement reduces to 10 units when 70% of deployed
nodes fail. Both of the clustering methods vary from 40 energy units to 20 units for the same
percentage of failed nodes range. Because of the individual node probing, KASN proves the
most energy inefficient method by consuming 70 energy units when 10% of deployed nodes
failed. However, the energy consumption reduces to 20 energy units when 70% of deployed
nodes failed.
Figure 5.7 shows the required time to detect a failed node after the failure occurred. The
figure demonstrates that the Cluster method is the most time efficient. It requires about 5
simtimes to detect a failed node when the number of failed nodes is small, and the detection
time gradually increases to about 25 simtimes as the number of failed nodes increases from
10% to 70% of deployed nodes. In the Cluster method, only cluster heads are periodically
monitoring their members and, unlike other methods, a failure detector does not share the
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Figure 5.6: Energy Overhead to Detect a Failed Node for Various Percentages of Failed
Nodes.
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Figure 5.7: Average Detection Time for a Failed Node for Various Percentages of Failed
Nodes.
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Figure 5.8: Control Overhead to Detect a Failed Node when the Packet Generation Rate
Varied.
failure information with other nodes. KASN takes about 15 simtimes more than the Cluster
method when 70% of deployed nodes failed. KASN shares the failure information with other
live nodes, so it takes more time than the Cluster method. CB requires 35 simtimes to detect
a failed node when 70% of deployed nodes become failed, which is more than KASN due to
the propagation time to create backpointers and inform those nodes. AFSD does not perform
well in this respect when compared to existing methods, the figure shows that the detection
time varies from 38 to 65 simtimes. AFSD depends on the packet sent and received between
nodes so packet loss increases with increasing number of failed nodes.
Case 3: Effects of Packet Generation Rate
To examine the effect of packet generation rate all parameters, except the packet generation
rate, were fixed (as described in case 2). The packet generation rate was varied from 1
packet/simtime to 10 packets/simtime.
Figure 5.8 shows that the control overheads for all methods are constant and do not
depend on the packet generation rate. Methods either probe or count messages to detect a
failed node. Results show that AFSD takes only 18 control packets to identify a failed node
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Figure 5.9: Energy Overhead to Detect a Failed Node when the Packet Generation Rate
Varied.
and outperforms other methods. The Cluster method and CB take almost double amount of
control packets than AFSD to detect a failed node, and KASN takes almost five times more
than AFSD. Because of their periodic probing, those methods take more control packets than
AFSD.
The energy overheads for various failed node detection methods shown in Figure 5.9, are
also constant and follow the same trend as control packet overheads shown in Figure 5.8.
AFSD is the most energy efficient solution for all data packet rates. The method outperforms
clustering methods by 10% and the KASN approach by about 40%.
Figure 5.10 shows the failed node detection time when the packet generation rate is varied.
In the figure, AFSD shows strong sensitivity to the failure detection time with the varied data
generation rates. It takes 50 simtimes to detect a failed node when the data packet generation
rate is 1 packet/simtime. This is also the worst case scenario for AFSD, and it is the longest
detection time among the compared failure detection methods. For AFSD, a gradual decrease
in detection time is noticed when packet generation rate is increased. The detection time
decreases about 70% and eventually reaches a minimum time of 18 simtimes. On the other
hand, existing failure detection methods are insensitive to data packet generation rate. The
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Figure 5.10: Average Failure Detection Time when the Packet Generation Rate Varied.
figure also shows that the failure detection time for methods other than AFSD is constant.
The Cluster method takes the shortest time to detect a failed node, followed by KASN.
CB takes almost twice longer to detect a failed node than the Cluster method which is
caused by creating backpointers and propagating failure information to those backpointers.
Interestingly, the minimum detection time of AFSD converges with the Cluster method for
this simulation testbed.
5.8 Discussion
The focus in this chapter, is the detection of failed sensor nodes that should be replaced
in order to maintain network effectiveness. The difficulty here is attributed to limited node
resources, especially energy constraints. Furthermore, lack of a global clocking mechanism
makes it hard to synchronise failure detectors. Energy-aware, asynchronous failure detec-
tion techniques can overcome these difficulties. Through the design of the proposed AFSD
scheme, it has been demonstrated that the overhead of monitoring sensor nodes can be re-
duced by utilising the data packets exchanged between nodes. A consensus mechanism is
used to synchronise failure detectors, instead of energy intensive distributed clocking. An-
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other advantage of the method is that failure detection time is minimum when data packet
generation rate is sufficiently high. A theoretical study proved that AFSD is complete by
detecting all the failed nodes, and accurate by avoiding any false positives.
It was found from the analytical study that for existing Keep-Alive algorithm based
methods, the control packet overhead for detecting a failed node is heavily dependent on the
node probing rate ∆. It is proportional to τ∆ , where τ is the node failure rate. To reduce
this overhead, ∆ can be increased, but this will increase failure detection time. Zhuang et al.
[2005] show that the probing rate should be related to the node failure rate. For example,
they find their best results when the ratio of those two rates was two. One possible solution
to avoid such dependency is relying on data packets exchanged between nodes, instead of
periodic probing. In AFSD, a failure detector only suspects a node when the detector fails
to receive a certain number of data packets from that node.
The analytically determined detection time of a failed node showed that it depends on the
node probing rate ∆ for existing methods. The smaller the probing rate, the sooner these
methods can detect a failed node. Small probing rate, however, will increase the control
and energy overheads. In contrast, when data packets are used as in AFSD, the detection
time depends on the packet generation rate and the required time to detect a failed node is
inversely proportional to the data packet generation rate.
Simulation has shown that for AFSD and other existing failure detection schemes, except
KASN, the control and energy overheads are linearly proportional to the number of nodes
that a failure detector is monitoring. KASN showed a quadratic increase because each node
was probing each other node in this technique. The simulation has also revealed that the
failure detection times for existing approaches mostly depend on the probing rate. On the
other hand, AFSD was sensitive to the node packet generation rate.
Simulation results were consistent with the analytical studies, and it showed that the
performance of existing techniques depended on node density while it has little effect on
AFSD. Energy efficiency for existing techniques was significantly affected by the number
of neighbours per node but AFSD showed minimum change in energy overhead when node
density was varied. The results have also shown that with high packet generation rate AFSD
can detect failed nodes very fast, but with lower packet generation rates it is slower than
other methods. Although packet generation rate may not be very high in sensor networks,
arguably energy saving is more important for sensor networks than failure detection time.
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5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, a failure detection method is described, called Asynchronous Failed Sensor
node Detection (AFSD) for sensor networks. Unlike existing methods, where periodical
probing is used, AFSD utilises exchanged data packets between nodes to monitor neighbours.
Each AFSD node maintains integer counters, called failure counters, to monitor every sent
and received message between neighbours. The protocol proposed is different for gateway
and for non-gateway nodes. In AFSD nodes maintain counters in such a way that, for a live
neighbour, the counter value is between zero and a predefined threshold value while for a
failed neighbour, it is unbounded. When a failure counter at a gateway reaches a predefined
threshold for a node that node is suspected to have failed. After suspecting a node, a gateway
initiates a consensus procedure between gateway nodes to validate the suspicion.
Analysis demonstrated that AFSD can accurately identify all the failed nodes with low
control and energy overhead and within a reasonable time. A theoretical proof demonstrated
its completeness and accuracy and the analytical study showed that control overhead, energy
consumption and detection time for AFSD are linearly proportional to the average number
of nodes and gateways within a cluster. An extensive simulation was also performed and
AFSD was consistent with the analytical result. Simulation results were consistent with the
analytical ones and demonstrated that AFSD is at least three times more energy efficient
than other examined methods, such as Keep-Alive Sharing Negative (KASN) [Zhuang et al.,
2005], Cluster [Ranganathan et al., 2001] and Cluster with Backpointers (CB) [Tai et al.,
2004]. Interestingly, AFSD detected failed nodes as quickly as other methods do when the
packet generation rate was high.
In this chapter, the focus was on identifying failed nodes energy efficiently. The next
chapter will present policies for replacing failed nodes with redundant ones to extend the
network lifetime.
Chapter 6
Failed Node Replacement Policies
6.1 Introduction
Due to limited energy capacity and hostile deployment environments, a sensor node can often
fail. As a result, the network may become ineffective because of the coverage and connectivity
holes created by failed nodes. Even though nodes are unattended in the field, applications for
sensor networks require an extended network lifetime. For example, a wild-life monitoring
network should be operationally effective in a hostile forest for a relatively longer period of
time [Mainwaring et al., 2002]. To maintain the network effectiveness, this chapter proposes
policies to replace failed nodes by utilising redundant node deployments for self-configuring
sensor networks.
In a sensor network, a subset of nodes that can provide complete network coverage and
connectivity is kept active to optimise the deployed node set. In such a network, a failed
node may create coverage and connectivity holes also called holes or network holes. The
replacement of a failed node can extend network operational lifetime by repairing network
holes. Zhang et al. [2006] show that complete coverage can ensure complete connectivity
under some constraints. Therefore, a coverage hole includes both coverage and possible
connectivity holes. This simplifies the failed node replacement problem as identifying and
repairing coverage holes.
In order to replace a failed node, the coverage holes created by that failed node should be
identified. Existing work on coverage hole detection relies on the coverage degree of sensing
points inside a node’s sensing region [Huang and Tseng, 2005]. In a different approach, each
node’s sensing region is represented as a Voronoi polygon. The distance between a point
and a sensor node in a Voronoi polygon is used to identify a hole boundary node [Wang
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et al., 2006]. Any of these techniques can be used to assist failed node replacement policies
to identify holes created by a failed node.
In this research, repairing coverage holes created by failed nodes is considered as failed
node replacements. Repairing holes is a relatively new area of research in sensor networks.
Most existing hole repairing techniques either use mobile sensors [Wang et al., 2006] or
node redeployment [Howard et al., 2002; Bulusu et al., 2004]. However, sensors are usually
distributed in a hostile environment where using mobile robots or additional node deployment
may not be feasible.
In contrast, to replace a failed node, redundant node deployment of a sensor network
is exploited. To meet coverage and connectivity requirements, redundant deployment of
nodes is common where nodes are randomly distributed. Redundant nodes are identified and
deactivated from the network to minimise the energy wastage (see Chapter 4). This chapter
gives policies to use such inactive nodes as replacements for failed nodes.
Three failed node replacement policies are proposed, these are - Directed Furthest Node
First (DFNF), Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF) and Best Fit Node (BFN)
policies. The aim of these policies is to repair a hole created by a failed node using redundant
but deactivated nodes. To identify the proper replacement location, existing perimeter based
hole checking techniques such as [Huang and Tseng, 2005; Zhang and Hou, 2005] are extended.
Using a perimeter based hole checking method, holes are bounded, in other words, hole
regions with boundary nodes and their boundary edges are identified. Once a hole is bounded,
the policies select redundant nodes to cover that hole. Under the DFNF policy, a live node
that has detected a failed node replaces it by activating its furthest inactive neighbours. Since
a hole is created outside a live node’s coverage region, an inactive neighbour with the longest
distance from the live node’s centre to the hole direction has the higher probability of covering
the hole. WDFNF is an extension of DFNF where the replacement of a failed node is selected
by considering both distance and direction of a redundant neighbour. Each of the inactive
neighbours is given a weight value with respect to a hole direction and distance. Based on
the weight values, an inactive neighbour is reactivated to cover the hole. In BFN policy,
all hole boundary nodes are involved in the replacement decision process. Hole boundary
nodes send their boundary edge information to the node that has first detected the failed
node. Boundary edges are used to create a polygon approximating the coverage hole. The
“minimum covering circle” of that polygon is the smallest circle that can entirely cover the
hole. BFN activates a previously deactivated node that is close to the centre of the minimum
covering circle to replace a failed node.
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Analytically calculated energy and time overheads for each policy demonstrate that for
the best case scenario, the energy overheads of DFNF and WDFNF are O(N) where N is
the number of active neighbours per node. This is because only a live node that has detected
the failed node first involves in the replacement procedure. Since all the hole boundary
nodes participate in the replacement process, BFN has an overhead of O(N2). For the worst
case, the energy overhead for DFNF and WDFNF are O(N2) because all the live boundary
nodes are trying to replace the hole. For BFN, the energy overhead is in the cubic order of
the number of active neighbours per node due to the fact that all the live boundary nodes
communicate with each other to replace a hole. Since a hole boundary node performs a fixed
set of instructions to replace a failed node, the time complexity for DFNF and WDFNF are
constant for the best case. For BFN, time complexity is linear in the order of the number of
active neighbours per node. For the worst case, the time complexity for all policies are the
same - in the order of the number of active neighbours per node.
An extensive simulation was performed to compare performances of various failed node
replacement policies. The simulation result shows that when the performances were mea-
sured using network lifetime, Quality of Coverage (QoC) and redundant node usage, BFN
outperformed DFNF and WDFNF at low network density. BFN activated redundant nodes
that were close to the centre of the minimum covering circles of coverage holes, so the prob-
ability of completely repairing the hole was higher than other policies. WDFNF had longer
network lifetime and better redundant node usage than DFNF. This is because, to replace a
failed node, WDFNF considered distance and direction of a deactivated node while DFNF
considered only distances of a deactivated node in a particular direction. WDFNF required
more time per failed node replacement than DFNF due to additional weight computations.
Interestingly, when the network was sufficiently dense, DFNF and WDFNF maintained the
same network lifetime as BFN with less energy and time overhead, because the higher number
of inactive neighbours per live node helped to identify the best replacement node efficiently.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Existing coverage identification and their
recovery schemes are described in section 6.2. Section 6.3 introduces the preliminaries of
the proposed policies. The failed node replacement policies are described in Section 6.4.
A detailed analytical comparison of those policies is also presented in section 6.4.4. This
is followed by the simulation results and performance evaluation in section 6.5. Finally,
comparative results are discussed and conclusion is drawn in Sections 6.6 and 6.7, respectively.
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6.2 Background and Related Work
This section discusses important research solutions for coverage and connectivity hole dis-
covery and their recovery techniques. Since a failed node affects the network by creating
a hole, the failed node replacement is considered as repairing the hole. Nodes are usually
randomly distributed in a sensor network, so nodes may not cover the entire sensor field.
Holes due to random node deployment can be avoided by redeployment of sensors however,
in this thesis, node redeployment is not considered. It is assumed that nodes are deployed
all at one time, and only holes created due to arbitrary node failures are addressed. In the
following, various existing hole detection mechanisms are discussed, and then their recovery
techniques are analysed.
6.2.1 Hole Detection
Whenever a node fails there is a possibility of having a coverage and/or connectivity hole. A
network hole should be detected to repair. Since the coverage range of a sensor is assumed half
of the transmission range coverage hole also includes possible connectivity holes [Zhang et al.,
2006]. For this reason, only coverage holes are used to represent the effect of a failed node. In
the literature, two different approaches to identifying coverage holes from sensor networks are
found. One is the perimeter checking approach, and another is the computational geometric
approach. Both of the approaches are discussed below.
Perimeter Checking Approach
In a perimeter checking coverage hole detection approach, all live sensors monitor their
sensing regions to predict any possible coverage holes. The localised boundary node detection
algorithm [Huang and Tseng, 2003; 2005] is a well known technique for such approaches.
This technique collects node local information to detect a coverage hole. It determines a hole
boundary node si, if there exists a point v inside the sensing region of si which is not covered
by a predefined number of neighbours of si. To identify a hole boundary node, the method
uses only the neighbour information so this method is distributed and scalable. Huang and
Tseng [2005] identifies that the complexity of the algorithm as O(N logN) where N is the
number of neighbours.
For a k-covered sensor network, where each of the sensing points is covered by at least
k sensors, a subset of sensing points on a node perimeter is used for checking the hole
boundary node. This reduces the computational overhead of the localised boundary node
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detection algorithms [Huang and Tseng, 2003]. An example of such techniques is Optimal
Geographical Density Control (OGDC) [Zhang and Hou, 2004; 2005] where a subset of sensing
points is selected from the intersection of two nodes’ sensing regions. OGDC identifies hole
boundary nodes by checking only those sensing points. In this method, a node si is adjudged
as a boundary node if, and only if, at least one sensing point v belongs to the sensing region
of si and sj is not covered by k-1 neighbours of si. Like the localised boundary node detection
algorithm [Huang and Tseng, 2003], the complexity of OGDC is also in the order of N, the
number of active neighbours per node.
Computational Geometric Approach
Computational geometry is another approach to find the coverage holes. In this approach,
based on closeness of neighbouring sensors, the sensor field is divided into polygons such as
Voronoi diagram [Wang et al., 2004] and Delaunay triangulation [Fang et al., 2006]. Some of
the well known computational geometric approaches to identify coverage holes are discussed
below.
To identify coverage holes, Carbunar et al. [2006] divides the sensor field into polygons,
called Voronoi polygons (VPs), based on deployed node set V. VPs are denoted by V or(si)
for si ∈ V , such that all the points in V or(si) are closer to si than any other node in V.
This method identifies coverage holes based on the closeness property of Voronoi polygons.
According to that property, if some area of a VP is not covered by the node inside the VP,
that area is not covered by any other nodes. This implies that there is a coverage hole.
This technique is not entirely distributed because Voronoi polygons of nodes reside at the
boundary of a sensor field may not be created locally [Zhang et al., 2006].
In a different approach, Zhang et al. [2006] propose a Localised Voronoi Polygon (LVP)
method where each node keeps track of its neighbours by storing direction and distance
information. LVP divides each Voronoi polygon into four quadrants, and points inside each
of those quadrants are compared to neighbours in that direction. The distance between each
point and each neighbours are used to find a coverage hole. Although LVP uses neighbour
local information, LVP has higher complexity than the typical localised perimeter checking
approaches due to complex geometrical computations.
Delaunay triangulation is another geometric computational approach where a Delaunay
triangulation is obtained from Voronoi diagrams [Preparata and Shamos., 1985]. Delaunay
triangulations are called dual graph of Voronoi diagrams because they are created by connect-
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ing nodes whose corresponding Voronoi polygons are adjacent. Edges of the triangulation
are the distances between two vertices or sensor nodes. Fang et al. [2006] show that if any of
these edges are greater than the coverage range that corresponding node is a weakly stuck
node, and all the weakly stuck nodes are hole boundary nodes. The technique is based on
distances between nodes which is similar to perimeter checking approaches, however creating
Voronoi diagram and Delaunay triangulation increases the computational complexity of such
approaches - their complexity is higher than perimeter checking based approaches.
6.2.2 Repairing Holes
To ensure the required QoS, a hole must be recovered from a network. In literature, two
types of hole repairing techniques are found - repairing with mobile sensors and repairing
with static sensors. Although mobile sensors are not considered in this research, repairing a
hole using mobile sensors are discussed for the sake of completeness.
In a mobile sensor hole repairing technique, sensor robots are used which are continu-
ously monitoring the sensor field for any possible coverage holes. Once a hole is detected,
mobile robots move to that place to repair the hole. Movement-Assisted Node Deployment
(MAND) [Wang et al., 2004; 2006] is an example of such a technique. Three different proto-
cols are given to calculate the target position where the mobile sensors should move to repair
holes. VEC (VECtor based algorithm) is motivated by the electro-magnetic particles where
mobile nodes move away from a dense area if coverage hole exists in their Voronoi polygon.
VOR (VORonoi based algorithm) pulls mobile nodes to their local maximum coverage holes.
Similar to VOR, Minimax fixes holes by moving mobile sensors closer to the farthest Voronoi
vertex, but it does not move as far as VOR to avoid the situation that the vertex which
was originally close becomes a new farthest vertex. The simulation result shows that those
techniques can maintain a predefined amount of coverage percentage for a certain period of
time, however even a mobile node in a sensor network is vulnerable and can be exhausted.
In this research, to replace failed nodes redundant deployment of sensors is used instead of
special sensors such as mobile robots.
In a different approach, Howard et al. [2002] assume that GPS or other localised infor-
mation for a sensor node may not be available, so they propose to deploy each node one
by one. A new node is deployed within the line of sight of another node, and each time
a node is deployed it sends back deployment information to the base stations. Based on
that, the position of the next deployment node is predicted. Even if there is any coverage or
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connectivity hole, the base station recovers that while deploying nodes. This is a centralised
approach where the base station is continuously monitoring node deployment to avoid and
repair network holes. In practice, nodes are assumed to be randomly deployed, and they
self-organise themselves to form the network in a distributed manner.
The radio beacon based adaptive node deployment is another well known approach to
repair holes. For example, in Self-Configuring Localisation Systems (SCLS) [Bulusu et al.,
2004], the radio beacon density is used as a parameter to re-enforce sensor nodes. This
method automates the additional node deployment system with the radio beacon density.
New beacons are placed at low density regions to balance the number of beacons all over the
sensor field. This centralised node deployment technique gradually deploys nodes whereas
this thesis assumes that all the sensor nodes are deployed at one time.
6.2.3 Summary
In summary, by using node local information, perimeter checking based coverage hole detec-
tion techniques can identify a network hole with a linear computational complexity. Geo-
metric computational approaches are also found to identify a coverage hole where the com-
putational complexity is higher compared to perimeter checking approaches. Most of the
existing hole repairing techniques are based on either mobile robots [Mei et al., 2006; Le
et al., 2006] or node redeployments [Wu and Yang, 2005]. Mobile robot based approaches
need a special type of node in the network with mobility, and node redeployment techniques
need a centralised approach to determine the appropriate location of node replacements.
6.3 Effects of a Failed Node
In this section, coverage and connectivity holes are determined and a hole bounding technique
is identified for the understanding of the suitable replacement position of a failed node.
A coverage measuring formula is given to calculate the network effectiveness in terms of
network coverage measuring the effect of failed nodes (see Section 6.5). To assist failed node
replacement policies, the hole boundary nodes and edges are identified.
6.3.1 Coverage and Connectivity Holes
Coverage and connectivity holes are defined because failure of an active node creates network
coverage and/or connectivity holes. Sensor networks dynamically re-configure their topology
by keeping a minimum number of node set active at a time providing complete network
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coverage and connectivity. In such a network, a failed node can leave some of the area
uncovered and, as a result, coverage and connectivity holes may be created.
Coverage is the ability to sense a region, and complete coverage is the ability to sense
throughout the sensor field. Huang and Tseng [2003] defines the coverage hole as an area
in the sensor field that cannot be sensed. Coverage holes are often related to the degree of
coverage as well. Let us assume that k is the required coverage degree. For a set of sensors
and a sensor field, there is a coverage hole if an area is not covered by at least k sensors [Huang
and Tseng, 2003]. The definition of coverage hole is application dependent because different
applications may have different coverage degree requirements. In this chapter, for simplicity,
the coverage degree requirement is assumed to be one. Figure 6.1 shows that a coverage hole
is created when node 4 fails.
The network connectivity is another important requirement for a sensor network which is
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the ability to forward the sensed data to base stations. Like redundant coverage requirement,
many applications may also need redundant connectivity to prevent accidental network par-
titioning. Connectivity or routing hole is defined as a region where nodes cannot participate
in the routing due to failure of nodes. Figure 6.2 shows that the failure of node 7 disconnects
node 8 and 9 from others so a coverage and connectivity hole is created.
6.3.2 Determining the Hole Area in a Sensor Network
In this section, the effect of a failed node is measured as network coverage. The effectiveness
of a sensor network depends on the area of a sensor field that the network can cover. When a
node fails, it may or may not create a partition in the network. In the following, both cases
are addressed by identifying two equations measuring the failed node effect.
If the failure of node i does not partition the network (Figure 6.1), the area of the coverage
hole is found by deducting intersecting regions between the failed node and other live node’s
sensing regions. Let the sensing coverage of a sensor node be uniform in all directions and is
circular [Cardei and Wu, 2006]. Let us also assume that there are n nodes in the sensor field
and the sensing region of node i is Ai. If CH is the coverage hole, the equation calculating
the hole area created by a failed node i is given below:
CH = Ai − (Ai ∩A0 +Ai ∩A1 + ...+Ai ∩An) (6.1)
= Ai −
n∑
j=0
Ai ∩Aj (6.2)
CH cannot be measured using equation 6.2 when there is a network partition. If a failed
node creates network partitions (Figure 6.2), it disconnects a subset of live nodes. Although
those nodes are alive, they are considered failed because of their inability to forward sensed
data. Parikh et al. [2006] present a generalised method for calculating the area of a coverage
hole created by a failed node when there is a partition. The method treats all disconnected
nodes as failed, hence the created hole is measured by deducting the intersection regions
created by live nodes and failed nodes from the sum of all the failed node sensing regions. If
failure of node i causes k nodes (Afk) to disconnect from the network, equation 6.2 becomes
as follows.
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CH = Ai − (Ai ∩A0 +Ai ∩A1 + ...+Ai ∩An) +
k∑
l=1
Afl − (Afl ∩A0 +Afl ∩A1 + ...+Afl ∩An) (6.3)
= Ai +
k∑
l=1
Afl −
n∑
j=0
Ai ∩Aj −
k∑
l=1
n∑
j=0
Afk ∩Aj (6.4)
6.3.3 Bounding a Hole
In this section, hole boundary nodes are identified to determine the dispersion and direction
of the hole. Identifying hole boundary and direction are important because, by using that
information replacement nodes can be selected to repair the hole. In this research, one of the
existing perimeter based hole checking approaches is used to identify hole boundary nodes
and edges because of their less computational complexity. The technique is given below.
A node is defined as a boundary node if its coverage region has a boundary with the hole
region. If a node si is a boundary node of a coverage hole, si will have two intersecting points,
called bounding points, with the hole. Such points are indicating the start and the end of
a hole boundary with respect to a live node. Figure 6.3 shows that node 1, encountering a
hole due to failure of node 4, has two bounding points P1s and P1e. In a special case, the
start and end point can be the same where the coverage region of a live node has only one
intersecting point with the coverage region of a failed node. These points are important,
indicating in which direction the hole has been created with respect to a live node si.
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The existing localised boundary node detection algorithm [Huang and Tseng, 2005] is
modified to identify boundary points of a coverage hole with respect to a live node. It is
assumed the sensor field is a sensing grid, and each sensor covers a subset of grid points
called sensing points. Coverage degree requirement is set to the minimum so, instead of
entire sensing perimeter, sensing points on the circumference of a sensing region are checked
to identify hole boundary points. When a node fails, neighbours of that node check the
distances of other live neighbours from their circumference points. If the minimum distance
between a circumference point and all of its neighbours is greater than the sensing range,
that point is in the hole boundary. The start and end of such points are stored as boundary
points. For a coverage hole, there will be at most two such points for each hole boundary
node.
The boundary points of each boundary node are used to approximate the hole as a
polygon where the line connecting these two points, called the boundary edge, is one of the
edges of that polygon. This edge is also the approximating boundary between the coverage
hole and a live node. Figure 6.3 shows the boundary edge between node 1 and the hole.
Once the boundary edges are identified, the polygon that approximating the hole can also
be determined.
6.4 Proposed Policies to Replace a Failed Node
In this section, different failed node replacement policies for sensor networks are proposed
by using redundant deployed nodes. This will help to extend network lifetime. Each node
maintains neighbour tables consisting of neighbour coordinate and current neighbour state
information such as active or inactive. Using that information, a node can identify the hole
boundary should a coverage hole be created by a failed node (Subsection 6.3.3). The failed
node replacement policies use hole boundary information to identify the replacement of a
failed node. Those policies are -
• Directed Furthest (inactive) Node First (DFNF)
• Weighted Directed Furthest (inactive) Node First (WDFNF)
• Best Fit (inactive) Node (BFN)
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6.4.1 Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF) Policy
DFNF is the simplest policy to replace a failed node. A live hole boundary node re-activates
one of its inactive neighbours based on the (deactivated) neighbour distance and the direction
of a hole created by a failed node. A coverage hole always occurs outside the sensing range
of a live node, so that an inactive neighbour in the same hole direction and situated outside
the sensing range has a higher probability to cover the hole. A DFNF live node finds such a
neighbour to replace a failed neighbour.
In DFNF policy, the node to first identify a coverage hole selects an inactive node from its
neighbour list to cover the hole. It chooses the neighbour that has the longest distance from its
centre but in the same direction to the coverage hole. The presence of an inactive neighbour in
the same direction may not be always found. If a replacement node partially covers the hole,
other neighbours will still experience holes outside their coverage range. Nodes anticipating
coverage holes reactivate their redundant neighbours using the same DFNF policy until the
hole disappears. Figure 6.4 shows that node 1 is a hole boundary node, and it has three
inactive neighbours. In the second figure (in Figure 6.4), it is noticed that if the furthest
inactive neighbour in the same hole direction is reactivated, it can cover the hole. DFNF
implementation procedure is given below.
A node that first detects a failed node is called the initiator node. An initiator node
follows the following steps.
• Using the boundary node detection technique (see Subsection 6.3.3), the initiator checks
its circumference points for a possible coverage hole.
• If there is a coverage hole, the initiator detects the bounding edge with the coverage
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hole by identifying bounding points as shown in Figure 6.3.
• The initiator determines the direction of the coverage hole using the hole boundary in-
formation. The sensing region of a node is circular, and the direction of a coverage hole
is the centre angle created by the cord connecting the start and end points (bounding
points) of that coverage hole. If the sensing range of a node is ts, and the distance
between the centre and the midpoint of a cord is d, the centre angle α is identified
using the following equation:
α = 2 arccos
(
d
r
)
(6.5)
• The direction and distance information for all the inactive neighbours are compared.
– For simplicity, it is sufficient to find the direction of an inactive neighbour (with
respect to a hole) from the mid-point of the boundary edge. If the coordinate of
an inactive neighbour and the boundary edge mid-point are (xi, yi) and (mx,my)
respectively, the direction angle β is computed using the following equation.
β = arctan
(
xi −mx
yi −my
)
(6.6)
• Direction angle to the hole controls the number of inactive neighbours to be considered
to repair the hole. Any inactive node within a specified direction to the hole and furthest
from the node centre is the replacement node (see Figure 6.4), and a reactivation signal
is sent to that node.
• The reactivated node sends a neighbour announcement message to nodes within its
communication range. Nodes that receive the message, update their neighbour table
accordingly.
• If there is still a coverage hole, other hole boundary nodes run the entire procedure as
if there is another failed node.
6.4.2 Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF) Policy
Weighted DFNF (WDFNF) is a variant of DFNF, where the direction and distance to the
hole of an inactive neighbour with respect to a live node are combined to select a failed node
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replacement. An inactive neighbour with longer distance from a boundary node and lesser
deviated angle from the hole direction is considered the pseudo ideal replacement for a failed
node.
In WDFNF, a weight is assigned to the distance and direction between a node and the
inactive neighbour. The weight is assigned in such a way that an inactive node with the same
direction to the hole has the highest weight value, and a node with the opposite direction has
the lowest weight in a weight scale. For example, a node with the same direction to the hole
has the weight value one in the zero to one scale. Similarly, an inactive node with a distance
of the communication range (that is, the maximum possible distance) has the highest weight
value. On the other hand, if the distance is zero, the weight is also zero in the zero to one
scale. The product of these two weights indicates how close the inactive node is to cover the
hole.
The implementation for WDFNF is the same as DFNF except for the best replacement
node finding step. In this policy, all inactive nodes are assigned a weight value based on
their distance and direction to a coverage hole. The highest weighted inactive node is the
replacement for a particular failed node. The procedure is given below.
A node that has encountered a failed node (and a coverage hole) is called the WDFNF
initiator. An initiator node follows the following steps.
• The initiator node calculates the direction to a coverage hole from its centre as men-
tioned in Subsection 6.4.1.
• It also identifies the direction of all of its inactive neighbours and compares against the
direction to the coverage hole to assign a weight value (for example, between zero and
one). An inactive neighbour with the same direction as the hole has the highest weight
value, and if it is in the opposite direction to the hole, its weight value is the least.
• The distances of initiator and inactive neighbours are calculated and compared to the
communication range to assign another weight value. The inactive node that has the
longest distance has the highest weight value. If an inactive node has the zero distance,
its weight value is zero in the zero to one scale.
• The product of these two weights is calculated, and the inactive neighbour that has the
highest value is the replacement node.
• The initiator node sends a reactivation signal to that highest weight value node.
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• After reactivation, the node sends a neighbour announcement message to nodes within
its communication range. Nodes that receive the message update their neighbour table
accordingly.
• If there is still a coverage hole, other hole boundary nodes run the whole procedure as
if there is another failed node.
6.4.3 Best Fit Node (BFN) Policy
In the Best Fit Node (BFN) policy, all the hole boundary nodes participate in the failed
node replacement procedure to identify an appropriate replacement. A node may not have
an inactive neighbour at an ideal place to cover the hole whereas another live nodes may
have. BFN identifies the replacement node by collecting inactive neighbour information from
all the boundary nodes of a hole.
In this policy, as soon as a live node identifies a hole, that node initiates a procedure
to find the ideal replacement position inside the hole such that if a node is placed at that
point, the hole will be covered as much as possible. The procedure has two steps - building
a polygon that approximates the hole, and calculating the appropriate replacement position.
To approximate the hole, a node collects the boundary edges from hole boundary nodes.
These are the edges of a polygon approximating the hole. Once the geometric shape of a
hole is found, the minimum bounding circle of that hole is identified. The centre of that
circumscribed circle is the ideal point to reactivate a node covering the hole. This is also
described in Figure 6.5.
Each boundary node has a boundary edge with a coverage hole and the node that has
detected the failed node first, called initiator node, collects those edge information. To collect
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the boundary edge information, an initiator node broadcasts a message seeking boundary
information to its neighbours. Neighbours having a boundary with the coverage hole further
broadcast the message to their neighbours and so on. To optimise the broadcast overhead,
it is a directed broadcast toward the coverage hole, and if a node already has broadcast a
message, it does not broadcast again. All the boundary nodes reply the message with their
boundary points, start and end points of the boundary edge. When all the edge information
is received, the initiator node constructs the polygon. The node also calculates the minimum
circumscribed circle and its centre. The ideal position to replace the failed node is the centre
of the minimum circumscribed circle of that polygon.
Figure 6.5 illustrates BFN where node 1, 2, 5, 6 and 3 are the boundary nodes of a hole
created due to failure of node 4. Let us assume that node 1 is the initiator node that first
identified the hole. Node 1 collects all the boundary edge information and draws the polygon
approximating the hole as shown in Figure 6.5. The minimum circumscribed circle is drawn
for that polygon and the centre of that circle is sent to hole boundary nodes to find the
inactive neighbour closest to the centre.
The BFN implementation detail is given below.
• There is an initiator node that identifies the coverage hole first.
• The initiator node broadcasts a message seeking hole boundary information to its neigh-
bours, and a hole boundary neighbour broadcasts to its neighbours, and so on.
• Nodes, having the hole boundary, forward their boundary points to the initiator node.
Considering the hole as a polygon, the line connecting those two points is an edge of
that polygon.
• The initiator node draws the minimum circumscribed circle of that polygon and iden-
tifies the centre of that circle.
• The initiator node forwards another message informing the best fit point (the centre
coordinate of the circumscribed circle) to the nodes having a boundary with the hole.
• Hole boundary nodes identify and forward their inactive neighbour information located
close to the best fit point.
• The initiator node chooses the inactive node closest to the best fit point.
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• The best fit node is reactivated and, after reactivation, the node sends an announcement
message to nodes within its communication range. Nodes that receive the message
update their neighbour table accordingly.
• If there is still a coverage hole, other boundary nodes run the whole procedure as if
there is another failed node.
Special Cases for BFN
Although BFN identifies a suitable failed node replacement that can repair the hole most,
it does not work for two network conditions - when the sensor field is infinite and when a
network partition occurred in an infinite sensor field.
• Sensor field boundary : BFN does not work for an infinite sensor field because nodes
at the field boundary may not determine their hole boundary edges. In this thesis,
the sensor field is assumed to be a finite plane (a X×Y rectangle), so the field has a
fixed boundary as shown in Figure 2.5, Chapter 2. Nodes at the sensor field boundary
consider the intersection points between their sensing regions and field boundary edge
as hole bounding points.
• Network partition: BFN does not work when there is a network partition because a
network partition creates an infinite hole region. However, if the sensor field is finite,
the hole region is also finite and bounded, and BFN works.
6.4.4 Overhead Analysis
In this section, the required energy and time to replace a failed node of above mentioned
policies are identified. Protocols designed for sensor networks need to be efficient in terms of
energy and time because sensor nodes are resource limited. Three different policies - Directed
Furthest Node First (DFNF), Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF) and Best
Fit Node (BFN) are given for replacing failed nodes using redundant but inactive nodes. The
energy and time overhead for those policies are analysed and compared.
Let us assume that the energy requirement for internal calculation of a replacement
procedure is 1 unit. It is also assumed that if there are N active neighbours per node, a
broadcast process requires N units of energy [Zou and Chakrabarty, 2005]. The execution
time of a single instruction including broadcast is fixed, say T time units.
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Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF)
In DFNF, if a node ni identifies a failed node, it tries to replace that with its inactive
neighbours. To minimise the overhead, ni does not interact with other active neighbours
when finding the replacement. Instead, ni calculates the direction of the coverage hole
created due to the failed neighbour, and computes distances between ni and its inactive
neighbours. Directions between ni and those inactive nodes are also calculated using the
available node information. If multiple inactive nodes are found within a specified direction
angle to the coverage hole, the inactive node nj having the maximum distance is reactivated
as a replacement of the failed node. If there is no inactive neighbour within the specified
angle, ni refrains from replacing the failed node, assuming that another hole boundary node
will replace it. When nj is reactivated, it sends a broadcast message to its neighbours, and
they update their neighbour tables accordingly.
In the best case scenario, the first node that has detected a failed node is able to replace
that failed node. In this case, the energy overhead of DFNF is linear - in the order of N .
Because it requires internal distance and direction computation to select a replacement node,
and the replacement node broadcasts the reactivation information to its N neighbours. On
the other hand, when no proper replacement is found by any of the N boundary nodes, this
is the worst case scenario. The energy complexity increases to O(N2) in this case, because
each of the boundary nodes activates one of their inactive neighbours to cover the hole.
For the best case scenario, if a live node executes η such instructions to replace a failed
node, the time requirement is constant which is ηT . For the worst case, each of the N
neighbours tries to repair the hole one by one and executes the same set of instructions, so
the time requirement is ηNT which is in the order of N , that is O(N).
Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF)
WDFNF is an extension of DFNF where the direction and distance of inactive neighbours
are used to replace a failed node. Each inactive neighbour is quantified by a weight value
based on the distance and direction with respect to a coverage hole and an active node. The
inactive node having the highest weight value replaces the failed node. The technique is
similar to DFNF, so the energy requirement for WDFNF is the same as DFNF. For the best
case, the energy requirement is in the order of average number of active neighbours N , that
is O(N). For the worst case, it is in the order of square of N , that is O(N2) where all the
hole boundary nodes perform WDFNF.
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Table 6.1: Analytical Results of Failed Node Replacement Policies - The Best Case
N is the average number of neighbours per node
T is the time to do a unit task
η and η′ are integer constants
Energy Overhead Time Overhead
DFNF O(N) ηT
WDFNF O(N) η′T
BFN O(N2) O(N)
Although WDFNF takes more time than DFNF for additional weight calculations, the
time requirement of WDFNF is still in the same order of DFNF. If the number of instructions
required to replace a failed node is η′, the time requirement is η′T for the best case. In
the worst case, the time requirement increases to the order of average number of active
neighbours, that is η′NT or O(N).
Best Fit Node (BFN)
In contrast to DFNF or WDFNF, all hole boundary nodes are involved in the failed node
replacement process in BFN. When a node ni identifies a failed node, it asks its neighbours
having a boundary with the hole to send the boundary information. A hole boundary node
relays that message to their respective neighbours and so on. In response, active boundary
nodes forward their boundary information to the replacement initiator ni. The initiator node
calculates the centre of the minimum circumscribed circle of the hole and notifies others.
Nodes identify their respective inactive neighbour closest to that centre and forward that
information to ni again. Finally, ni chooses the best fit node among them and forwards the
information to reactivate that.
In BFN, nodes participating in the node replacement procedure require at most three
directed broadcasts - for identifying boundary nodes, collecting boundary information and
informing the appropriate replacement node position. If N is the average number of active
neighbours per node, the maximum number of boundary nodes for a coverage hole created
by a failed node is also N . The best case of BFN is when the first replacement node can
cover the entire hole. Since each of those N nodes needs to broadcast a message finding
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Table 6.2: Analytical Results of Failed Node Replacement Policies - The Worst Case
N is the average number of neighbours per node
Energy Overhead Time Overhead
DFNF O(N2) O(N)
WDFNF O(N2) O(N)
BFN O(N3) O(N2)
other boundary nodes, the energy requirement for BFN is in the order of square of number
of neighbours, that is O(N2). If all the boundary nodes need to run the procedure to cover
the hole, it is the worst case. Since there are N boundary nodes trying to repair the hole
one by one, the energy complexity becomes O(N3) for the worst case.
The time requirement also depends on the number of neighbours, hence it is in the order
of N or O(N) for the best case. In the worst case, with each of the N nodes running the
same procedure, the complexity increases to O(N2).
The comparative overhead analysis for three different failed node replacement policies is
given in tables 6.1 and 6.2.
6.5 Experimental Performance Analysis
An extensive simulation study has been performed evaluating the performances of the pro-
posed failed node replacement policies which are Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF),
Weighted Directed Furthest Node First (WDFNF) and Best Fit Node (BFN). The No Re-
placement policy has also been implemented where failed nodes are not replaced. The No
Replacement policy is considered the base case for performance comparisons. For different
failed node replacement policies network lifetime redundant node usage, time complexity and
energy efficiency are compared.
Network lifetime is defined as the time up to which a network is operationally effective.
The effectiveness of a network is redefined based on Quality of Coverage (QoC) that it can
provide [Parikh et al., 2006]. QoC is measured as the percentage of sensor field covered by
a network. In the experiment, each time a failed node was replaced by different policies,
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QoC was computed using equations 6.2 and 6.4. Redundant node deployment is exploited
for replacing failed nodes. How efficiently redundant nodes are reused by different failed
node replacement policies is also shown. An important issue for protocols devised for sensor
networks is time and energy efficiency. These metrics are measured by implementing failed
node replacement policies in the simulation testbed.
6.5.1 Simulation Model
The simulation testbed used for experiments had following parameters to vary the network
conditions. A sensor field (Q) of 50×50 square units was considered where sensor nodes
were randomly deployed. S is the set of sensor nodes deployed where all the sensor nodes
were homogeneous, however they had unique IDs. The number of deployed nodes |S| was
varied from 100 to 1000 to vary the node density. The network was considered “sparse” when
|S| = 100, “dense” when |S| = 500 and “extremely dense” when |S| = 1000.
It was assumed that nodes were identical having the same energy, memory and processing
powers. The initial node energy (E) was set to 30K energy unit. The energy requirement for
internal computations to find a replacement node was 1 energy unit. For transmitting (Etx)
a single data packet, the energy consumption was set to 1 energy unit and for receiving (Etr)
the value was set to 0.5.
Zhang and Hou [2005] showed that complete coverage ensures complete connectivity when
the transmission range of a sensor node is at least twice of its sensing range. For this reason,
the transmission range (tr) and the sensing range (ts) of a sensor node were set to 8 and 4
units respectively.
The network was formed from a base station - a node with limitless resources. After de-
ploying nodes, redundant nodes whose sensing area was already covered by their neighbours
are identified. Redundant nodes were identified and deactivated to reuse them as replace-
ments for failed nodes. Active nodes continuously sensed the sensor field and forwarded the
sensed data to the base stations using the shortest path routing algorithm.
The network performed sensing and data communication until it became ineffective. The
network effectiveness was measured by QoC where a minimum coverage threshold Cth was
set. The value of Cth was 70% coverage. (The value of Cth was taken from [Parikh et al.,
2006].) The simulation program was stopped when the coverage reduced below Cth.
In every simulation seconds (simtimes), an active node was randomly selected from the
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network and made it failed. Failed node replacement policies replaced that node using
redundant but inactive nodes.
Node replacement policies do not need any implementation parameters, except DFNF.
Nodes using DFNF find replacement nodes in the hole direction. Any inactive node within a
specified angle and furthest from the node centre is the replacement node. In this simulation,
a DFNF node considered inactive neighbours that were within 45◦ to the hole direction,
assuming that on average a hole boundary edge creates central angle equivalent to 45◦. BFN
and WDFNF are based on neighbour distance and/or direction information between nodes
so, nodes using those policies, do not need any such implementation parameters. Followings
are the important parameters of our simulation model.
• Sensor field (Q) = 50 × 50 square grid.
• Sensing range of a sensor node (ts) = 4 units.
• Transmission range of a sensor node (tr) = 8 units.
• Initial node energy (E) = 30 K energy unit.
• Transmission cost of a single packet (Etx) = 1 energy unit.
• Receiving cost of a single packet (Etr) = 0.5 energy unit.
• Coverage threshold (Cth) : 70% of Q [Parikh et al., 2006].
• Deployed node set (S) : |S| Nodes are randomly deployed in the sensor field. |S| ranges
from 100 to 1000 nodes.
• Inactive nodes per transmission range (I) : I is the average number of redundant neigh-
bours per node. I ranges from 1 to 20.
• Active nodes per transmission range (N) : N is the average number of active neighbours
per node. At N = 5, the sensor field is found fully covered by the active node set, so
in this simulation average value of N is 5.
6.5.2 Network Lifetime
Now the effect of inactive nodes on network lifetime for various node replacement policies is
shown. Network lifetime is defined as the time up to which the network can cover at least
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Figure 6.6: Network Lifetime for Various Node Replacement Policies when Inactive Nodes
per Transmission Range Varied from 1 to 10.
70% of the sensor field. Failed nodes are replaced using redundant (and previously deacti-
vated) nodes to extend network operational lifetime. As nodes are immovable and randomly
deployed, the perfect replacement may not be found. If there is more than one redundant
node to replace a failed node, it helps find a better replacement. For this reason, although
the average number of active nodes per transmission range was fixed at 5, experiments were
performed for various inactive node densities.
Figure 6.6 and 6.7 shows the effects of replacement policies on lifetime when the number
of inactive nodes per transmission range is varied. For the No Replacement policy lifetime
does not depend on the density of the network and the policy is considered the base case
for comparison. In the figures, the base case lifetime is found constant at 38 time units.
For BFN, network lifetime is about three times of the base case at the lowest node density.
BFN shows an increase in the lifetime with the increase of inactive nodes per transmission
range. Because increase of the number of inactive neighbours, increases the probability of
having more appropriate replacement nodes. When the number of inactive nodes increases
to 10 per transmission range, BFN improves the lifetime 12 times than the base case. When
the network is extremely dense, BFN extends the lifetime about 20 times more than the
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Figure 6.7: Network Lifetime for Various Node Replacement Policies when Inactive Nodes
per Transmission Range Varied from 1 to 20.
base case as shown in Figure 6.7. WDFNF extends the lifetime twice the base case at
low node density, and it also shows a gradual increase with the increase of inactive nodes
per transmission range. When the number of inactive neighbours per node is 10, network
lifetime for WDFNF is about 50 time units less than the network lifetime of BFN. When the
inactive node density increases extremely (Figure 6.7), WDFNF matches with BFN. DFNF
has network lifetime at least 10 time units less than WDFNF and about 60 time units less
than BFN at low network density. Interestingly, when the density of inactive nodes increased,
DFNF reduces the lifetime differences and is able to extend the lifetime similar to WDFNF.
When the number of inactive nodes is increased, all the policies find appropriate replacement
nodes using their respective node replacement policies.
6.5.3 Redundant Node Usage
Usage of redundant nodes is important to extend network lifetime because those nodes can
replace failed nodes. Failed node replacement policies given in this chapter are using redun-
dant nodes to repair network holes. To measure the redundant node usage, the percentage of
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Figure 6.8: Usage of Redundant Nodes when Coverage reduces to Less than 70% of Entire
Sensor Field.
redundant nodes that has been reactivated was considered. For various failed node replace-
ment policies, the redundant node utilisation results are given below.
Figure 6.8 shows the redundant node usage graph in percentage for various node re-
placement policies. Understandably, the No Replacement policy has zero usage of redundant
nodes. The result shows that BFN uses 100% of redundant nodes when the number of in-
active nodes is low. With the increase of inactive nodes per transmission range, the usage
gradually decreases to about 80%. This is because redundant nodes are static and randomly
distributed in the network, therefore redundant nodes in one place cannot repair coverage
holes created in other places. WDFNF and DFNF show an opposite tendency to BFN be-
cause they may not always find appropriate replacement nodes at low node density. With
the increase of the number of redundant nodes, they increase the redundant node usage.
For example, the redundant node usage percentage for WDFNF is about 55% when the
number of inactive nodes per transmission range is only 1. When the number of inactive
nodes is 10 per transmission range, the redundant node usage is about 75% for WDFNF.
After that, the usage matches with BFN. The result also shows that DFNF uses only 30% of
redundant nodes when the inactive node density is the minimum, that is 1 inactive node per
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Figure 6.9: Required Energy to Replace a Failed Node while the Number of Inactive Nodes
per Transmission Range is varied.
transmission range. DFNF reactivates a redundant node if it is within the 45◦ to the hole
direction. When the number of inactive neighbours per node is only one, DFNF may not be
able to replace the coverage hole. For this reason, the coverage drops below the threshold
Cth while still 75% of redundant nodes are unused. Interestingly, DFNF gradually improves
the redundant node usage with the increase of inactive nodes and matches with WDFNF at
high node density.
6.5.4 Energy/Time Overhead
Average energy and time required to replace a failed node for various replacement policies
are measured. In Subsection 6.4.4, the best case and the worst case scenarios to replace a
failed node are analysed. The analytical expectations are validated using simulation results.
Figure 6.9 shows the average energy consumption to replace a failed node by different
replacement policies. In this simulation, the number of active nodes per transmission range
was fixed at 5 so the average energy requirements to replace a failed node for BFN were steady
at 21 energy units. This is because all the active boundary BFN nodes participated in the
hole repairing procedure. In WDFNF and DFNF, the node that has detected the failed node
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Figure 6.10: Required Time to Replace a Failed Node while the Number of Inactive Nodes
per Transmission Range is varied.
tries to replace it with one of its inactive neighbour. The figure shows that compared to a
dense network, WDFNF and DFNF both take more energy to replace a failed node when the
number of inactive nodes per transmission range is low. For WDFNF, required energy per
failed node replacement is about 13 energy units at low node density, and the average energy
requirements reduces and stabilises at about 5 energy units with the increase of node density.
When the number of inactive neighbours increases, the probability of getting a replacement
node at the first replacement initiator node also increases (the best case). DFNF shows a
similar tendency as WDFNF, however it takes at least 3 energy units more than WDFNF.
DFNF only relies on distances of inactive nodes which do not guarantee full coverage of a
hole. For this reason, some other boundary nodes may have to reactivate their neighbours
to repair the rest.
Figure 6.10 shows the time requirements to replace a failed node during the simulation.
A BFN node needs to communicate with other live boundary nodes, hence it takes more time
than other policies. BFN is almost constant at 16 time units because of the fixed number of
active nodes per transmission range. DFNF and WDFNF show sensitivity to the increasing
inactive neighbours. Initially both policies take about 12 and 15 time units respectively to
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replace a failed node. When the number of inactive nodes per transmission range reaches
5, DFNF stabilises at 5 time units and WDFNF stabilises at 8 time units which are almost
1
3 and
1
2 of BFN time requirements respectively. DFNF takes the least time because of its
simpler computation technique than other policies.
6.5.5 Quality of Coverage (QoC)
Quality of Coverage (QoC) of a sensor network shows the effectiveness of a network [Parikh
et al., 2006]. Sensors are deployed to sense the sensor field, so providing the complete
coverage is extremely important. Since sensors are stochastically distributed, 100% coverage
of a sensor field may not be possible. In addition, nodes may become exhausted anytime for
various reasons, which can also reduce the coverage percentage of the sensor field. A coverage
threshold is set to define the effectiveness of a sensor network. The threshold is set at 70%
coverage of the sensor field. The network remains effective when the network coverage is
≥ 70%, otherwise ineffective. For various network conditions namely, sparse, medium dense,
dense and extremely dense network, lifetime was measured as the time when coverage became
< 70% of the sensor field. Above mentioned node replacement policies used redundant nodes
to keep the network effective. The results of QoC for those failed node replacement policies
are given below.
Figure 6.11 shows QoC achieved by different failed node replacement policies. The results
were obtained when the network was sparse that is, each active node on average had only one
inactive neighbour. In this experiment, a randomly selected active node was intentionally
made exhausted in every time unit. Failed node replacement policies recovered the hole due to
that failed node. QoC of the No Replacement policy is calculated as the base case for others.
The No Replacement policy shows that it starts with 100% coverage and when nodes start
failing, the network effectiveness degrades sharply. The network using the No Replacement
policy becomes ineffective at about 38 time units. DFNF can maintain the required coverage
up to 43 time units. It tries to replace the failed node with inactive neighbours, however
it may not always find the appropriate replacement because of the low network density and
that has an effect on QoC. Although WDFNF uses a better failed node policy than DFNF,
it cannot improve the lifetime significantly because of the very few inactive neighbours to
replace. The result shows that WDFNF only maintains QoC 12 time units more than DFNF.
BFN chooses the inactive node that has the higher probability to cover the hole most. The
effect also reflects in the result where it shows that BFN can maintain QoC for the longest
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Figure 6.11: Quality of Coverage with Time when the Network is Sparse.
period of time, which is about two times more than the base case and DFNF and about 30
simtimes more than WDFNF.
Figure 6.12 shows QoC of various node replacement policies at medium network density.
The average number of inactive neighbours was set to 5 in this experiment. The No Replace-
ment policy understandably had the same lifetime as it showed in Figure 6.11. DFNF and
WDFNF extend network lifetime by maintaining the coverage threshold up to 180 and 200
time units respectively. With the increase of inactive neighbours, the probability of finding
better replacement nodes is also increased. BFN, due to its superior replacement policy, still
outperforms others and has a lifetime of about 250 time units. This is about 25% more than
WDFNF and about 40% more than DFNF.
Figure 6.13 shows QoC of replacement policies when the average number of redundant
neighbours for each active node is 10. Since the number of inactive nodes increases, DFNF
and WDFNF have more inactive neighbours to select a failure replacement node. Both poli-
cies narrowed the lifetime gaps with BFN from sparse and medium dense network conditions.
In this case, DFNF differs by 20% from BFN and by 5% from WDFNF which maintains QoC
up to about 350 time units but still about 15% less than BFN.
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Figure 6.13: Quality of Coverage with Time when the Network is Dense.
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Figure 6.14: Quality of Coverage with Time when the Network is Extremely Dense.
When the number of inactive nodes per transmission range was set to 20 per transmission
range, the quality of coverage provided by each failed node replacement policies is shown
in Figure 6.14. The average number of inactive nodes per transmission range is also the
average number of inactive neighbours per node. Each node has sufficient number of inactive
neighbours to properly repair coverage holes created at its neighbouring region. The effect is
also visible in the figure for DFNF and WDFNF. Both techniques can maintain QoC as long
as BFN. The result shows that, except for the No Replacement policy, lifetimes of all policies
almost converge at 830 simtimes. Nodes were static and were failing at a regular interval.
Although replacement policies tried to replace failed nodes, result shows that the maximum
lifetime of the simulated network was about 830 simtimes.
6.6 Discussion of the Result
In this chapter, three failed node replacement policies are given to repair holes using re-
dundant but deactivated nodes. The aim of those policies is to extend network lifetime by
maximum utilisation of limited resources including redundant node deployment. In the first
policy, called Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF), distances of inactive neighbours to the
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Table 6.3: Comparison of Failed Node Replacement Policies - When the Network is Sparse
Policies Lifetime Redundant Energy Time
Node Usage Overhead Overhead
No Replacement 34 0% NA NA
DFNF 51 30% 14 12
WDFNF 55 55% 13 14
BFN 87 100% 21 16
Table 6.4: Comparison of Failed Node Replacement Policies - When the Network is Medium
Dense
Policies Lifetime Redundant Energy Time
Node Usage Overhead Overhead
No Replacement 34 0% NA NA
DFNF 172 70% 10 6
WDFNF 205 75% 7 11
BFN 265 90% 21 17
hole direction is used to replace a failed node. However, this policy may not find the most
appropriate replacement node, especially at low network density. In Weighted Directed Fur-
thest Node First (WDFNF), a method using distance and direction of inactive nodes is given
to find better failed node replacements where complexity is higher compared to DFNF. Fi-
nally, a policy, called Best Fit Node (BFN), is proposed where all the inactive neighbours of a
failed node are considered to find the appropriate replacement with a higher energy and time
overhead. Extensive simulation was performed to assess their performances using network
lifetime, redundant node usage and computational overhead. The results are summarised in
Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
Network lifetime was redefined according to the effectiveness of the network. It was as-
sumed that a network is effective up to the time when it is still able to cover at least 70%
of the sensor field [Parikh et al., 2006]. Summary Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show that
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Failed Node Replacement Policies - When the Network is Dense
Policies Lifetime Redundant Energy Time
Node Usage Overhead Overhead
No Replacement 34 0% NA NA
DFNF 355 75% 8 5
WDFNF 365 75% 5 9
BFN 405 80% 21 18
BFN maintains the coverage threshold longer than any other techniques in all network con-
ditions due to a more accurate failed node replacement technique than others. When all the
neighbours of a failed node participate in the replacement process, appropriate replacements
among the potential inactive nodes are found. In DFNF and WDFNF, the node to first
identify a failed node replaces the failed node using its inactive neighbours. The node may
not find the appropriate replacement because only one hole boundary node involves in the re-
placement process. There is a possibility that the replacement node may be able to partially
cover the hole. In this scenario, other hole boundary nodes that are still experiencing a hole,
try to repair it with their inactive neighbour set. The experiment showed that, when there
was sufficient number of inactive neighbours per active node, both techniques significantly
improved their network lifetimes. For example, Table 6.6 shows that the network lifetimes of
DFNF and WDFNF are similar to that of a BFN network when the network was extremely
dense.
Failed node replacement policies reused redundant deployed nodes to replace a failed
node. The simulation results showed that better utilisation of the redundant nodes resulted
in a better network lifetime for BFN compared to other policies. When each of the live
nodes had sufficient number of inactive neighbours, WDFNF and DFNF were able to find
appropriate replacements, and that increased the redundant node usage (Tables 6.6).
Any network protocols designed for sensor networks should be energy and time efficient.
The analytical study showed that, in the best case, the energy overhead for DFNF and
WDFNF is linearly proportional to the average number of active neighbours per node. Both
the policies perform fixed instructions to replace a failed node so the time overhead is constant
in this case. In contrast, BFN tries to find a replacement node by collecting information from
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Table 6.6: Comparison of Failed Node Replacement Policies - When the Network is Extremely
Dense
Policies Lifetime Redundant Energy Time
Node Usage Overhead Overhead
No Replacement 34 0% NA NA
DFNF 830 82% 8 4
WDFNF 829 82% 5 7
BFN 831 82% 21 18
all the active hole boundary nodes. In the best case, appropriate replacement node is found
with the energy overhead in the quadratic order of the number of active neighbours. The time
complexity for BFN is linearly proportionate to the number of active neighbours. In the worst
case, the energy and time overheads for BFN increases in the cubic and in the quadratic order
of the number of active neighbours respectively. In this case, energy overhead for WDFNF
and DFNF is proportional to the square of the number of active neighbours per node. The
time complexity for those policies is linearly proportional to the number of active neighbours
per node.
The simulation results conform to the analytical outcomes. Table 6.3 shows that the time
and energy overhead for all three cases are close to each other when the network was sparse.
At low inactive node density, DFNF and WDFNF could not find a proper replacement at
the first try, so multiple hole boundary nodes reactivated their inactive neighbours to cover
the same hole. This increases the time and energy overhead. The result shows that with
the increase of the number of inactive neighbours, the relative time and energy overheads for
those techniques decreased and stabilised at a minimum value. The differences of time and
energy overheads between BFN and other two techniques were noticeable at high inactive
node density.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the problem of failed node replacement to maximise network opera-
tional lifetime. The replacement process is considered as repairing the coverage hole created
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by a failed node. Whenever a hole is created, hole boundary nodes and edges are identified.
Using that information, the hole is repaired by reinstating already deployed but redundant
nodes. Three failed node replacement policies have been proposed. Directed Furthest Node
First (DFNF) is the simplest policy, as the failed node identifier replaces that by its inactive
neighbours based on distances toward the hole direction. Weighted Directed Furthest Node
First (WDFNF) is an extension of DFNF where the direction and distance both are used to
select a replacement node. In the Best Fit Node (BFN) policy, all the active neighbours of a
failed node participate in the decision process to identify the appropriate replacement node.
Analytical and simulation studies showed that there is a trade-off between energy effi-
ciency and finding the appropriate replacement node. Analytical results showed that DFNF
and WDFNF have energy overhead linearly proportionate to the number of active neighbours
while BFN has energy overhead in the cubic order of the number of active neighbours in the
worst case. The simulation of those policies showed that BFN maintained the network qual-
ity of coverage for a longer period of time than other policies when the network was sparse.
DFNF performed badly among the three policies at low inactive node density but was able
to match with others when the network was extremely dense. WDFNF perhaps is the best
policy to replace failed nodes in sensor networks because it had energy and time overhead
close to DFNF and network lifetime same as BFN when the network was dense or extremely
dense.
This research only considers sensors which are static however, sensors with mobility may
also be available in near future. Policies to replace failed nodes using mobile sensors can be
investigated further.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Research Aim and Achievements
This thesis has investigated sensor node organisation techniques for maximising the lifetime
of sensor networks. The issues related to network formation, such as energy balancing,
redundant nodes, node failure and failed node replacement have been addressed. Some of
these issues have been studied in the context of node energy efficiency, however a sensor
network needs to consider more than the energy consumption of individual nodes in order
to remain effective for a longer period of time. This is because any energy remaining in a
live node after the network has failed is wasted energy. The research goal was set to form
a network where limited resources, including energy, are considered when organising sensor
nodes. The best utilisation of resources resulted in maximised network lifetime.
In particular, this thesis demonstrated the sensor networking issues and challenges in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 and then addressed those by balancing energy while organising
nodes (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 provided a method to identify redundant nodes and Chapter 5
identified failing nodes in an energy efficient manner. Finally, Chapter 6 gave policies to
replace failed nodes by redundant nodes.
Research achievements that help to extend sensor network operational lifetime are sum-
marised below.
Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC)
A node self-organisation method, called Energy Balanced Clustering (EBC), was proposed
to demonstrate that a balanced network can maximise network lifetime. In EBC, tasks are
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redistributed among high energy nodes to relieve low energy nodes. EBC classifies nodes
based on an energy level threshold - a node having energy reserves above the threshold is
called an Excess Energy Node (EEN), otherwise it is a Necessary Energy Node (NEN). EBC
forms connected clusters of small groups of nodes by selecting cluster heads from EENs.
Neighbours attached to those EENs become cluster members. An EEN leaves the cluster
head task when it becomes a NEN, and thus extends network lifetime by avoiding early
exhaustion.
Network lifetime analytical models developed for various node organisation techniques
demonstrated that the lower bound of an EBC node lifetime is at least 15% higher than
that of existing techniques such as All-Active [Cerpa and Estrin, 2004], LEACH [Heinzelman
et al., 2002] and ASCENT [Cerpa and Estrin, 2002]. Extensive simulation has also been
performed and results showed that network lifetime has a strong relationship with energy
balancing. Compared to existing techniques, EBC extends network lifetime by at least 10%,
while EBC’s standard deviation of residual energy levels is at least 20% lower for various
lifetime definitions.
Self Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC)
Redundant node deployment has an impact on network lifetime because redundant nodes
consume excess energy by performing unnecessary repetitious tasks. A distributed node
redundancy identification method, called Self-Calculated Redundancy Check (SCRC), was
proposed to eliminate redundant tasks. A grid is laid over the field to help each node
to calculate its own redundancy measure by checking the coverage degree of its sensing
region. Before deactivating a potentially redundant node, a coverage and connectivity check
is performed to avoid network holes. This optimises the active node set and minimises
network energy consumption while providing complete network coverage and connectivity.
Analysis showed that the time, message and space complexity of SCRC is linearly propor-
tional to the number of neighbours of a node. An extensive simulation study demonstrated
that, compared to existing redundant node identification techniques, SCRC can identify 5 to
10% more redundant nodes for different node distribution schemes, namely uniformly random
and Poisson distributions.
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Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection (AFSD)
In order to maintain network effectiveness, failed sensor nodes should be detected and re-
placed. A failure detection method, called Asynchronous Failed Sensor node Detection
(AFSD), was proposed to support sensor nodes monitoring neighbours. To lower energy
overhead, AFSD does not perform periodic probing, but nodes compare the numbers of
messages sent to and received from other nodes, and in case of discrepancy node failure is
predicted. The prediction is verified using a consensus mechanism among detectors.
A theoretical study proved that AFSD is complete by detecting all the failed nodes and
is accurate by avoiding false positives. The complexity analysis showed that the control,
energy, and time overhead of AFSD are linearly proportional to the number of neighbours
and gateways within a cluster. An extensive simulation showed that AFSD’s performance is
consistent with the analytical result, and that it is at least three times more energy efficient
than compared methods. It also demonstrated that with high packet generation rate AFSD
can detect failed nodes very fast.
Policies for Replacing Failed Nodes
A new concept, called policy for failed node replacement, was given and three failed node
replacement policies were proposed to improve network operational lifetime by repairing
network holes created by failed nodes. In the Directed Furthest Node First (DFNF) policy,
an active node repairs the hole using one of its deactivated neighbours which is selected based
on neighbour and hole location. Compared to DFNF, Weighted Directed Furthest Node First
(WDFNF) selects better replacements by considering both the distance and direction of an
inactive neighbour. Finally, Best Fit Node (BFN) policy was proposed where all the active
nodes adjacent to the coverage hole participate in the replacement procedure. BFN identifies
the best replacement node in terms of covering the longest part of the hole.
Analytical study of failed node replacement policies showed that the energy and control
overhead of DFNF and WDFNF are constant, while it is in the quadratic order of node
density for BFN in the best case. In the worst case, the overhead increases linearly in the
order of node density for DFNF and WDFNF, while it increases in the cubic order for BFN.
The simulation result showed that DFNF and WDFNF can maintain the same network
lifetime as BFN when network condition was extremely dense.
Future Work 189
7.2 Future Work
In this section, the future research directions in sensor networks are described. Future work
that is specific to the techniques proposed in this thesis is also discussed.
7.2.1 Research Directions in Sensor Networks
With the emergence of Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology, the number
of applications available on sensor networks will continue to grow [Akyildiz et al., 2002].
However, cost constraints and the need for ubiquitous deployments results in small sized
resource-constrained, especially energy limited, sensor nodes. Since these low end nodes are
unattended in the sensor field, their energy reserves are generally irreplaceable. For this
reason, nodes can affect network operational lifetime due to finishing their limited energy
reserves. To prolong the network operational lifetime, energy efficiency must be considered in
almost every aspect of network designing. Energy efficiency is needed not only at the physical
layer (such as low power transceiver, sensing and processing units) and the link layer (for
instance, energy efficient medium access control), but also at the network layer (for example,
energy efficient routing) and higher layers (such as query optimisation). In this thesis, issues
of node organisation have been addressed to form a lifetime maximising network but other
research areas are still open to address. In terms of research directions, the following areas
will require extensive research efforts in the future:
Network Protocol Stack
Unlike the Internet where TCP/IP is the standard transport protocol upon which all the
Internet applications are built, a common protocol stack is yet to be defined for sensor
networks on which most applications can be implemented. Although currently IEEE 802.11
is used, a new protocol architecture is needed to combine energy awareness and promote
cooperative efforts of sensor nodes. It is also likely that not every application will need the
entire protocol stack, hence cross-layer optimisation may be required [Marron et al., 2004;
Sichitiu, 2004].
In the literature, some research efforts can be noticed on these very issues such as time
shared modem architecture [Chien et al., 2001] at physical layer, S-MAC (Sensor Medium
Access Control) [Ye et al., 2002] at data link layer and power aware routing [Singh et al.,
1998; Chang and Tassiulas, 2004] at network layer. Still a combined effort is needed to realise
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a complete protocol stack for sensor networks. In summary, some of the future protocols for
sensor networks can be listed as follows.
• Physical layer : Low power signal modulation schemes for sensor networks.
• Data link layer : Reliable and energy-aware medium access control and error control
techniques for sensor networks.
• Network layer : Energy-efficient and network lifetime maximising routing protocols for
sensor networks.
• Transport layer : Efficient transport protocols such as energy efficient broadcasting for
a resource limited sensor network.
Query and Data Aggregation
Sensors are deployed for the purpose of monitoring and collecting sensory data based on
specific queries. This has been put forward as an essential paradigm for query and data
forwarding in sensor networks [Intanagonwiwat et al., 2000; Krishnamachari et al., 2002].
To minimise the energy consumption, the idea is to combine the data coming from different
sources enroute, eliminating redundancy and minimising the number of transmissions. This
paradigm shifts the focus from the traditional address-centric routing approaches such as find-
ing shortest paths between pairs of addressable end-nodes to a more data-centric approach,
for example, finding routes from multiple sources to a single destination that allows internal
mechanism of eliminating redundant data. This leads to more specific research challenges of
query and data optimisation to extend network lifetime.
7.2.2 Future Work Specific to this Thesis
This section describes future work specific to the implementation and performance analysis
of the techniques proposed in this thesis. Due to time and length constraints, it was not
possible to explore these directions in this thesis. Instead, they are described briefly below.
In this research, the performance analyses of all the proposed techniques are based on
static sensors. On the other hand, if node mobility is allowed, network re-organisation will
actually lead to higher overheads compared to the All-Active method. To deal with the mobile
sensors, a movement restricted clustering method can be used where cluster heads are not
allowed to move. Another issue to be addressed in future work is the heterogeneity of sensor
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nodes. The scenarios studied in this thesis assumed that all the nodes are identical from
the node architectural point of view. While this assumption is true for many applications, it
does not hold in environments where different sensors are used for sensing different objects.
For example, a weather sensor network sensing moisture and temperature has two types of
nodes with different sensing ranges.
The proposed self-configuring node organisation mechanism extends the node and network
lifetime by balancing energy consumption over the network. In the implementation, it is
assumed that each sensor is randomly sensing and generating data however, to conserve the
node energy, a sensor may be activated only when a particular sensing phenomenon occurred.
For example, when an intruder enters into a restricted area, only a subset of deployed sensors
should sense and forward data. For future work, the effect of target location dependent node
organisation needs to be investigated.
The models developed in this work assume that a network is effective if it can provide
complete coverage and connectivity. The required degree of coverage and connectivity was
set to the minimum for the sake of simplicity. A fault-tolerant and reliable service may
need higher degree of redundancy. Creating a fault-tolerant and reliable node organisation
technique is also our future aim.
Lastly, very little empirical data is currently available for large scale sensor networks.
In fact, very few sensor network applications are implemented so far in real life, and many
potential applications are yet to come. So, in order to perform realistic analysis in this thesis,
sensing query patterns were modelled using either the Poisson or Uniformly random distribu-
tions obtained from past research. However, as the number of sensor networks is increasing,
real traces of sensing query patterns will be available. In future work, real work traces will be
used for the simulations to obtain more realistic and accuracy results. Depending on resource
availability, prototypes of the techniques proposed in this thesis may also be developed to
obtain deeper understanding of their strengths and weaknesses.
7.3 Final Remarks
This thesis has demonstrated that sensor node organisation can maximise the lifetime of a
sensor network. It has been found that by taking into account limited resources, particularly
energy, a sensor network can survive a longer period of time. Technological advancements can
contribute significantly to the improvement of network lifetime, however, these advances are
being made slowly. The increasing requirements of long serving networks will always place a
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heavy demand on energy-aware sensor networks. The node organisation techniques proposed
in this thesis are significant because they address the network lifetime maximisation problem,
and they create a network upon which other issues such as query and data aggregation and
network protocol stacks, can be addressed.
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